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1 
THE LANDMARK THAT WASN’T: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT PLAY IN FIVE ACTS 
Lee Levine* & Stephen Wermiel**‡ 
Abstract: What follows is an original case study of our First Amendment law of free 
expression and how it is created by the Supreme Court. Drawing heavily on heretofore 
unpublished internal papers from the chambers of Justice William Brennan and other 
Justices, this Article reveals how the 1964 landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan was once in serious jeopardy of being overruled. In the course of this discussion, 
and in their examination of the evolution of the Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders (1985), the authors describe and analyze: (1) how and to what extent the 
holdings in Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) came to be reconsidered; (2) how 
the nature of the expression at issue in Greenmoss Builders factored into the examination of 
this defamation case and changed the way the First Amendment limits the common law of 
defamation; (3) how the members of the Burger Court considered the question of the media 
versus non-media status of a defendant in a defamation case; (4) how the Justices grappled 
with the question of the legitimacy under the First Amendment of presumed and punitive 
damages awards in defamation actions; (5) how the issue of the difference between private 
speech and public speech came to take on constitutional significance; (6) whether the Court 
should reconsider the balance it struck in Sullivan between the public’s interest in being fully 
informed about public officials and public affairs and the competing interest of those who 
have been defamed in vindicating their reputation; and (7) how all of this ultimately 
influenced and determined the outcome in Greenmoss Builders. 
In the swirl of this discussion and examination of the historical record, the reader gets a 
rare glimpse of the inner workings of the Court and its clerks along with a better appreciation 
of how consensus is built and lost, replete with occasional barbs. Moreover, this Article 
reveals just how laborious the shaping of First Amendment doctrine can be, given the issues 
(some never fully discussed in published opinions) raised by the Justices in their 
consideration of the Greenmoss Builders case. In these respects and others, this Article 
informs the reader of some of the central (albeit internal) moments in the history of 
defamation law following Sullivan and thereby sheds new light on how the law in this area 
might be shaped in the future. 
  
                                                     
* Partner, Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schulz, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
** Fellow in Law and Government, American University Washington College of Law. The authors 
wish to thank Abby Duggan, Marisa Harrilchak and Matthew Schafer for their invaluable research 
assistance; Jeff Flannery at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, John Jacob, 
archivist of the Lewis Powell Papers at Washington and Lee Law School, and Amy Taylor at the 
American University Washington College of Law Pence Law Library; Adam Liptak for his 
thoughtful comments on a preliminary draft, and Ron Collins, to whom the authors are especially 
indebted for his wise counsel and guidance. 
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[D]ebate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.1 
—Justice William J. Brennan (1964) 
PROLOGUE 
At this time next year, legal scholars, journalists, media lawyers, and 
at least some portion of the generally informed citizenry will 
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 When it was decided in March 
1964, the renowned free speech philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn 
famously declared Justice William J. Brennan’s opinion for the Court to 
be “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”3 In his seminal treatment of 
the case published in 1991, shortly before Justice Brennan resigned from 
the Court on which he had then served for nearly thirty-four years, 
journalist Anthony Lewis hailed Sullivan as effecting “a sea 
change . . . in the law of the First Amendment,” one that has since then 
caused the Supreme Court to give “the amendment’s bold words their 
full meaning.”4 More recently, the Court emphatically reaffirmed its 
allegiance to the theory of free expression that Justice Brennan set out in 
Sullivan, holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper5 that “our ‘profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’”6 makes it “clear” that even “a 
stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”7 
Over the years, however, Sullivan has had its share of detractors as 
well, including not only those who believe they have been harmed by the 
publication of defamatory falsehoods, but also an assortment of 
academics, pundits and judges.8 Most recently, Justice Antonin Scalia 
                                                     
1. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
2. Id. 
3. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Meiklejohn).  
4. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 234 
(1991). 
5. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
6. Id. at 534 (quoting Sullivan). 
7. Id. at 535. 
8. See, e.g., Faxon v. Mich. Republican State Cent. Comm., 624 N.W.2d 509, 523 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2001) (“[The outcome mandated by Sullivan] is not a result of which, to say the least, we are 
enamored. We recognize the value of open, free-wheeling, and ‘robust’ political debate . . . . 
[H]owever, we question the value of arguably false, defamatory, and negative political advertising 
whose purpose is not to defeat an opponent but to demean and destroy that opponent.”); Doe v. 
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singled out Sullivan as the best example he could conjure of 
constitutional law run amok, an illegitimate declaration by Brennan and 
the other “living constitutionalists” sitting on the Warren Court that, 
“[y]es it used to be that . . . George Washington could sue somebody that 
libeled him, but we don’t think that’s a good idea anymore.”9 
Sullivan, of course, was not the Court’s last word on the role of the 
First Amendment in limiting the rights of Presidents and everyone else 
to “sue somebody that libeled” them. In the first decade after it was 
decided, the Court consistently expanded Sullivan’s reach, but this 
process took a decisive turn in 1974 with Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion 
for the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.10 There, Powell sketched out 
a complicated scheme of First Amendment-based limitations on the 
common law of defamation pursuant to which (1) public officials and 
                                                     
Daily News, L.P., 632 N.Y.S.2d 750, 756 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1995) (“The sliding scale approach 
formulated by the Court [in Sullivan] has resulted in the appearance that the First Amendment does 
not apply equally to either speakers or speech of public concern. The text of the First Amendment 
draws no such distinctions, and neither should the Court.”); see also Anthony Lewis, New York 
Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 620 (1983) (“If there can be no test of truth in political 
debate, then there can be no libel actions as a result of anything said in such debate.”); Abner J. 
Mikva, In My Opinion, Those Are Not Facts, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 291, 297 (1995) (noting that “at 
some point [the expansion of Sullivan] might be protecting too much inaccurate and harmful 
reporting”); Rodney A. Smolla, A Defense of the Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, 7 COMM. LAW. 
3, 3 (1989) (arguing that Sullivan had spawned a body of law that “is costly, cumbersome, and fails 
to vindicate either free speech values or the protection of reputation”); Memorandum from Bruce 
Fein, General Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (undated) (John Roberts Files, on file with the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Box 25) (describing Sullivan as “profoundly flawed” and 
supported by “errant reasoning”) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
9. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the 2011 Washington Ideas Forum (Oct. 6, 2011), available 
at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/scalia-our-political-system-is-designed-for-
gridlock/246257/. 
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court’s holding in Sullivan itself was limited to defamation actions 
instituted by public officials; to recover damages in a civil defamation action, such plaintiffs were 
obliged to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant published a defamatory 
falsehood about them with “actual malice.” As Professor Harry Kalven presciently noted, however, 
Sullivan had a “generous sweep” that would invite courts “to follow a dialectic progression from 
[discussion about] public official[s] to government policy to public policy to matters in the public 
domain.” Kalven, supra note 3, at 209, 221; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and 
the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267. Specifically, three years 
after Sullivan, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court held that 
defamation actions instituted by “public figures”—i.e., a then ill-defined class of noteworthy 
persons who did not hold public office—were also governed by the Sullivan actual malice standard. 
Id. at 163–65 (Warren, C.J., concurring). And, four years after Butts, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, determined the 
“actual malice” requirement articulated in Sullivan should extend “to all discussion and 
communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the 
persons involved are famous or anonymous.” Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis 
added). 
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public figures could not sue successfully unless the defendant had 
published a defamatory falsehood about them with “actual malice”—i.e., 
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth; (2) other 
defamation plaintiffs could not prevail unless the defendant could be 
shown to have published the falsehood with some degree of fault (to be 
set as a matter of state law); and (3) no defamation plaintiff could 
recover presumed or punitive damages without proving “actual 
malice.”11 
Unlike Sullivan, in which the Court was unanimous in its result and 
no Justice contended that the First Amendment demanded less than 
Brennan’s opinion required,12 the Court in Gertz was badly divided. 
Only four other Justices joined Powell’s opinion, which was attacked in 
separate opinions by Brennan and by Justice Byron White—the former 
contending that the “actual malice” standard should apply in all cases 
(regardless of the status of the plaintiff) in which the publication at issue 
addressed a matter of public concern; the latter asserting that the First 
Amendment-based rights articulated in Sullivan should not extend 
beyond cases brought by public officials and public figures at all.13 
                                                     
11. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974) (“‘The constitutional guarantees 
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made 
with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.’”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)); id. 
at 336–37 (“The Court extended the constitutional privilege announced in [Sullivan] to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic persons who ‘are nevertheless intimately involved in the 
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of 
concern to society at large.’”) (quoting Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)); id. at 
347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory 
falsehood injurious to a private individual.”); id. at 349 (“[W]e hold that the States may not permit 
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.”); see also Joel D. Eaton, The American 
Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. 
L. REV. 1349 (1975); Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Making of Modern Libel Law: A 
Glimpse Behind the Scenes, 29 COMM. LAW. 1 (2012). 
12. Although the Court was unanimous in its result in Sullivan, Justices Black, Goldberg, and 
Douglas each concurred, arguing that the Court should have gone further and held all defamation 
actions brought by public officials violative of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
297 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., joining, concurring) (“I regret that the Court has stopped short of 
[finding an absolute privilege to criticize public officials as] indispensable to preserve our free press 
from destruction.”); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., with Douglas, J., joining, concurring) (“The impressive 
array of history and precedent marshaled by the Court . . . confirms my belief that the Constitution 
affords greater protection than that provided by the Court’s standard to citizen and press in 
exercising the right of public criticism.”). 
13. Justice Powell’s opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Stewart, and Blackmun. Justice 
White’s dissenting opinion was premised on his strongly stated view that “[r]ecovery under 
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All of the foregoing is common knowledge; it is the stuff of law 
school curricula and literally thousands of legal briefs filed in litigated 
cases. What is not generally known is that a decade after Gertz, and 
twenty years after Sullivan, the Court grappled with another defamation 
case that raised fundamental questions about the ongoing efficacy of 
Sullivan itself, about the reach of the First Amendment, and about the 
contours of the so-called “constitutional” law of defamation. Indeed, as 
the voluminous unpublished papers compiled on the case by Justices 
Brennan, Powell, and White reveal, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.14 promised to be the Court’s most important 
decision in the field since Gertz. That it ultimately was not is itself 
significant, especially when considered against the backdrop of the 
considerable internal debate and exchange of substantive views about 
the very viability of Sullivan that it engendered. And, at least for 
Brennan, Powell, and White—Justices who espoused very different 
conceptions of the role of the First Amendment in defamation matters—
Greenmoss Builders presented an opportunity both to debate the merits 
of Sullivan and to address (at least within the Court) what the Justices 
had, for better and worse, accomplished in Gertz. 
When it was decided in 1985, Greenmoss Builders yielded no 
majority opinion and therefore made no new law, at least as a technical 
matter. Like Gertz, however, it featured separate opinions by Justices 
                                                     
common-law standards for defamatory falsehoods about a private individual, who enjoys no 
‘general fame or notoriety in the community,’ who is not ‘pervasive(ly) involve(d) in the affairs of 
society,’ and who does not ‘thrust himself into the vortex of (a given) public issue . . . in an attempt 
to influence its outcome,’ is simply not forbidden by the First Amendment.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 399 
(White, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal footnote omitted). Conversely, Justice 
Brennan’s dissent advocated the rule that had been adopted by the plurality for which he wrote in 
Rosenbloom. See id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I adhere to my view expressed in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. . . . that we strike the proper accommodation between avoidance of 
media self-censorship and protection of individual reputations only when we require States to apply 
the . . . knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard in civil libel actions concerning media reports of the 
involvement of private individuals in events of public or general interest.”). Justice Douglas 
continued to espouse his—and Justice Black’s—belief that “[s]tates are without power ‘to use a 
civil libel law or any other law to impose damages for merely discussing public affairs.’” Id. at 357 
(Black, J., concurring) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295). Chief Justice Burger also dissented, 
asserting that, with respect to plaintiffs that were neither public officials nor public figures, he 
“would prefer to allow this area of law to continue to evolve as it has up to now . . . rather than 
embark on a new doctrinal theory which has no jurisprudential ancestry.” Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). See also id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“If my vote were not needed to create a 
majority, I would adhere to my prior view [in support of Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in 
Rosenbloom].”); Levine & Wermiel, supra note 11, at 41 (noting that “[f]rom the outset, Powell 
[was] determined to remake substantially the constitutional balance that Brennan had struck in 
Sullivan and in the decade of decisions that followed it.”). 
14. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
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Powell, Brennan, and White, in which each Justice offered his own 
perspective.15 Those views are by now well known. What has not 
previously been understood is the drama (personal and professional) that 
preceded those opinions and what it reveals both about how the Court 
formulates constitutional doctrine and the body of First Amendment law 
it created in Sullivan and Gertz. 
Greenmoss Builders consumed the Court’s attention for two full 
years, from the beginning of the October 1983 Term, when it first 
considered the petition for certiorari filed in the case, through the last 
day of the October 1984 Term, when the decision was finally 
announced. As a result, the Justices left behind one of the most detailed 
records of the Supreme Court’s internal deliberations on a single case in 
recent memory, certainly in a case involving the competing interests of 
free expression and protecting individual reputation. The record tells a 
tale that at times resembles the maneuverings of battlefield commanders, 
in this case seeking strategic advantage in a constitutional war of ideas 
while simultaneously defending against the salvos of their ideological 
adversaries. At bottom, however, this is a story of an internal struggle 
for the very survival of Gertz and Sullivan, in which the three central 
characters—Justices Brennan, Powell, and White—advocated 
profoundly different visions of the role of a free press in a democracy 
and of the proper responsibility of government to place limits on that 
freedom. We present it here as a constitutional play in five Acts. 
I.  ACT I—THE DRAMA BEGINS 
Greenmoss Builders was not an obvious candidate for the articulation 
of fundamental First Amendment principles. It did not, like Sullivan, 
spring from a raging public controversy over civil rights or even from a 
publication addressing any public issue at all. Rather, it arose from a 
credit report issued to its paid subscribers by Dun & Bradstreet, which 
falsely informed them that the plaintiff company had filed for 
bankruptcy. The Vermont Supreme Court had ruled for the plaintiff, 
concluding that the constitutional limitations on the reach of the 
common law of defamation set out in Gertz did not apply in an action 
brought against a nonmedia defendant such as Dun & Bradstreet and 
that, as a result, the plaintiff should not only prevail, but recover both 
presumed and punitive damages without a showing of either fault or 
                                                     
15. See id. at 751 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 765 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id. 
at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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actual injury.16 
Initially, Brennan assumed that Greenmoss Builders would be a 
simple case. As framed by the Vermont Supreme Court and the petition 
for certiorari, the case squarely raised only one issue: whether the First 
Amendment protections identified in Gertz applied to nonmedia 
defendants.17 The only Justice who had ever indicated that the First 
Amendment applied more robustly to media (as opposed to nonmedia) 
speakers was Potter Stewart,18 who retired from the Court before 
                                                     
16. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. was a rating company that issued credit reports on private 
companies. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 416 (Vt. 1983), 
aff’d, 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Greenmoss Builders, Inc. was a construction company about which Dun 
& Bradstreet had gathered and thereafter distributed information to a limited number of paid 
subscribers. Id. at 415–16. Dun & Bradstreet’s reports were “based on information solicited from 
the business itself, the business’ banking and credit sources, from trade suppliers, and from public 
records.” Id. at 416. Based on a part-time employee’s misreading of such public records, which Dun 
& Bradstreet did not further review (in contravention of its own policies), the report at issue falsely 
stated that Greenmoss Builders had filed for bankruptcy. Id. Dun & Bradstreet later corrected the 
error but refused to disclose to Greenmoss Builders which five subscribers had received the initial, 
erroneous report. Id. Unsatisfied with both the correction and with Dun & Bradstreet’s refusal to 
provide its subscriber list, Greenmoss Builders instituted a defamation action in the state courts of 
Vermont. Id. at 417. 
  In the Vermont courts, Greenmoss Builders argued that the false report had “damaged [its] 
business reputation, [and had caused a] loss of company profits, and . . . of money expended to 
correct the error.” Id. at 415. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Greenmoss Builders, awarding it 
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages, but the trial judge granted 
Dun & Bradstreet’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the jury instructions inaccurately 
reflected portions of the Supreme Court’s holding in Gertz. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. 323). On 
interlocutory appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed what it described as the “critical issue” 
of “whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . require that the qualified protections afforded 
the media in ‘private’ defamation actions, as set forth in Gertz, be extended to actions involving 
nonmedia defendants.” Id. at 417. Asserting that “[t]here is a clear distinction between a publication 
which disseminates news for public consumption and one [like Dun & Bradstreet] which provides 
specialized information to a selective, finite audience,” the court concluded that “[t]here is no threat 
to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful 
dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of 
self-censorship by the press” in the latter circumstance that warrants constitutional protection. Id. at 
417–18 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment-based standards articulated in Gertz were inapplicable and affirmed the jury’s awards 
of both compensatory and punitive damages on that basis under the otherwise controlling common 
law. See id. at 419–20.  
17. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont, Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 416 (Vt. 1983) (No. 83-18), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 1118. 
18. Those views were first articulated in a highly publicized speech at Yale Law School, in which 
Stewart argued that the First Amendment’s press clause was designed to extend separate and more 
substantial protections to the media than to other speakers. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 455, 533 (1983) (“Freedom of the press—not freedom of speech—was the primary concern 
of the generation that wrote the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of 
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Greenmoss Builders and was replaced by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. 
That debate had already played itself out in academia and in a number of 
non-defamation cases (most notably the Court’s 1978 decision in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti19), with Justices at both ends of the 
                                                     
Rights. Freedom of speech was a late addition to the pantheon of rights; freedom of the press 
occupied a central position from the very beginning.”); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press 
Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 933 (1992) (“Whether or not we believe 
that press freedom ranked at the very pinnacle of constitutional values, it surely was of great 
importance, and the First Amendment was designed to protect the freedom of the press by putting, 
in Jefferson’s words, a ‘legal check . . . into the hands of the judiciary.’”) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
1788–1789 659 (1958)); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy 
Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007) (noting that the First 
Amendment’s language suggests that the press deserves special First Amendment protections); 
Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to 
Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 658 (1975) (“[F]reedom of the press as a right 
recognizably distinct from that of freedom of speech is an idea whose time is past due.”). But see 
David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 118 (1975) (“I submit that the 
goal of first amendment theory should be to equate and reconcile the interests of speech and press, 
rather than to separate them.”).  
19. 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978) (“[T]he press does not have a monopoly on either the First 
Amendment or the ability to enlighten.”); id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Because the First 
Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no 
difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and 
those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide 
dissemination.”); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding that “[t]he 
media have no special right of access to [prisons] different from or greater than that accorded the 
public generally”); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (“The First 
Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the 
general public.”); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (“Newsmen have no 
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded to the general public.”) 
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)); id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The 
guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citizen; they do not create 
special privileges for particular groups or individuals.”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974) 
(“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional 
right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”) (quoting Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)); Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969) 
(“Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some.”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 
(1965) (“[A] reporter’s constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the 
public.”); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937) (“The publisher of a newspaper 
has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade 
the rights and liberties of others.”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735 (1931) 
(“Story defined freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment to mean that ‘every man 
shall be at liberty to publish what is true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.’”) (quoting 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1880 (5th ed. 
1891)); see also Lee Levine, Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 
87 YALE L.J. 1723, 1723–24 n.6 (1978) (noting that the history of the press clause and the evolving 
nature of the press as an institution, among other things, militates against conclusion that the First 
Amendment protects institutional press more than any other citizen); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for 
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 459, 465 (2012) (concluding that “any calls for specially protecting the press-as-industry 
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Court’s ideological spectrum (including Brennan) rejecting the idea that 
the First Amendment protects media speech most robustly. 
In an unpublished narrative “Term History” that Brennan had his law 
clerks prepare annually for his own reference, the account of Greenmoss 
Builders for the Court’s October 1984 Term asserts that Brennan 
expected it to be an “easy” case but that, for a number of reasons, it 
turned out to be more “complicated.”20 For one thing, Dun & Bradstreet 
itself proved to be arguably less popular with the Justices than the 
gallery of media defendants that had come before them in previous 
defamation cases (less popular even than pornographer Larry Flynt and 
the John Birch Society, not to mention Time Magazine and the New York 
Times).21 The way Brennan explained it, “[m]any of the Justices had had 
personal experience in private practice with Dun & Bradstreet and were 
not especially enamored of what they thought of as a large, often 
irresponsible, company that could easily ruin small businesses.”22 In 
addition, a number of Justices expressed concern that a reversal would 
place in doubt the constitutionality of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
which regulated the dissemination of credit-related information by 
entities such as Dun & Bradstreet.23 
Most importantly, as Brennan noted, the deliberations in Greenmoss 
Builders revealed deep “hostility” within the Court “to the New York 
                                                     
have to look to sources other than text, original meaning, tradition, and precedent for support”). 
Justice Brennan, specifically, consistently recognized no distinction between media and nonmedia 
for the purposes of First Amendment protection. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 
43 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (“Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale 
magazine distributor or a ‘private’ businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in 
ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue.”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (“We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is 
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press 
that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct.”). 
20. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories LXXXII (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
21. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988) (involving Hustler magazine 
published by Larry Flynt); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) (involving a 
magazine published by the John Birch Society); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 282 (1971) 
(involving an article in Time magazine); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257 (involving an advertisement 
published in the New York Times). 
22. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXII. 
23. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (1982). Originally passed by Congress in 
1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act was intended to give consumers better access to credit 
information about themselves and created a cause of action against credit agencies for failing to 
follow reasonable procedures to report accurate information. The Justices may have worried that a 
ruling in favor of Dun & Bradstreet would undermine enforcement of the federal law by affording 
additional, First Amendment-based protection to credit reporting agencies. 
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Times v. Sullivan line of cases generally and to Gertz in particular.”24 As 
a result, the case was “fiercely fought out”25 in a manner largely unseen 
by the public, but nevertheless of substantial significance to an informed 
appreciation of the Court’s defamation jurisprudence. 
A.  The Protagonists 
The protagonists in the drama revealed themselves early on. When the 
petition for certiorari in Greenmoss Builders was first discussed in 
Conference in early October 1983, only Justices Brennan, White and 
Powell expressed serious interest in it.26 Thereafter, both White and 
Powell had it relisted several times,27 suggesting that each was mulling 
over what to do with the case. 
In Powell’s chambers, the case received significant attention from the 
outset. Although he asked to have the case relisted, Powell noted to 
himself in late September that the Court should “still deny”28 the petition 
because, since the jury had been instructed that the standards articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Gertz applied to the credit reporting agency, 
and had found for the plaintiff in any event, the case did not “squarely” 
present the constitutional issue of Gertz’s application to nonmedia 
defendants set forth in the petition for certiorari.29 Still, in the 
                                                     
24. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXII. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at LXXXII–LXXXIII. 
27. Id. at LXXXIII. Under longstanding Supreme Court procedures, four votes are required for a 
petition to be granted and scheduled for argument and decision. When the Dun & Bradstreet 
petition came to the Court in the summer of 1983, six of the nine Justices participated in a “cert. 
pool” in which each petition was read and summarized by one law clerk, assigned on a rotating 
basis, and the resulting memorandum was shared among all six chambers. At the time, only Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens did not participate in the cert. pool and Brennan screened the 
petitions himself, except when his law clerks reviewed cases in the summer (which is when the Dun 
& Bradstreet case came to the Court). When the petition and brief in opposition are filed, a case is 
scheduled for review at the Court’s conference. Any Justice can ask that a case be discussed, and 
any Justice can ask that the case be held over (relisted) for a subsequent conference. These 
procedures are still followed today, although now all Justices except Samuel Alito participate in the 
cert. pool. For a discussion of the current workings of the cert. pool and its history, see Adam 
Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2008, at A21.  
28. Justice Powell, Docket Sheet (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Sept. 26, 
1983) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington 
and Lee Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
29. More specifically, Greenmoss Builders argued that “the applicability of Gertz to nonmedia 
defendants [was] not squarely before the Court because the Vermont Supreme Court found that the 
jury instructions satisfied the Gertz standard.” See Preliminary Memorandum from Justice Powell to 
the Cert. Pool 5 (Sept. 26, 1983) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the 
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preliminary memorandum prepared for the cert. pool (serving six of the 
nine Justices), a law clerk advised the Justices that, in essence, the 
Vermont Supreme Court had gotten it right—i.e., “[o]n its face, Gertz 
does not apply to a non-media defendant, and this Court has never so 
extended it.”30 In the margins of his copy of that memorandum, Powell 
sketched out by hand what appeared to be his conflicting views about the 
issue. He noted that Gertz was “concerned [with the] tension [between 
the] ‘need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate 
[interest] in redressing wrongful injury,’”31 adding both that the Court 
“must consider [the] state interest in protecting/compensating private 
persons subject to defamation” and the “uncontrolled discretion of juries 
to award damages where no actual loss unnecessarily inhibits [First 
Amendment] freedoms.”32 Thus, he wrote that, although the “doctrine of 
presumed damages [is] bad,” the Court should “only interfere [with 
state] law on damages where that law implicates [First Amendment] 
concerns.”33 Ultimately, Powell concluded, the question before him was 
“does [the] commercial speech at issue here warrant intruding in state 
law?”34 
By the time the Greenmoss Builders case arrived at the Court, Byron 
White had come to harbor serious reservations about the Court’s 
development, following Sullivan, of a constitutional law of defamation.35 
                                                     
Powell Archives, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. Thus, “[u]nless the Court wishe[d] to 
overturn that conclusion, the holding that Gertz does not apply is really only dicta.” Id.  
30. Id. at 6. 




35. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 421–23 (1998) (noting that, by the time Greenmoss Builders came before 
the Court, Justice White “regretted joining New York Times v. Sullivan”); see also Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 398–99 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (“I continue to subscribe to the 
New York Times decision and those decisions extending its protection to defamatory falsehoods 
about public persons. My quarrel with the Court stems from its willingness ‘to sacrifice good sense 
to a syllogism’—to find in the New York Times doctrine an infinite elasticity.”) (footnote omitted); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (noting that he was 
in the minority in his view that Sullivan should not be expanded beyond its current borders); Ocala 
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (“Inevitably, 
[Sullivan], by imposing on libel and slander plaintiffs the burden of showing knowing or reckless 
falsehood in specified situations will result in extending constitutional protection to lies and 
falsehoods which, though neither knowing nor reckless, do severe damage to personal reputation.”); 
Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 22 (1970) (White, J., concurring) (cautioning 
against extending Sullivan). 
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Those reservations become apparent in an October 13, 1983 dissent that 
White circulated from what then appeared to be a denial of certiorari in 
the Greenmoss case. In that never-issued dissent, White argued that the 
issue “whether the First Amendment actual malice standard applies in a 
defamation action brought by a private plaintiff against a non-media 
defendant” was both “important and unsettled” and therefore “deserves 
our attention.”36 White correctly acknowledged that the Court had 
“several times, without discussion, applied New York Times in cases 
involving public figure plaintiffs and nonmedia defendants,”37 
specifically citing Garrison v. Louisiana38 and Henry v. Collins,39 and 
noted that “New York Times was decided along with Abernathy v. 
Sullivan,40 which involved four individual petitioners to whom the same 
standards were applied as to the newspaper.”41 However, he also 
observed that, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,42 the Court asserted that it had 
“‘never decided’ whether New York Times extends to nonmedia 
defendants, thus indicating that the question remains open.”43 
In addition, White contended that Greenmoss Builders raised what he 
described as the “related question” of Gertz’s applicability “in a case 
involving a private plaintiff and a nonmedia defendant.”44 In White’s 
view, these issues are “especially appropriate for consideration by this 
Court because of [their] implications for First Amendment jurisprudence 
as a whole.”45 And, White, citing Chief Justice Burger’s concurring 
opinion in Bellotti,46 wrote, “this issue intersects with another difficult 
issue: the extent to which the institutional press perhaps enjoys unique 
privileges [under the First Amendment].”47 
                                                     
36. Justice White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Petition for Certiorari One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Oct. 13, 1983) (on file with the White Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
37. Id. at 3. 
38. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
39. 380 U.S. 356 (1965). 
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
41. Justice White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Petition for Certiorari One, supra note 36, at 3. 
Abernathy v. Sullivan, a separate defamation action that Sullivan had instituted against civil rights 
leader, Rev. Ralph David Abernathy and three other individual, nonmedia defendants, was 
consolidated in the Supreme Court with the New York Times case. 
42. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
43. Justice White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Petition for Certiorari One, supra note 36, at 3 
(quoting Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133 n.16). 
44. Id. at 4. 
45. Id. at 5. 
46. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978)). 
47. Id. 
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Brennan, as noted, believed that Greenmoss Builders was an “easy” 
case and should be disposed of on the simple ground that the 
constitutional rules set out in Sullivan and Gertz protected all defamation 
defendants, not just those affiliated with the media.48 Accordingly, he 
arrived at each of the Court’s conferences in the fall of 1983 prepared to 
vote to grant the petition and, thereafter, to reverse the decision of the 
Vermont Supreme Court.49 
By the end of October, Chief Justice Warren Burger had joined White 
and Brennan in voting to grant the petition.50 When the Chief Justice 
circulated a memorandum indicating that White’s draft opinion had led 
him “to give a reluctant ‘grant,’”51 Powell wrote in the margin of his 
copy that he was “still inclined to deny.”52 Nevertheless, Powell had the 
case relisted again and, on November 4, 1983, voted to grant as well.53 
His handwritten notes indicate that Justice Thurgood Marshall was also 
prepared to grant “if I do.”54 Powell wrote to himself that he had “again 
looked at this,”55 and although “we may have to rely on arguably dicta to 
reach [the] Gertz issue,”56 the Court “probably . . . could,” especially “in 
view of [the] importance of [the] underlying [question] whether Gertz 
applies to non-media [defendants].”57 In the end, five Justices voted to 
grant the petition.58 
B.  The Argument 
Prior to the argument, which was scheduled for March 21, 1984, 
Powell received a bench memorandum from his law clerk, which he 
                                                     
48. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXII. 
49. Id. at LXXXII–LXXXIII. 
50. Id. at LXXXIII. 
51. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference (Oct. 21, 1983) (with handwritten 
notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
52. Id.  
53. Justice Powell, Docket Sheet (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Nov. 4, 
1983) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington 
and Lee Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
54. Justice Powell, Docket Sheet (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Oct. 28, 
1983) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington 
and Lee Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
55. Id.  
56. Id.  
57. Id.  
58. Justice Powell, Docket Sheet, supra note 53 (The five Justices that voted to grant certiorari 
were Chief Justice Burger along with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell.). 
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described as “excellent.”59 The clerk recommended, as Powell described 
it in his own handwritten notes, that the Court “extend Gertz’s 
requirement of a malice showing to allow recovery of ‘presumed’ or 
‘punitive’ damages in a libel suit by a private plaintiff vs a private (non-
media) defendant,” but that “no malice [be] required to recover actual 
damages.”60 According to the clerk, this result followed from what 
Powell had himself written in Bellotti—i.e., that the “press does not have 
a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the capacity to 
enlighten.”61 In his notes, however, Powell observed that, while “this is 
true . . . it doesn’t necessarily follow that, absent malice, only ‘actual’ 
damages may be recovered vs a non-media defendant.”62 
Powell’s extensive handwritten notes of the argument itself appear 
intended to document the views of his colleagues. He noted that 
O’Connor had asked whether, “if D&B’s position is accepted (that is all 
speakers have First Amendment rights) it would extend to Securities 
Acts, including § 10(b)?”63 When counsel for Greenmoss Builders 
                                                     
59. Bench Memorandum from Cammie R. Robinson for Justice Powell 1 (Mar. 17, 1984) (with 
handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Archives, Washington and Lee Law 
Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
60. Id. The Court in Gertz had held that, although state law may not impose strict liability on 
defendants who libeled a private figure, beyond that states were free to award damages for “actual 
injury” sustained by such plaintiffs. 418 U.S. at 347–48. By the same token, the Court held that the 
common law could not provide for the recovery of presumed or punitive damages absent a showing 
of actual malice. Id. at 349. Accordingly, the clerk’s suggestion would have extended these aspects 
of the holding in Gertz, to the extent it was properly construed otherwise, to cases involving 
nonmedia defendants. 
61. Bench Memorandum from Cammie R. Robinson for Justice Powell, supra note 59, at 7 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978)). 
62. Id. at 1.  
63. The transcript of the oral argument roughly confirms Powell’s notes. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 10–11, Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (No. 
83-18), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_18. Although transcripts 
in the 1980s did not identify the Justices by name, the OYEZ website recording of the argument 
makes it clear that the questioner was Justice O’Connor. According to the transcript, the following 
exchange took place between a Justice and Gordon Garrett representing Dun & Bradstreet: 
QUESTION: There are federal laws in the securities fields, such as Section 10(b)(5), that 
govern statements that are made in connection with the sale of securities. Do you think there’s 
a First Amendment right for people who are publishing information about securities that has to 
be considered every time we have a 10(b)(5) action? 
MR. GARRETT: Your Honor, I think that would require a different analysis than we have in 
the defamation area. As I understand the question, we would be talking about individuals 
publishing matters who are subject to the control of the SEC, as being licensed, perhaps. 
I think that in restraining those types of publications there is a much different focus. In those 
cases, I believe the Court is focusing on the recipient of the report rather than the individual 
identified in the report in defamation cases. And I think — 
QUESTION: Well, but you’re asking us to recognize a First Amendment right here in 
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asserted that the case involved commercial speech, the argument turned 
to a discussion of the Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.64 In Greenmoss Builders, a 
holding that the credit report at issue constituted commercial speech 
would have yielded the conclusion, under the Central Hudson test, that it 
was not protected by the First Amendment at all because it was false. As 
Powell noted, White “said if respondent is right about commercial 
speech, petitioner has conceded falsity—flunking the first test of Central 
                                                     
connection with the Dun & Bradstreet type of publication, and I’m just wondering if that 
wouldn’t lead us to having to recognize First Amendment rights in a 10(b)(5) situation or an 
ordinary fraud situation, anything? 
MR. GARRETT: I do not believe so, Your Honor, because what we are talking here about is 
the sole issue of speech in context of defamation, not speech in the context of giving advisor’s 
advice to the SEC. And as I indicated, I believe a totally different analysis would apply there. 
What we are asking the Court to recognize is that the First Amendment protects all speakers 
against these types of awards, and we do not believe that the state interest varies in securing 
gratuitous awards of money damages for plaintiffs depending on the speaker or the message.  
64. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Overruling several decades of precedent holding otherwise, see 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”), the Court in 
1976 asserted for the first time that so-called “commercial speech”—i.e., typically described as 
speech that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction”—is entitled to at least some 
degree of First Amendment protection. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Virginia Board, the 
commercial speech in question was described as: “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y 
price.” Id. at 761. Thus, the category of commercial speech subject to comparatively modest First 
Amendment protection has typically been confined to analogous advertising and solicitation. See, 
e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534 (2001) (cigarette advertising outdoors and 
at point-of-sale); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 492 (1996) (alcohol 
advertisements); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985) (legal 
services advertisements); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) 
(commercial billboards). 
  In Central Hudson, the Court distilled the so-called Central Hudson test from its previous, albeit 
less than definitive, commercial speech jurisprudence. 447 U.S. at 560–61, 564. Specifically, the 
test, which assesses those circumstances in which government regulation of commercial speech 
violates the First Amendment, is comprised of four factors: (1) the speech must not propose or 
advocate the sale of an illegal product or be false or otherwise misleading; (2) the state interest in 
regulating the speech must be substantial; (3) the regulation must “directly advance” the state’s 
interest; and (4) the regulation cannot be “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 
Id; see, e.g., id. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”). Ultimately, however, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, presumably because the credit report at issue did not itself 
purport to propose a commercial transaction. See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8 (“We 
also do not hold, as the dissent suggests we do, that the report is subject to reduced constitutional 
protection because it constitutes economic or commercial speech. We discuss such speech, along 
with advertising, only to show how many of the same concerns that argue in favor of reduced 
constitutional protection in those areas apply here as well.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 790 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that speech at issue proposed no commercial transaction).  
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Hudson.”65 When the respondent’s lawyer agreed and “said this should 
end the case,”66 Powell noted that White “seemed to agree—if this was 
commercial speech.”67 Powell also recorded that, at this point, Justice 
John Paul Stevens asked about “‘commercial speech’ in a newspaper? 
E.g., that a company had gone bankruptcy [sic]?”68 
                                                     
65. The transcript contains the following exchange between an unnamed Justice, presumably 
White, and Thomas Heilmann, counsel for Greenmoss Builders:  
QUESTION: Well, yes, but if you’re right about your commercial speech ground you never 
get to all this other argument. 
MR. HEILMANN: That’s correct, Your Honor. 
QUESTION: Because I guess you rely on the first requirement for constitutional protection 
that the Court suggested in Central Hudson. 
MR. HEILMANN: We do, and it’s never been — 
QUESTION: You say that there’s no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public. 
MR. HEILMANN: That’s right. 
QUESTION: And if it’s—you say that if it’s conceded this report was false, they have 
conceded themselves out of First Amendment protection. 
MR. HEILMANN: Yes, because — 
QUESTION: Because this is commercial speech. 
MR. HEILMANN: Not only because it’s commercial speech.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749 
(1985) (No. 83-18), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_18. 
66. Id. at 35:  
QUESTION: Well, if we agree with that isn’t that the end of the case? 
QUESTION: Yes. 
MR. HEILMANN: I think that is the end of the case. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 42–44, contains the following exchange: 
QUESTION: May I ask one question. I think you’re getting to your end. Take your opponent’s 
hypothetical of a newspaper of general circulation that has a column on the back: Recent legal 
developments, subhead bankruptcies, and they mistakenly say your company went into 
bankruptcy, the same facts. 
What happens with that? 
MR. HEILMANN: Well, the issue again is self-censorship. Is the newspaper going to say that 
they won’t publish this fact—and we’re not talking about your analysis of Greenmoss’ 
business. We’re talking about this fact, Greenmoss is bankrupt. 
If the newspaper is going to say they won’t publish the fact because of presumed damages, and 
if they won’t publish that for that reason, for the reason of presumed and punitive damages, 
then the news will just be pablum, and that’s the fear that the Court has, obviously. 
QUESTION: Let me be sure I understand your answer. You’re saying a different rule would 
apply to that case than to this case? 
MR. HEILMANN: Yes. I’m getting into the answer that I think is involved here. The issue is 
chilling of speech. I don’t think a company like Dun & Bradstreet is going to be chilled, 
because, for one thing, the news media very rarely simply publishes a fact. They publish the 
fact in connection with a thesis. 
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From Brennan’s perspective, the argument provided few clues about 
the internal fireworks to come. Although, according to Brennan, Justice 
William Rehnquist appeared “to push strongly for an affirmance,” the 
other Justices “seemed resigned, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to 
a reversal,” which would overturn the verdict against Dun & 
Bradstreet.69 Following the argument, and even after both White and 
Powell “seemed to grow intrigued with the idea that the case could be 
affirmed on commercial speech grounds,” the “betting” in Brennan’s 
chambers before the Conference was that Powell (the author of Gertz) 
would vote to reverse and White (the “vigorous” dissenter in that case) 
would vote to affirm.70 What transpired thereafter, Brennan would note 
later, “demonstrated the folly of such predictions.”71 
C.  The Initial Conference 
According to Brennan’s Term History, and confirmed by his 
handwritten notes at Conference on March 23, 1984, the discussion of 
Greenmoss Builders that day was “surprisingly spirited and tentative.”72 
As was his custom “in difficult cases in which he wishes to maintain his 
assignment power” regardless of whether he ultimately joined the 
majority,73 Burger voted to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, 
                                                     
QUESTION: But in Justice Stevens’ question I thought he did give you a hypothetical where 
the newspaper published a fact somewhat separately from its editorial and news coverage. And 
I think his question was what should be the rule in that case as to the newspaper. 
MR. HEILMANN: Well, I’m not really addressing what should happen in the situation with 
the newspaper. I don’t think you can take the result — 




73. Id. In response to the Chief Justice’s assignment practices, Justice Douglas once threatened to 
publish a dissent complaining that the Chief Justice’s effort to retain the assignment power in one 
case was “an action no Chief Justice in my time would ever have taken. For the tradition is a 
longstanding one that the senior justice in the majority makes the assignment. . . . When, however, 
the minority seeks to control the assignment, there is a destructive force at work in the Court. When 
a Chief Justice tries to bend the Court to his will by manipulating assignments, the integrity of the 
institution is imperiled.” LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
146 (2006) (quoting Justice Douglas’ unpublished dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see 
also PETER H. IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION 440–41 (2006) (describing how 
Chief Justice Burger once assigned four cases despite finding himself in the minority); BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 45 (1997) (“Chief Justice 
Burger was severely criticized because he did not always follow the spirit of the established 
assignment practice.”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 
8 (1988) (“It is said that Chief Justice Burger did not follow the established practice in his 
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while at the same time expressing his opposition both to invocation of 
the commercial speech doctrine and to a media/nonmedia distinction in 
the allocation of First Amendment rights.74 Indeed, taking the issue as 
framed by the Vermont Supreme Court, Burger, according to Brennan’s 
account, again expressed his disagreement with the views of Justice 
Potter Stewart (retired at this point) that the First Amendment reflected 
an “institutionalized dichotomy” that gave the “press special [First 
Amendment protection] . . . .”75 
After Burger had spoken, Brennan set out his view that the judgment 
should be reversed, on the ground that the Gertz standard necessarily 
applied. According to Powell’s notes of the Conference, Brennan 
specifically urged the Court to “address [the] commercial speech issue 
and reject it.”76 Brennan reportedly said that “D&B is like [the] Wall 
Street Journal reporting a bankruptcy.”77 
White then surprised at least Brennan by joining his vote to reverse, 
calling the case a “clear reversal.”78 White, in Brennan’s account, 
explained that, although he was “no fan of Gertz,”79 he rejected both the 
notion that the speech at issue was “commercial”80 (according to Powell, 
White said the speech at issue was “like all financial reporting”81) and 
any media/nonmedia distinction in applying the law of defamation. 
Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun expressed essentially the same 
views,82 although the former added that he would not be averse to 
dismissing the writ as improvidently granted.83 After Powell passed, 
Rehnquist voted to affirm.84 He reportedly told his colleagues that, 
although he considered all of the alternative arguments for deciding the 
                                                     
assignment of opinions. It is alleged that he voted with the majority in order to control the 
assignment of opinions, even though his true sentiments were the other way.”).  
74. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIII. 
75. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes 2 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 23, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review).  
76. Justice Powell, Conference Notes (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Mar. 
23, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
77. Id.   
78. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVII. 
79. Id. at LXXXIII. 
80. Id. 
81. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 76. 
82. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIV. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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case “singularly unattractive,”85 he considered Gertz to be “a last minute 
compromise,” which he said he would not join again (although he had 
provided the fifth vote for Powell’s opinion in that case) and did not 
wish to extend any further.86 
Stevens, who (as Brennan noted in his Term History) was “author of 
the Seventh Circuit opinion that had been reversed in Gertz,”87 said he 
considered Greenmoss Builders to be an extremely “difficult”88 case and 
expressed some sympathy for Burger’s proposal simply to dismiss the 
petition. If the Court were to decide the case, Stevens said, he was 
inclined to reverse, although he was particularly concerned that a 
decision to do so would call into question the constitutionality of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act. On the one hand, Stevens suggested, the kind 
of speech regulated by that statute might be considered “commercial”;89 
on the other, the Vermont Supreme Court had been wrong to hold that 
Gertz is “inapplicable”90 to all nonmedia defendants. 
For her part, O’Connor, the Court’s most junior Justice, also 
expressed some interest in dismissing the writ but offered an alternative 
theory to affirm. According to O’Connor, Gertz ought not to be held to 
apply to “purely private speech.”91 In her view, only speech concerning 
public affairs ought to be protected by the First Amendment in the 
defamation context. In other words, she reportedly told the Conference, 
                                                     
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 330 (1974). In the Seventh Circuit, Gertz argued 
that Sullivan was inapplicable because he was not a public figure. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 
F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In his opinion for a panel of that Court, 
then-Judge Stevens did not address whether the plaintiff was a public figure, assuming instead that 
he was not. Instead, Stevens focused on a different question, i.e., “[w]hether the article, taken as a 
whole, and more narrowly in its references to plaintiff, is of any significant public interest.” Id. 
Relying on Brennan’s opinion in Rosenbloom, Stevens concluded that the underlying civil action in 
which Gertz had represented the plaintiff was of “significant public interest” and therefore 
analogous to the subjects addressed by the publications and broadcasts at issue in Sullivan and its 
progeny. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47–52 (1971)). In his opinion in 
Gertz, Stevens considered distinguishing the case before him from Sullivan, because “[i]t is one 
thing to omit the word ‘alleged’ from an otherwise accurate comment on a newsworthy subject [but] 
it is quite another to include a gratuitous and collateral remark about a participant in a public 
controversy [as was done here].” Id. (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, he ultimately concluded that, 
under Sullivan, “even a false statement of fact made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.” Id. at 806. 
Finding in favor of the defendant, Stevens held that the publisher neither knew that the information 
was false nor “acted recklessly within the Supreme Court’s definition of that term.” Id. at 806–07. 
88. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIV. 
89. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 75, at 1. 
90. Id. 
91. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIV. 
04 - Levine & Wermiel Article .docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:54 PM 
2013] THE LANDMARK THAT WASN’T 21 
 
“Gertz standard applies to some non-media defendants” only if the 
purposes of Gertz are engaged.92 
When Powell finally spoke, he told his colleagues—apparently for the 
first time and with surprising candor—that he regretted what he 
described as the “unnecessarily broad language” that he had employed in 
Gertz.93 He said that he had come to conclude that his “sins” in Gertz 
had returned to “haunt” him.94 Having reconsidered the issue, Powell 
had now concluded, according to Brennan’s account, that “Gertz must be 
read in” and limited to the “context of media defendants.”95 
D.  The Second Conference 
Because four Justices (Burger, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor) had 
not cast final votes, the case was scheduled for a second Conference on 
March 30, 1984.96 On March 26, Stevens notified the Conference that he 
too would vote to reverse, having satisfied himself that a narrowly 
crafted opinion would not threaten the Fair Credit Reporting Act.97 Two 
days later, however, O’Connor circulated a memorandum in which she 
announced her vote to affirm on the ground she had advanced at the first 
Conference, that the speech at issue in Greenmoss Builders “related to 
                                                     
92. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 76 
93. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIV. 
94. Id. 
95. Later that day, Powell dictated, but did not send, a private letter to Stevens and O’Connor. See 
Letter from Justice Powell to Justices Stevens and O’Connor (Mar. 23, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. In it, he urged his colleagues to join in 
dismissing the writ. He went on, however, to pick up on a suggestion that Stevens had made at 
Conference, that “we may be able to identify some subclass between the typical media defendant 
and the common law libel suit between private individuals,” a view “similar” to that expressed by 
O’Connor. Id. According to Powell, Sullivan “was based on the special role of the media in a 
democracy,” which “justified a constitutional decision in that case,” as well as “in each of our 
subsequent cases.” Id. Powell suggested that Dun & Bradstreet “has some of the characteristics of 
the financial page of newspapers, but it is essentially different—as I believe both of you noted. It 
can be argued quite reasonably that Dun & Bradstreet owes a higher duty than the press. It is in the 
business—not of serving the need in a democracy for a forum in which issues and ideas may be 
debated—but of making money by selling sensitive credit information.” Id. Thus, Powell ended his 
letter (which he ultimately decided not to send), by suggesting that “we could say that because of its 
business, and at least its implicit guarantee of a high degree of accuracy, that as a minimum, the 
New York Times [actual malice] standard applies.” Id. Powell wrote that he “could agree cheerfully 
to this, but am not yet persuaded we should deprive the states altogether of their traditional right to 
apply their own libel laws in litigation between private parties” and concluded by suggesting that, if 
“any purpose could be served by the three of us discussing this, I would be happy to join you at any 
time.” Id. at 2. There is no record that any such discussion ever took place. 
96. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIV. 
97. Id. 
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commercial credit and the marketplace of money, not the marketplace of 
ideas.”98 In her view, “[s]uch information is marketed more as a 
commodity than as speech and deserves only the most modest First 
Amendment protection.”99 
Within hours of his receipt of O’Connor’s memo, Powell—who had 
apparently received an early copy of it—informed the Conference that 
he agreed with it and would also vote to affirm.100 Although (as Brennan 
described him in the Term History) Powell was no “friend of punitive 
damages,” he remained troubled by “what he saw as Dun & Bradstreet’s 
enormous unchecked power to harm small businesses.”101 Hence, 
Brennan believed Powell had been struggling to find a way to “avoid his 
own opinion in Gertz” which he otherwise “had no desire to 
overrule.”102 
Thus, in his own memorandum to the Conference following 
O’Connor’s, Powell included large portions of a private letter that he had 
drafted but not sent to Stevens and O’Connor the previous week.103 In it, 
he described the Greenmoss Builders case as “a ‘sport’ in the law of 
libel.”104 He noted that D&B is a “business” that “has some of the 
characteristics of the financial page of newspapers, but is essentially 
different” because “its business is narrowly specialized.”105 At this 
juncture, however, Powell appeared to change his mind about the 
consequences of this distinction. Specifically, although Powell said in 
his unsent letter that he would “agree cheerfully” to a decision that 
granted D&B the protections of the actual malice standard, he now told 
the Conference that, “in view of the nature of D&B’s business and its 
capability to destroy the credit of other businesses (particularly small 
businesses), it would not be irrational to hold D&B to strict liability.”106 
Accordingly, Powell asserted, it would be “unfortunate” if the Court 
were to “choose this case as a vehicle for constitutionalizing the entire 
                                                     
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at LXXXV. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Memorandum from Justice Powell for the Conference (Mar. 28, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355; see also Letter from Justice Powell to 
Justices Stevens and O’Connor, supra note 95.  
104. Letter from Justice Powell to Justices Stevens and O’Connor, supra note 95. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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law of libel” and agreed with O’Connor’s proposal that the Court treat 
“D&B as belonging to a special category of disseminators of 
information” who traffic in a “type of commercial speech.”107 
E.  Brennan Takes Charge 
At the March 30 Conference, therefore, five Justices (Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun) voted to reverse, while three (Powell, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor) voted to affirm. Burger indicated that, 
although he “might vote to affirm,” he was not yet “at rest.”108 
Accordingly, the Chief Justice had no choice but to relinquish to 
Brennan, the senior Associate Justice in the majority, the authority to 
assign the case. Although he gave some thought to assigning the 
majority opinion to White in order to keep him on board, Brennan 
assumed that White’s vote was “safe”109 since he had not altered his 
position following receipt of the O’Connor and Powell memoranda. 
Thus, according to his Term History, Brennan “considered it safe”110 to 
keep the opinion for himself and thereby take advantage of his first 
opportunity since his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom in 1971111 to write 
the Court’s controlling opinion in a defamation case. Needless to say, it 
would also be his first opportunity to lead the Court in a re-examination 
of Gertz and its implications. 
Brennan’s colleagues appeared to sense the potential significance of 
this assignment as well. After it was made, Powell and Rehnquist 
received a private letter from Burger in which the Chief Justice confided 
that he did not believe it “feasible to assign a dissent until we see how 
far Bill [Brennan] goes. He will, I assume, want to push out some ‘new 
frontiers’ on Sullivan.”112 The following week, Powell wrote Burger to 
agree, and suggested that he share his views with O’Connor as well.113 
Brennan circulated his draft majority opinion on May 29. In it, he 
squarely held that Gertz’s prohibition of “awards of presumed or 
punitive damages for false and defamatory statements absent a showing 
                                                     
107. Id. 
108. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVI.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 (1971). 
112. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVI. 
113. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Apr. 6, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” extends to 
nonmedia defendants.114 He characterized the Court’s decision in 
Rosenbloom, “[d]espite the variety of views on liability”115 expressed in 
that case, as reflecting a “clear consensus for the conclusion that, at the 
very least, the First Amendment limits the availability of punitive 
damages awards in defamation actions brought by private parties.”116 
And, hoping that his words would speak for the Court, Brennan 
endeavored to re-explain the relevant holding in Gertz. Specifically, he 
wrote that, although the Court in Gertz “had no occasion to consider”117 
whether “presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions are 
invariably incompatible with the First Amendment,”118 it did hold that 
“such damages could not be awarded” absent a showing of actual 
malice.119 Building on the multiple reasons that Powell had articulated in 
Gertz for this limitation, Brennan concluded that “when the threat of 
unpredictable and disproportionate damages induces potential speakers 
to refrain from speaking, both the speaker and society as a whole are the 
losers.”120 His opinion proceeded to reject the notion that there is any 
relevant distinction to be made between media and nonmedia speakers in 
this regard, noting (apparently in anticipation of a dissent from Powell) 
that “the fact that petitioner’s information is ‘specialized’ or that its 
subscribers pay ‘substantial fees’ hardly distinguishes these reports from 
articles in many publications to which respondent would presumably 
attach the label ‘media’.”121 
Brennan then turned to the heart of the matter, explaining why and 
how the First Amendment simultaneously protects the press and 
nonmedia speakers. “Recognizing the critical historical role played by 
the press in gathering and disseminating information for the benefit of 
the public, we have often emphasized the need for careful judicial 
scrutiny of government actions that impede the exercise of that function 
or that single out the press for different treatment.”122 By the same token, 
                                                     
114. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(May 29, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
115. Id. at 6. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 10. 
121. Id. at 12. 
122. Id. at 13. 
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Brennan asserted, by “guaranteeing equal liberty of expression, the First 
Amendment furthers a central object of our constitutional scheme, to 
assure every member of society an equal right to dignity, respect, and the 
opportunity to participate in self-government.”123 As a result: 
[T]he constitutional protections afforded speech depend on the 
nature, context, and function of the expressive activity at issue, 
not on the status or identity of the speaker. Accordingly, the 
rights of the institutional press, however defined, are no greater 
and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or 
organizations engaged in the same activities.124 
Finally, Brennan’s opinion rejected the contention that the “character 
or content” of the speech at issue—that is, its putative status as 
“commercial speech”—deprived it of the First Amendment’s 
protections.125 Here, Brennan reminded his readers that “apart from 
identifying those limited types of unprotected expression” famously 
catalogued in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire¸126 the Court had been quite 
clear that “judges, like other government officials, are not free to decide 
on the basis of their content which sorts of protected expression are in 
their judgment less ‘valuable’ than others.”127 In addition, he rejected the 
                                                     
123. Id. at 14. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 15. 
126. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Since 1942, the Court had operated from the premise that the First 
Amendment does not protect certain, specifically defined categories of speech. See generally id. at 
571–72 (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” such as 
fighting words, obscenity, defamation and incitement, which “are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); Laurent Frantz, The 
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1430 (1962) (“[I]f there are categories . . . of 
speech which are unprotected without regard to balancing, is it not proper to infer that there are 
categories which are protected without regard to balancing?”). The Court’s identification of various 
categories of unprotected speech in Chaplinsky spawned its subsequent embrace of a categorical 
approach to defining the limits of First Amendment protections. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography as unprotected category); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless 
action); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (true threats); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Brennan, 
J.) (obscenity). 
127. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion One, supra note 114, at 15. Most recently, the Court has 
decided a series of cases endorsing Brennan’s views in this regard and rejected invitations that it 
recognize additional categories of unprotected speech. See United States v. Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 
S. Ct. 2537 (June 28, 2012) (Kennedy, J., announcing judgment) (false speech about military 
honors); id. at 2544 (discussing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 
(2010) (content-based restrictions are permissible “only when confined to the few historic and 
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“commercial speech” argument on the ground that “the mere fact that 
petitioner’s speech concerns commerce or business in itself provides no 
basis for altering the constitutional analysis.”128 The so-called 
“commercial speech” doctrine, in contrast to the publication at issue in 
Greenmoss Builders, encompasses only expression that, by its terms, 
purports to “propose” a “commercial transaction” by relating “facts 
uniquely within the speaker’s knowledge.”129 
The opinion was classic Brennan. He used the occasion of having 
what he thought was a solid five-vote majority to underscore the major 
values undergirding First Amendment protection in defamation cases 
and to bolster the foundations of Sullivan that had, perhaps, eroded some 
in Gertz and its progeny.130 Two years shy of his 80th birthday and less 
often in command of majorities than earlier in his tenure, Brennan 
seemed mindful that he would not be on the Court forever and that 
opportunities to advance important constitutional values should not be 
missed.131 
                                                     
traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 
__ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (speech depicting violence directed to children) (“[N]ew 
categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain 
speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (speech depicting violence to 
animals) (“Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new 
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of 
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or 
discussed as such in our case law.”); see also Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of 
Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 7 (1985) (“[T]he efficacy of 
the constitutional standard depends on judges defining the limits of that category of expression 
entitled to first amendment protection rather than on juries evaluating the demeanor and credibility 
of witnesses and drawing inferences from the evidence.”). 
128. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion One, supra note 114, at 19. 
129. Id. 
130. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 172 (1979) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 181 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
First Amendment bestows an “editorial privilege” on media defendants unless overcome by a 
public-figure plaintiff making prima facie showing that statement at issue was defamatory); Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 481 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In my view . . . the actual-
malice standard of New York Times must be met in order to justify the imposition of liability in 
these circumstances.”). 
131. Following a mild stroke, Brennan retired from the Court on July 20, 1990. See Linda 
Greenhouse, Vacancy on the Court; Brennan, Key Liberal, Quits Supreme Court; Battle For Seat 
Likely, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at A1. Just a year earlier, Brennan had marshaled a majority in 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), where the Court overturned the conviction of a man for 
burning an American flag. Id. at 420. Indeed, just over a month before his retirement, Brennan 
wrote the Court’s opinion declaring unconstitutional a federal law passed in response to Johnson, 
noting, “[p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so 
revered, and worth revering.” United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); see also Metro 
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (Brennan, J.) (finding FCC minority ownership 
policies constitutional under equal protection clause), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
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F.  Counting to Five132 
Marshall promptly joined Brennan’s opinion, as did Stevens who, at 
least according to his clerks, had “become solidly convinced” to do so 
by Brennan’s “excellent opinion.”133 He did, however, privately ask 
Brennan to modify the sentence, quoted above, in which Brennan wrote 
that “judges, like other government officials, are not free to decide on 
the basis of their content which sorts of protected expression are in their 
judgment less ‘valuable’ than others.”134 Stevens wrote to Brennan that 
he feared the sentence could be viewed as inconsistent with the view he 
had championed in cases such as Young v. American Mini-Theatres135 
and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,136 which envisioned judges doing just 
that in many circumstances. Although Brennan had crossed swords with 
Stevens on the latter’s reasoning in this regard in the past,137 he thought 
it best not to confront him again and offered to change the word 
“content” to “message.”138 This accommodation satisfied Stevens, who 
promptly joined the Brennan opinion on June 4, 1984.139 
White, however, was another matter. The initial reaction to the 
Brennan draft in his Chambers appeared to be positive. In a 
                                                     
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (Brennan, J.) (double jeopardy), 
overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). But see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy 
to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to such discourse, our 
freedom would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne’s pictures may be distasteful, but the Constitution 
guarantees both his right to possess them privately and his right to avoid punishment under an 
overbroad law.”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (dissenting from ruling that the City of New York could control 
private amplification equipment at concert). 
132. The term “counting to five” is a reference to Brennan’s legendary emphasis on strategizing 
to figure out how to secure five-vote majorities on the Court. He would tell his law clerks each 
Term that getting five votes was the most important principle of constitutional law. For a fuller 
discussion, see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 196 
(2010). 
133. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVI. 
134. Id. (emphasis added). 
135. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
136. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
137. Compare Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J.) (“[A] line may be drawn on the basis of 
content without violating the government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of 
protected communication.”), with Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court’s decision may be seen for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: another of the 
dominant culture’s inevitable efforts to force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to 
its way of thinking, acting, and speaking.”). 
138. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVI. 
139. Id. 
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memorandum to his Justice, White’s law clerk pronounced Brennan’s 
opinion “very strong.”140 Still, the clerk acknowledged, Brennan had 
painted with “a broad brush” and pointed out to White “a few places 
where he might be felt to have overdone it.”141 Specifically, the law 
clerk noted that Brennan “offers some general ruminations about the 
illegitimacy of punitive damages,” which raised the question for White 
of “how much of a rehash of Gertz you are willing to join” especially 
since Brennan’s “treatment of punitive damages is pretty inconsistent 
with what you wrote in Gertz.”142 Finally, the clerk noted that Brennan 
had not included in his draft “any statement to the effect that the Court is 
not deciding what rule applies when a public figure sues a nonmedia 
defendant.”143 In the clerk’s view, however, the “vast majority” of courts 
have held that Sullivan’s “actual malice” standard applies in such 
circumstances and “it seems a correct and unavoidable result”—
accordingly, he wrote to White, “I think that any disclaimer would be 
insincere, misleading, and incorrect, and the present silence is 
appropriate.”144 
After returning from the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference in early 
June (which he had attended with Brennan), however, White circulated a 
memorandum to the Conference that Brennan’s chambers described “as 
something of a bombshell.”145 Having learned that Powell was planning 
to write a dissent, and that O’Connor had said she would wait for it 
before announcing her own intentions, White did the same—he said that 
he would await Powell’s draft before casting his own vote. Brennan’s 
                                                     
140. Memorandum from Michael Herz for Justice White 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc.) (undated) (on file with the White Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) 
(on file with the Washington Law Review). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. In his own draft, Brennan had stated that punitive damages “pose[] a danger of 
constitutional dimension” when the conduct deterred by the threat of them is “expression protected 
by the First Amendment.” Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion One, supra note 114, at 10. The law clerk 
offered White “two ways of bringing this situation within Gertz.” Memorandum from Michael Herz 
for Justice White, supra note 140, at 1. On the one hand, White could join Brennan on the ground 
that “it is impossible to draw a line between media and nonmedia defendants; this is essentially an 
administrative concern.” Id. On the other, White could premise his vote to reverse on the argument 
that, “even if one could draw such a line, it would be inappropriate because nonmedia defendants 
enjoy the same protection as media defendants, there being no legitimate distinction between them.” 
Id. Brennan, according to White’s clerk, had made both arguments and the clerk believed “he is 
correct to rely on both prongs. Even if you disagree with Gertz,” he wrote to White, “if the rule in 
that case is going to be applied, there is no good reason for not applying it across the board.” Id. at 
2. 
143. Memorandum from Michael Herz for Justice White, supra note 140, at 2. 
144. Id. at 3. 
145. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVI. 
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chambers learned that White’s own clerks “as usual, had no idea what 
was bothering” their Justice, which further perplexed Brennan, 
especially because White “had pushed to get the case granted in the first 
place” and had called it a “clear reversal” at Conference.146 
Indeed, Brennan was moved to pick up the phone and call White, who 
explained to Brennan that he “hated” Gertz and had been “startled” to 
learn that Powell was planning to write a dissent.147 As Brennan 
described the conversation, White said he “could not imagine what 
Powell would write but would be sympathetic to any reasonable way to 
get around” Gertz.148 After the call, Brennan described himself as “fairly 
confident” that White would “ultimately go along” with his opinion.149 
G.  Powell’s Problems 
Unbeknownst to Brennan, there was a wild card in the process that 
would prompt White to withhold his vote. Specifically, Brennan was 
unaware of the degree to which Powell now harbored doubts about his 
own decision in Gertz. Indeed, in late May, another of Powell’s law 
clerks provided Powell with a memorandum offering alternative 
“general approaches” the Justice might take in crafting an opinion of his 
own.150 Powell had apparently told the clerk that, while he did not object 
to construing the First Amendment to preclude states from awarding 
punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice “in the present 
situation,” he would find it “unacceptable” to “constitutionaliz[e] the 
entire law of libel.”151 Although Brennan’s opinion did not purport to do 
the latter, the clerk’s “suspicion” was that it would have that “effect.”152 
Accordingly, the clerk recommended that, “if it is possible to write a 
coherent dissent articulating a contrary view, you should not join” 
Brennan.153 In the end, the clerk recommended that Powell: 
[B]ack away slightly from Gertz’s statement that there was no 
state interest in presumed and punitive damages. That is, you 
                                                     




150. Memorandum from Joseph Neuhaus for Justice Powell 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (May 30, 1984) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file 
with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
151. Id. at 2. 
152. Id. 
153. Id.  
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could say that Gertz was speaking in the context at issue there. It 
meant that there was no net state interest in these forms of 
damages, after the First Amendment values were considered. Of 
course, there is some interest in allowing presumed damages, 
and perhaps some in allowing punitive damages as well.154 
In his handwritten notes in the margins of the clerk’s memo, Powell 
wrote “yes” no fewer than three times.155 
On June 1, 1984, Powell dictated a memorandum in which he 
considered his options. After reminding himself that, in Sullivan, the 
Court “draws no distinction between ‘damages’ of various kinds,” and 
noting “as a matter of interest” that Sullivan, “in several places, indicates 
that truth or falsity is really irrelevant to any constitutional 
consideration, a position Gertz rejected,”156 Powell acknowledged that 
Brennan’s proposed holding in Greenmoss Builders was “limited to 
presumed and punitive damages” and did not purport to address either 
the standard of liability or the availability of compensatory damages in 
such cases.157 Nevertheless, he shared his law clerk’s concern that 
“much”158 of the Brennan opinion “can be read—and perhaps will be—
as limiting even actual damages to proof of malice when that issue is 
                                                     
154. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
155. Id. at 2, 5. In a second memorandum to Powell expanding on his original views the 
following day, the clerk seemed to reconsider, at least somewhat, his conclusion that his Justice 
ought to dissent. After explaining that the Brennan opinion would not, as a practical matter, alter the 
common law significantly, he wrote: “In sum, WJB’s result would not be a bad thing for the world, 
but it does tend to trample unnecessarily on principles of federalism. For me this would probably be 
enough to reach a different result, but it is a close call.” Memorandum from Joseph Neuhaus for 
Justice Powell 4 (May 31, 1984) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. And, because he recognized the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to draw lines based on the identity of the speaker or the content of 
the speech (including expanding the commercial speech category to encompass more than 
advertisements), the clerk told Powell that “I now favor essentially listing the factors that make us 
conclude that this is not an area of speech that implicates constitutional values to the degree they 
were implicated in Gertz”—i.e., “that this is not an issue of public or general importance, that this is 
not speech that appears in a newspaper, and that this is speech of an economic or commercial nature 
that is unlikely to be chilled very much by application of state rules.” Id. at 5. The clerk ended his 
memorandum by telling Powell that, although he favored a dissent by the Justice along these lines, 
he was not “certain that the Court should create a variety of levels of First Amendment protection 
for speech” depending on such factors. Id. at 7. To this, Powell wrote in the margin of the clerk’s 
memorandum, “this is troublesome.” Id. 
156. Personal memorandum of Justice Powell 2 (June 1, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
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before the Court.”159 Accordingly, Powell set out his options. There were 
two suggested by the law clerk: (1) concurring in the result and writing 
separately to emphasize that, although “there is a difference between 
private speech and public speech,”160 the government “interest in both 
presumed and punitive damages is so minimal that states cannot impose 
them at all except under constitutional standards,”161 or (2) dissenting in 
an opinion that “‘back[s] away slightly from Gertz’s statement that there 
is no state interest in presumed and punitive damages.’”162 Powell 
himself added a third—“make a distinction between presumed and 
punitive damages”163—an option that he wrote “would appeal to me 
because I think a malice standard may well be justified before punitive 
damages are awarded even in a suit by a private person against a private 
person.”164 In assessing the alternatives, Powell returned to the language 
of his “holding” in Gertz—i.e., “the states may not permit recovery of 
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a 
showing of knowledge of falsity of [sic] reckless disregard for the 
truth.”165 This, he recognized, “may not be easy to reconcile in terms of 
drawing a distinction between presumed and punitive damages,” which, 
                                                     
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 3 
161. Id. 
162. Id. (citation omitted). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 5. The Court in Sullivan had held that a public official could only recover damages 
resulting from defamation if the official could prove that the defamatory statement was made with 
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 
(1964) (“[S]ince . . . erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need . . . to survive. . . , only 
those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded 
by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions.”) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations omitted). As the Court has explained, the actual malice standard articulated in 
Sullivan is “quite different” from “malice” as traditionally defined at common law, which is 
“frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton 
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” Cantrell v. Forest City Pub Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974); see 
also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 n.7 (1989) (“The phrase ‘actual malice’ is unfortunately 
confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will.”). Moreover, a mere “[f]ailure to 
investigate does not in itself establish bad faith.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968). 
Instead, “[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Id. at 731. Such evidence may include 
those instances “where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is 
based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call.” Id. at 732.  
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he concluded, warranted further discussion with his law clerk.166 
Later that same day, presumably following those further discussions, 
Powell wrote the Conference that he would “try my hand at a dissent.”167 
H.  Powell’s Dissent—Take One 
Powell circulated the first draft of that dissent on June 15. In it, he 
relied both on the identity of the speaker and on the content of the 
speech at issue to distinguish Greenmoss Builders from Sullivan and 
Gertz, which were otherwise endorsed in all respects. The opinion’s 
opening paragraph framed the discussion of Sullivan as limiting “the 
reach of state laws of libel and slander in suits against media 
defendants,”168 ignoring entirely the Abernathy nonmedia defendants in 
that case,169 and asserted that “[a]ll of the Court’s decisions since then 
that have considered the constitutional role in defamation law also have 
involved suits against a media defendant arising out of an article or 
broadcast on an issue of public concern and importance,”170 despite the 
presence of cases like Garrison v. Louisiana,171 Henry v. Collins,172 and 
St. Amant v. Thompson173 among the Court’s defamation decisions.174 It 
included a footnote warning that, while Brennan’s “opinion discusses 
only the questions of presumed and punitive damages, its effect is 
broader,” and its “logic . . . apparently would require that the rule 
announced in Gertz . . . barring liability without fault in cases involving 
media discussion of public issues, be applied in all defamation 
                                                     
166. Personal memorandum of Justice Powell, supra note 156, at 5. 
167. Memorandum from Justice Powell for the Conference (June 1, 1984) (on file with the 
Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). As noted in her June 5th memorandum, O’Connor indicated that she would “wait to see” 
what Powell drafted, Memorandum from Justice O’Connor for the Conference, Brennan Papers 
(June 5, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division), and 
White also wrote to say he too would “await Lewis’s dissent,” Memorandum from Justice White for 
the Conference, Brennan Papers (June 5, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
168. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(June 15, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
169. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
170. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent One, supra note 168, at 1. 
171. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
172. 380 U.S. 356 (1965). 
173. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 37–39.  
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actions.”175 Gertz did not support such a result, Powell wrote, both 
because in that case there “was a libel suit against a media defendant” 
and because the “article in question discussed a question of undoubted 
public importance.”176 Greenmoss Builders, in contrast, involved “a 
purely private defamation action against a commercial credit reporting 
agency.”177 In the end, Powell asserted that the Court’s result 
“unnecessarily repudiates the common law and trivializes the First 
Amendment. There is nothing in Gertz that requires it.”178 At this point, 
the opinion contained another footnote that addressed Powell’s 
previously expressed concerns about the express “holding” in Gertz: 
There is language in Gertz that can be read broadly to the effect 
that presumed and punitive damages have no place in the law of 
defamation. It is necessary, however, to view this language in 
the context of the only issue before the Court. The suit was by a 
private person against a media defendant. It was the presence of 
the media defendant that primarily caused the Court in Gertz to 
limit recovery to “actual injury.”179 
As to the damages question, Powell added: 
Presumed and punitive damages were deemed—for the reasons 
first articulated in New York Times—to threaten the historic role 
of the media in a representative democracy. No such threat is 
present when one private party is libeled by another private 
party—at least where the libel is circulated in the course of, and 
is solely concerned with, both parties’ businesses. In weighing 
the interests that may be at issue, it is well also to repeat that 
there is a significant public interest “in compensating private 
individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.”180 
This reframing of the decision in Gertz might have effectively cleared 
up for Powell the concerns he harbored about the scope of the First 
Amendment interest in defamation cases and about the importance of 
allowing the states substantial leeway in crafting their own laws. It is, 
however, an exceedingly narrow statement of the purposes of both 
Sullivan and Gertz that ignores the difficulty of line-drawing among 
types of speakers, subjects of speech and types of damages that Powell 
                                                     
175. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent One, supra note 168, at 2. 
176. Id. at 5. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. (footnote omitted). 
179. Id. at 10–11. 
180. Id. at 11 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–49 (1974)).   
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himself acknowledged in his exchange with his law clerk.181 
I.  The Undecided 
Powell’s draft was apparently enough for Blackmun to cement his 
own views—he joined Brennan’s opinion that same day.182 O’Connor 
and Rehnquist, however, joined Powell.183 With a tally of four for 
Brennan and three for Powell, that left Burger and White. Although 
Brennan’s chambers had been led to believe that Burger’s own clerk had 
“pushed him hard”184 to join the Brennan-crafted majority opinion, 
Burger reportedly could not “bring himself”185 to do so and, on June 19, 
1984, told the Conference that “as of now,” he would vote only to 
dismiss the writ.186 
At this juncture, therefore, Brennan knew he needed White but that 
further efforts to persuade him might backfire. So, although Brennan 
was known as the master of discerning and accommodating the concerns 
of other Justices to forge majority opinions,187 he held back and awaited 
further word from White. Powell, however, was more proactive. 
Following what appears to have been some one-on-one discussion with 
White, Powell wrote to him privately on June 18, to address White’s 
apparent suggestion that the case be reargued because Powell’s opinion 
“would decide an issue not decided below or argued here”188—i.e., 
whether all of the First Amendment-based protections set out in Gertz 
applied in suits against nonmedia defendants. Powell disagreed, telling 
White that the “question of whether the entire law of defamation should 
be constitutionalized clearly is before us and needs to be decided.”189 
That said, he invited White to make “suggestions”190 for revisions to his 
opinion, which Powell said he would “welcome the opportunity to 
                                                     
181. See supra text accompanying note 155. 





187. For a discussion of Brennan’s reputation as a consensus builder on the Court, see STERN & 
WERMIEL, supra note 132, at 223.  
188. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice White (June 18, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
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consider.”191 
On June 20, Powell wrote a second private letter, this one to Burger, 
with copies to Rehnquist and O’Connor. In it, he told the Chief Justice 
that his vote “to DIG[] came as a surprise.”192 He then proceeded to 
“review[] the ‘bidding,’”193 for Burger’s benefit, emphasizing that the 
Chief Justice had not only previously indicated an inclination to join 
him, O’Connor, and Rehnquist, but also that he had subsequently written 
to them to express concern about “how far Bill Brennan” would go in his 
own opinion.194 In this regard, Powell pushed hard to define the contours 
of the debate, adding that “I note at this point that Bill could not have 
gone any farther than he has in his opinion for the Court.”195 Powell 
concluded with the following: 
In view of this rather clear record, I wrote a full dissenting 
opinion on the assumption that there were four of us who could 
not go with Bill Brennan. His opinion overrules two centuries of 
the common law and the present defamation laws of most of the 
states. As a vote to DIG at this time would have no significance, 
I hope that in due time—when you have an opportunity to take 
another look—you will “stay with us.”196 
Upon receiving her copy, O’Connor wrote a handwritten note to Powell, 
thanking him “for writing to the Chief to refresh recollections of the 
history of this important case.”197 
Powell’s letter got Burger’s attention. Later that same day, he wrote 
to Powell, with copies to Rehnquist and O’Connor, indicating that “[i]f 
you think it will help ‘institutionally,’ I will go along with you. I would 
want to see what, if anything, Byron [White] does.”198 
                                                     
191. Id. 
192. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (June 20, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. The term DIG means “dismissed as 





197. Handwritten note from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell (June 20, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
198. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell (June 20, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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J.  The Fight for White 
Thus, it became apparent to both Powell and Brennan that White’s 
vote would almost certainly determine the outcome of the case. For his 
part, Powell took renewed aim at Brennan’s opinion in an effort to win 
White’s vote and garner his own majority. He launched what Brennan’s 
Term History described as a “battle of footnotes” in which the authors of 
Sullivan and Gertz appeared to fight for the legacy of their signature 
cases, each invoking “increasingly strong language through several 
drafts on both sides.”199  
As the Term wound down, the waiting continued. White apparently 
had to leave town again, this time for his daughter’s wedding. 
Nevertheless, both Brennan and Powell continued to court his vote, 
informally sending typewritten versions of additional footnotes for his 
consideration. Still, White remained silent. At lunch one day, shortly 
before he left Washington, White reportedly asked his clerks whether 
they thought Powell was offering to overrule Gertz, at least in part. His 
clerks told him they did not read the Powell opinion to do so.200 
Accordingly, when he returned to the Court on June 25, 1984, White 
visited Powell and put the question to him directly. Powell reportedly 
told him that, although he had no intention of overruling Gertz, he did 
hope to cut back on the implications of some of the broad dicta in his 
                                                     
199. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVII. Some of these footnotes 
merit comment. In one, Powell addressed the Tenth Circuit’s then relatively recent decision in Pring 
v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), reversing a jury verdict against the 
publisher of Penthouse magazine, which had included punitive damages in the amount of $25 
million. The footnote pointed out that the district judge had reduced the jury’s award to $12.5 
million and that the Court of Appeals had eliminated it entirely as a consequence of its “holding that 
an obviously fictional account of the pageant could not be libelous under the narrow theory argued 
by plaintiff.” Justice Powell, Draft Rider B for Draft Dissent One (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (June 14, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee 
Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. This account 
was apparently included to demonstrate that punitive damages may or may not be appropriate given 
the circumstances of a given case. In another, Powell attempted to suggest that punitive and 
presumed damages might be treated differently, despite his acknowledgement that “[m]y opinion for 
the Court in Gertz, as the Court today notes, did not distinguish between” them. Justice Powell, 
Draft Rider C for Draft Dissent One (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (June 14, 
1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. Nevertheless, Powell wrote that, “[u]pon 
the more mature reflection required by the Court’s constitutionalization of the entire law of libel, I 
find both historic and logical reasons” for distinguishing between them—i.e., because the “purpose 
of presumed damages is essentially compensatory, . . . they are appropriate when it is clear from the 
nature of the libel that injury occurred and that measuring the damages precisely is impossible,” 
while the purpose of punitive damages is “wholly different” and effectively permits “a private 
litigant to punish a defendant . . . without due process of any kind.” Id. 
200. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXVIII. 
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opinion.201 White was not satisfied. Indeed, he subsequently confided in 
Brennan that, if Powell had only made some changes in his dissenting 
opinion, he might have joined it, thereby creating a majority to affirm 
the Vermont Supreme Court.202 
After his fateful meeting with Powell, White broke his silence, in a 
memorandum he addressed to Brennan and circulated to the Conference 
later that same day. He said that he was “up in the air”203 about the case 
on a number of fronts: 
As you might suspect, Lewis’ opinion strikes a responsive chord 
in me; but because it appears to narrow Gertz v. Welch, or at 
least to withdraw somewhat from the rationale of that case, I am 
unprepared to take that step without a reargument. On the other 
hand, there is substance to his views, and I will not join your 
opinion with its reaffirmation of Gertz. If there is not 
reargument, which I am prepared to move, I shall concur in the 
judgment with the following few words: 
 
Justice White concurring in the judgment. 
  I am unprepared to join either Justice Brennan’s or Justice 
Powell’s opinion and believe that the case should be reargued. 
That view not having prevailed, I join the Court’s judgment of 
reversal, which I think is more consistent with existing 
precedent than an affirmance would be.204 
K.  Strange Company 
The irony in all of this was palpable. Brennan, the author of Sullivan 
and Rosenbloom, who had been effectively marginalized by Powell as he 
crafted the Court’s majority and opinion in Gertz,205 had been placed in 
the position of defending Powell’s handiwork and reaffirming it. White, 
who had joined Brennan in both Sullivan and Rosenbloom, and who had 
railed against Powell’s opinion in Gertz,206 was sufficiently moved by 
                                                     
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Memorandum from Justice White for Justice Brennan and the Conference (June 25, 1984) 
(on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
204. Id. 
205. See Levine & Wermiel, supra note 11 at 4 (“From the standpoint of Justice Brennan, the 
story of Gertz is one about his colleagues’ reactions to Brennan and the positions he espoused rather 
than about Brennan’s own role.”).  
206. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 
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Powell’s reasoning (and offended by Brennan’s defense of Gertz) to 
withhold his vote from Brennan. And Powell, who had withstood 
White’s withering attack in Gertz and had dismantled the plurality 
Brennan had cobbled together in Rosenbloom, had apparently managed 
to curry at least some favor with White by disclaiming at least some 
aspects of his own reasoning in Gertz. 
White’s memorandum provoked Brennan to telephone his colleague 
again, this time to inquire whether White’s cryptic reference to 
Brennan’s opinion being “more consistent with existing precedent” 
might lead him to join the Brennan opinion if additional changes were 
made.207 It was then that White told Brennan that, if anything, Powell 
was more likely to secure his vote if changes were made in Powell’s 
opinion.208 Still, White continued to advocate reargument, perhaps in the 
hope that he could thereby garner sufficient support to overrule at least 
significant portions of Gertz. 
It might have been expected that Burger, who had by this time twice 
voted to dismiss the case, would be opposed to reargument. Nonetheless, 
perhaps because White had provided him with a fifth vote for 
reargument in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority209 
at about the same time, the other Justices were not surprised when 
Burger wrote to White (and the Conference) on June 25 that “I had voted 
to DIG but I will give you a ‘consolation vote’ to join your vote to re-
argue.”210 Brennan had written to Burger earlier that day and, after 
noting that the Chief had “voted to deny cert in this case and . . . twice 
voted to DIG,” assumed that “Byron’s suggestion that the case be argued 
again will not have much appeal for you.”211 Accordingly, Brennan 
asked, “Is there anything I can do in the way of changing my opinion 
                                                     
a few printed pages, [the Court in Gertz] has federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring 
unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 
States.”). 
207. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIX. 
208. Id. at LXXXVIII. 
209. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Court, by 5-4 vote, ultimately overruled National 
League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and held that it was impossible to define what 
actions of state and local government constitute traditional functions that would make them immune 
from federal regulation. The majority opinion was written by Blackmun and joined by Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Stevens, with Burger, Rehnquist, Powell, and O’Connor dissenting. 
210. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger for Justice White and the Conference (June 25, 
1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
211. Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice Burger (June 25, 1984) (with handwritten notes 
from Chief Justice Burger) (on file with the White Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division) (on file with Washington Law Review).  
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that might enable you to join it so that we can avoid burdening the Court 
with another argument in this case?”212 In a handwritten note to Brennan 
scrawled across the bottom of the latter’s letter, Burger replied, “Dear 
Bill, I want to relieve your worries about the December calendar—hence 
I will vote to reargue.”213 Even before Burger had announced his 
intentions, Stevens privately predicted as much to his clerks: “He didn’t 
think the case should be argued, but he’ll probably think that since it was 
argued, it should be argued twice!”214 
L.  Two Questions 
The final scenes of what would be the first Act of the Greenmoss 
Builders drama took place in the last days of the 1983–84 Term. Just 
before the Conference voted 5-4 to rehear the case, Powell made one last 
attempt to secure White’s vote, repeating his contention that Brennan’s 
opinion would overrule “centuries”215 of common law. Upon hearing 
this, Rehnquist was moved to say, “Why, Lewis, I thought you did that 
in Gertz.”216 
Brennan and Powell then put down their swords long enough to 
collaborate on the questions that the parties would be asked to reargue 
the following term. On June 26, 1984, Powell’s law clerk proposed four 
separate questions, each reflecting a different permutation of the 
media/nonmedia distinction and the nature of the speech, which was 
variously referred to as “speech of an economic nature” and “reports on 
the financial condition of private parties.”217 By the following day, 
however, Powell had reduced the questions to two, which he proposed to 
                                                     
212. Id. 
213. Id.  
214. Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories, supra note 20, at LXXXIX. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Memorandum from Joseph Neuhaus for Justice Powell (June 26, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355 (“1. Whether, in a defamation action, the 
constitutional rule of New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages 
should apply where the suit is against a nonmedia defendant and the speech is dissimilar from that at 
issue in those cases. 2. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional rule of New York Times 
and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should apply to nonmedia defendants 
sued for reports on the financial condition of private parties. 3. Whether, in a defamation action, the 
constitutional rule of New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages 
should apply where the suit is against a nonmedia defendant and the alleged defamation is a report 
on the financial condition of a private party. 4. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional 
rule of New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should apply in 
suits against nonmedia defendants involving speech of an economic nature.”).  
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Brennan in a private letter: 
1. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional rule of 
New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and 
punitive damages should apply where the suit is against a non-
media defendant? 
2. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional rule of 
New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and 
punitive damages should apply where the speech is of a 
commercial or economic nature?218 
In his letter, Powell told Brennan that he believed these questions were 
both appropriate because, while the “reasoning of your opinion applies 
to all defamation actions against media and nonmedia defendants and 
without regard to the type of speech,” Powell’s “would leave open the 
question whether the constitutional rule applies with equal force 
regardless of the nature of speech,” and “[t]here may be a different 
balance where the speech relates solely to an economic matter (as in this 
case) or to an accusation that a lady is sleeping with the wrong 
gentleman.”219 
Brennan apparently agreed, because later that same day, Powell 
adapted his letter to Brennan as a memorandum to the entire Conference, 
which included both the questions he had proposed to Brennan as well as 
the rationale for posing them.220 O’Connor, White, and Burger all 
concurred in what was now the Powell-Brennan formulation.221 
And there it stood on the Term’s final day, when the Justices returned 
from lunch to announce that both Greenmoss Builders and Garcia would 
be reargued the following fall. At the time, Brennan did not suspect that 
the case would ultimately “number among the great disappointments”222 
                                                     
218. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (June 27, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
219. Id. 
220. Memorandum from Justice Powell for the Conference (June 27, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
221. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell and the Conference (July 2, 1984) (on file 
with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington 
Law Review); Letter from Justice White to Justice Powell and the Conference, (June 28, 1984) (on 
file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with Washington 
Law Review); Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell and the Conference (June 27, 1984) 
(on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with 
Washington Law Review). 
222. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories 91 (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
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of the October 1984 Term or that it would “presage difficulties for 
Justice Brennan’s doctrines of First Amendment limitations on state 
defamation law”223 for years to come. 
Perhaps Brennan was overconfident, relying too much on his long, 
warm relationship with White and his frequent alliances forged with 
Powell.224 Or perhaps Brennan simply believed in the invincibility of 
what he had created in Sullivan. But by the summer of 1984, it had 
become clear in media law circles that the existing state of defamation 
law was far from at rest, even if the extent of that unease was not enough 
to shake Brennan’s faith.225 
                                                     
223. Id. 
224. Brennan and White sat next to each other at oral argument for a number of years and 
developed a warm relationship. See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 132 at 453. Brennan counted 
Powell as an important swing vote or fifth vote for much of their tenure together. For an example of 
this, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and for a discussion of it, see STERN & WERMIEL, 
supra note 132, at 475. 
225. In 1982, General William Westmoreland, the commander of United States forces during the 
Vietnam war, brought a highly publicized defamation action seeking $120 million in damages 
against CBS for its portrayal of the General in a CBS documentary, “The Uncounted Enemy: A 
Vietnam Deception.” Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y 1984). At about the 
same time, former Israeli Defense Minister and future Prime Minister Ariel Sharon brought an 
equally well known defamation suit against Time, Inc., in which he sought $500 million in damages 
arising from an article entitled “The Verdict Is Guilty: An Israeli Commission Apportions the 
Blame for the Beirut Massacre.” Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). These 
and other significant defamation suits of the era, see, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 771 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing jury verdict awarding President of Mobil Oil Co. and his son of 
$250,000 in compensatory damages and $1.8 million in punitive damages after the Washington Post 
published an article suggesting that the father had used his influence to launch his son’s career), 
caused many in the media industry to believe that Sullivan had proven to provide ineffective 
protection to the press. See Michael Massing, The Libel Chill: How Cold Is It Out There?, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV., May–June 1985, at 31, 43 (surveying media professionals’ views on increasing 
number of libel actions and concluding that then-current state of “libel is threatening to take 
[investigative journalism] in an unhealthy direction, creating a type of immunity for powerful 
figures, especially those with entrenched interests in the local community”). In response, in 1988 a 
group of libel experts proposed a model statute for libel reform. See ANNENBERG WASHINGTON 
PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW: THE REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM 
PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM (1988). As Professor Rodney A. Smolla, the 
primary proponent of the Proposal, wrote, “The Annenberg recommendations apparently struck a 
number of responsive chords—not always harmonious—generating a cacophony of public discourse 
ranging from euphoric praise to excoriating criticism.” Rodney Smolla & Michael Gaertner, The 
Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25, 26 
(1989) (listing sources); see also C. Thomas Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1, 18 (1989) (noting that the Proposal is “preferable to proposals that simply force a 
predetermined structure on the variety of plaintiffs and defendants . . . [or] abandon the New York 
Times balance in favor of a questionable legislative experiment that restructures libel law”); Paul 
Gaffney, First Amendment Analysis of the Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 601, 623 (1990) (concluding that the Proposal “ignores the beneficial aspects of libel damages, 
and rests on potentially faulty assumptions about what libel defendants and plaintiffs may want”). 
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II.  ACT II—THE END OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE 
MEDIA/NONMEDIA DISTINCTION? 
A.  Powell Prepares for Reargument 
Over the summer that followed, Powell reassigned the case to one of 
his new law clerks. He explained to his new clerk that he thought it 
“unlikely that Justice Brennan will change his opinion substantially, and 
possibly major changes in our opinion will not be necessary.”226 Even 
so, Powell said he had learned “from experience . . . that additional time 
for reflection and research often does enable one to improve an opinion. 
As we may have a chance to win BRW, this is worth a try.”227 
The new law clerk was not shy about running with Powell’s 
invitation. He produced a detailed memorandum in which he suggested 
that Powell revise his previous position extensively, picking up on the 
distinction between punitive and presumed damages he had explored in a 
footnote in his draft dissent.228 The law clerk proposed that Powell 
“distinguish between presumed and punitive damages in a way that 
would make the opinion both broader and narrower than Justice 
Brennan’s.”229 With respect to punitive damages, the law clerk suggested 
that Powell could “lay out your objections to them and suggest either 
voiding them entirely on substantive due process grounds or hemming 
them in procedurally.”230 Presumed damages, in contrast, would “be 
allowed only when actual damages would fail fully to compensate the 
victim.”231 Powell underlined this passage in his copy of the 
memorandum and wrote an emphatic “Yes” in the margin.232 In early 
                                                     
226. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz at 2 (June 30, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
227. Id. 
228. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell (undated) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. See Justice Powell, Draft Dissent One, 
supra note 168, at 11.  
229. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 228, at 10. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 11. 
232. Id. In Gertz, the Court held that private plaintiffs could not recover punitive or presumed 
damages absent a showing of actual malice. 418 U.S. at 349–50. In doing so, Justice Powell’s 
opinion for the Court explained that, by requiring no showing of fault before a defamation plaintiff 
could recover presumed damages, the common law had effectively permitted juries to “award 
damages where there is no loss,” a result which “unnecessarily compounds the potential of any 
system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms.” Id. at 349. Similarly, with respect to punitive damages, the Court concluded in Gertz that 
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September, Powell further set forth his own views on the issue in a note 
to his law clerk, which largely accorded with the clerk’s proposal: 
I have gradually become persuaded that at least in personal 
injury cases—or perhaps in any cases where compensatory 
damages are provable—punitive damages are an archaic 
carryover from a different age. The difference is that the proof 
of compensatory damages has become a specialized professional 
skill. There is less need for punitive damages.233 
Powell then reflected on his own practice as a lawyer: 
In the early years of my law practice I tried a number of suits, 
including common law and FELA damage suits, brought against 
the Southern Railroad. My law firm was state litigation counsel. 
Proof even of compensatory damages was rather primitive. 
Punitive damages were rarely even requested. Today, techniques 
of proof, developed by the American Trial Lawyers Association, 
enable injured plaintiffs to recover fully for present and 
estimated future damages, including speculative damages for 
pain and suffering.234 
He then proceeded to base his inability to join Brennan’s opinion from 
the previous term on “two considerations”—(1) “particularly in 
                                                     
“juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to 
the actual harm caused[, which] . . . unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship.” 
Id. at 350. For many of the same reasons, the approach advocated by Powell’s clerk would have 
gone even further than Gertz and extended the protections afforded by the First Amendment against 
the award of presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions beyond those provided by the 
actual malice standard to include, in the case of punitive damages, their outright prohibition in 
defamation cases, and, in the case of presumed damages, their limitation to cases in which the 
plaintiff would not otherwise be fully compensated for its loss by an award of provable damages. 
233. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz 1 (Sept. 13, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
234. Id. at 1, 2. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, was passed 
in 1908 to create a cause of action under federal law for railroad workers to sue their employers for 
negligence in connection with workplace illness or injury. Powell’s representation in FELA cases 
dated back decades. See, e.g., Fore v. S. Ry. Co., 178 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1949) (ruling that plaintiff 
failed to show negligence on part of railroad); S. Ry. Co. v. Mays, 63 S.E.2d 720 (Va. 1951) (ruling 
that plaintiff’s negligence caused his death and railroad was not responsible). In both these cases, 
Powell served as co-counsel defending the railroad. Powell also defended the railroad against 
personal injury lawsuits seeking damages that were not FELA cases. See, e.g., Nichols v. S. Ry. 
Co., 45 S.E.2d 913 (Va. 1948) (ruling that the negligence of the farmer caused his own death when 
he was struck by train while walking his cows across tracks); S. Ry. Co. v. Barker, 4 S.E.2d 395 
(Va. 1939) (holing that the railway was responsible for sparks that ignited plaintiff’s truck and hay). 
For a history of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, including efforts to educate lawyers 
about trying damage cases, see RICHARD S. JACOBSON & JEFFREY R. WHITE, DAVID V. GOLIATH: 
ATLA AND THE FIGHT FOR EVERYDAY JUSTICE (2004), available at 
http://www.poundinstitute.org/davidvgoliath.aspx. 
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defamation cases, it is difficult to prove compensatory damages, and 
injured persons would be without a remedy,”235 and (2) “I am reluctant 
to have this Court constitutionalize the common law of a large number 
of states only in defamation cases.”236Accordingly, Powell saw the 
challenge before him as whether “I could write a principled opinion 
holding that punitive damages—by definition a penalty—lawfully may 
be imposed only by the state in cases where compensatory damages can 
be proved.”237 This, Powell recognized, “would be an unprecedented 
change, but the system as a whole would be fairer.”238 
Four days later, Powell wrote to the law clerk again, this time after 
having “reread the opinions last Term, and also in Gertz.”239 As 
reargument fast approached, he described himself “not at rest,”240 and 
identified three “intriguing”241 paths he might take. He could, he wrote, 
(1) stand on last term’s dissent; (2) retain its substance but “add a 
separate Part that argues more fully the difference between allowing 
punitive damages in defamation cases and in cases (particularly damage 
suits) in which fully compensatory damages are provable and 
recoverable;”242 or (3) “join the Court’s judgment but argue that punitive 
damages in all types of cases—absent proof of malice (as defined)—
violate the Constitution.”243 Under the last option, “New York Times 
would be extended as WJB proposes to all defamation actions.”244 On 
one copy of this memorandum in his files, however, Powell had crossed 
through this third alternative and written “confused dictation” in the 
                                                     
235. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz, supra note 233, at 2. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. (emphasis in original). 
238. Id. Powell’s consideration of these issues preceded, albeit by only a few years, the Court’s 
subsequent and detailed body of precedent subjecting awards of punitive damages generally to 
constitutional scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (imposing such limitations); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 
18 (1991) (deciding for first time whether punitive damage award violated due process); Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989) (noting, as of 1989, the 
issue as to “whether due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive damages 
in the absence of any express statutory limit . . . must await another day”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
239. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz 1 (Sept. 17, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
240. Id. at 5. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 3. 
243. Id. at 4. 
244. Id.  
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margin.245 
Some days later, Powell’s law clerk provided to him the answers to 
several questions the Justice had posed about an approach that would 
“(i) deny punitive damages in all libel actions, (ii) allow presumed 
damages in all non-media action without proof of actual malice, and (iii) 
allow presumed damages against media defendants only on a showing of 
actual malice.”246 The clerk noted that, “[i]nsofar as your rule would 
deny punitive damages to public persons even when actual malice is 
shown,” it would “alter the New York Times v. Sullivan rule.”247 That led 
Powell, on the eve of the Conference, to again memorialize his own 
thoughts, candidly admitting in a memorandum to himself that “I am not 
sure I have yet thought through all of the implications of trying to 
develop a new theory of damage liability.”248 Remarkably, Powell also 
confessed (albeit only to himself and presumably to his law clerk) this 
about his opinion in Gertz: 
Although I was proud of the opinion at the time, I now view it as 
far too long and unnecessarily broad in its sweep. I hope I have 
learned a good deal about opinion writing since the 1973 Term. 
But, I think the basic holding of Gertz is clear and [was] sound 
at that time.249 
Having now revisited the issues raised in Gertz, Powell decided that, 
“[s]ubject to further thought and discussions,” he should “consider” 
permitting presumed damages without a showing of malice in “private 
defamation cases such as this,”250 but still hold that “punitive damages 
are not recoverable in any defamation case without regard to whether or 
not malice is proved. Recovery against a media defendant would be 
limited to presumed damages, and allow these only when malice as 
defined at common law is proved.”251 And, Powell noted, his rule 
“against the imposition of punitive damages in defamation cases would 
be broad enough to apply to any cases in which compensatory damages 
                                                     
245. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz, supra note 239, at 1. 
246.  Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Oct. 4, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
247. Id. 
248. Personal memorandum of Justice Powell 1 (Oct. 4, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 4. 
251. Id. at 5. 
04 - Levine & Wermiel Article .docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:54 PM 
46 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
may be recovered.”252 
 
B.  The Reargument and Conference 
 
In his Term History, Brennan described the reargument itself as 
revealing “little new.”253 The subsequent Conference, however, was—as 
                                                     
252. Id. 
253. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 92. At the outset of the 
reargument, the Dun & Bradstreet lawyer, Gordon Lee Garrett, was peppered with questions about 
whether the defendant was a media company or not and whether that made a difference in the case. 
The transcript, Transcript of Oral Argument at 2–5, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (No. 83-18), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_18, contains the following exchange between 
unnamed Justices and Garrett: 
QUESTION: I wonder if you would tell me your definition of the difference between media 
and non-media. I can understand it clearly if a private individual writes a letter and makes the 
statement. That person as an individual is probably non-media. But what is your definition of 
non-media generally? 
MR. GARRETT: Your Honor, I think that is the rub in this case when it comes to deciding 
constitutional limitations on presumed and punitive damages. Obviously, the media could be 
defined as one who uses a medium to communicate information, and Dun and Bradstreet, 
much like a newspaper, does that. We hire reporters to obtain information which our 
subscribers will want. 
QUESTION: Now, we have in Washington I don’t know how many, but I suppose it must be a 
great number of letters, like The Kiplinger Letter, that goes out every week or periodically, 
sometimes on a broad range of subjects, sometimes on a limited subject like labor law. 
Is that media or non-media? 
MR. GARRETT: It seems to me, Your Honor, while The Kiplinger Letter, like Dun and 
Bradstreet, may not be considered the traditional media, it is certainly media in that it is an 
organization that communicates information to its readers which have a reason to know that. 
QUESTION: Is that issue before us, counsel? You didn’t bring that issue up here. 
MR. GARRETT: The media/non-media issue? That is the very basis that the Vermont 
Supreme Court ruled against Dun and Bradstreet in this case. 
QUESTION: I know, but they held that you were non-media. 
MR. GARRETT: They held—they said— 
QUESTION: Did you challenge that in your petition for certiorari? 
MR. GARRETT: Oh, absolutely, Your Honor. Well, we did not—we have never taken the 
position, Your Honor, that we were the traditional media. 
QUESTION: Are you taking the position that you are media? 
MR. GARRETT: We certainly take the position that we are media for the application of the 
Gertz rules on presumed and punitive damages. 
QUESTION: Well, of course, your first question presented in certiorari is, do the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution permit private plaintiffs to recover presumed 
compensatory damages or generally for libel against a non-media defendant? 
MR. GARRETT: That is correct, Your Honor. As I said, we have never taken the position that 
Dun and Bradstreet was part of the traditional media like the New York Times or CBS, but we 
certainly are media in the sense that we communicate information to our subscribers. 
QUESTION: Yes, but the way you present the case to us is that— let’s assume that this is a 
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Brennan later put it—“another story.”254 This was especially so because, 
at the time, the other Justices—including Brennan—apparently had no 
idea what was taking place inside Powell’s chambers. 
At the Conference, Burger began the discussion by once again 
declining to take a firm position. According to Powell’s notes, Burger 
asserted that the media had not traditionally “been given special 
protection”255 and that “D&B, & Kiplinger, & others who give advice 
are different from media,” although they “inflict more damage.”256 By 
the same token, Burger said he would “not extend Gertz,”257 which, he 
added, he “didn’t agree [with] then, & don’t agree [with] now,”258 
because the “[r]ationale of media cases does not apply to private 
defendant[s].”259 Thus, although the case had now been argued twice on 
its merits, Burger reiterated that he would prefer to dismiss the writ 
                                                     
non-media defendant, and then does Gertz apply to non-media defendants. That is the question 
you put to us. 
MR. GARRETT: That is correct— 
QUESTION: So we have to get into whether Dun and Bradstreet is or isn’t a media defendant? 
MR. GARRETT: Your Honor, I think it is— 
QUESTION: You say we don’t, really, in this question. 
MR. GARRETT: Well, I think it is quite correct that the constitutional prohibitions against 
presumed and punitive damages don’t depend on the nature of the speaker or the subject matter 
of his speech. 
QUESTION: Right. I thought you thought in order to win your case you would have to 
convince us that Gertz applies to non-media defendants generally, and I think that is your 
whole argument, too, in your brief. 
MR. GARRETT: I think certainly that that would win the case for us, Your Honor. 
QUESTION: How do we reach that question if we don’t know what a non-media defendant is? 
MR. GARRETT: Well, I think that is the very problem in the case, Your Honor, that it would 
force the Court to go back to basically the Rosenbloom ad hoc test to make determinations on 
who is and who is not the media, and I think the most important thing is that the rationale for 
the Gertz opinion simply does not depend on those kinds of distinctions. 
254. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 92. 
255. Justice Powell, Conference Notes (Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Oct. 5, 
1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
256. Id. Kiplinger, to which Burger referred, and which was also referenced in the second 
argument, see the transcript for the Dun & Bradstreet reargument, supra note 253, is a company that 
publishes numerous newsletters and magazines that analyze the economy and offer economic and 
investing advice, perhaps the most famous being The Kiplinger Letter.  
257. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255. 
258. Id.; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(expressing concern that right to counsel would be hindered if every lawyer was “fair game for 
irresponsible reporters and editors”).  
259. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255. 
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entirely, but “will not reverse.”260 
That left the field open for the combatants from the previous term to 
launch their initial salvos, proceeding as always in order of seniority. 
Brennan began by reiterating the views expressed in his previous, albeit 
ill-fated opinion. According to a Memorandum to the Conference he 
prepared, and likely read as was his custom by this time in his tenure on 
the Court, Brennan was unusually blunt. After noting that “[n]othing 
presented on reargument has changed my mind,”261 he limited his 
“remarks to three items that I believe to be of particular significance.”262 
First, he wrote: 
[T]his Court has never accepted the distinction between media 
and non-media defendants. Are we now prepared to announce 
that we have changed our minds and that the billion dollar media 
industry in this country is deserving of greater first amendment 
protection that the individual citizen or the “lonely 
pamphleteer”? I hope not.263 
Second, Brennan asserted, even if the Court were to attempt to make 
such a distinction, “there is no principled way to draw a line between 
Dun & Bradstreet and innumerable other corporations and organizations, 
including the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, that publish 
for financial gain and rely upon the accuracy of those publications to 
attract subscribers.”264 Third, Brennan argued that “the distinction 
between public and non-public speech”265 that Powell had proposed the 
previous term “does not sufficiently protect the values behind the first 
amendment,”266 which is “concerned not only with furthering self-
government but also with guaranteeing the dignity of the individual.”267 
                                                     
260. Id. 
261. Memorandum from Justice Brennan for the Conference 1 (undated) (on file with the 
Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
262. Id. 




267. Id. In this passage, Brennan alluded to two of the leading theories typically advanced to 
explain why the First Amendment properly protects the freedom of expression. Compare 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) 
(“[The voters] must know what they are voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time 
allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented . . . .”), and 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983) (“[S]peech about ‘the manner in which government is 
operated or should be operated’ is an essential part of the communications necessary for self-
governance the protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment.”) (quoting Mills 
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In Brennan’s view, “[e]conomic, social, and religious information plays 
a critical role in that process.”268 
For his part, White offered a new twist on the position he had 
announced in June. Not unexpectedly, he began by saying he was 
prepared to overrule Gertz. According to Powell’s notes, White said that, 
“Gertz is dead wrong,” but had been “accepted . . . as a precedent.”269 If 
“we still accept Gertz,” he added, “it is not easy to avoid it here.”270 
Accordingly, he said, he would vote to affirm if the Court were prepared 
to overrule Gertz but, if not, he would vote to reverse, but would join 
only in the judgment, “probably” in a separate opinion.271 And, although 
the comment apparently and somewhat remarkably escaped Brennan’s 
attention at the time (since it is not noted in his Term History or taken 
into account in his subsequent strategy), Powell’s notes indicate that 
White also told his colleagues that, “[New York Times] also was [a] 
mistake.”272 
After Marshall and Blackmun reaffirmed their support for Brennan, 
Powell, as Brennan described it in his Term History, “stirred the 
soup.”273 After voicing continued support for a media/nonmedia 
distinction, he floated his proposal that presumed and punitive damages 
be treated differently. As Brennan later put it, this proposal not only 
came “out of the blue,” but it had also not been considered by the court 
below, by the litigants in their briefing, or by any member of the Court 
                                                     
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)), with THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE 
EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (“The proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities 
as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realization the mind must be free. Hence 
suppression of belief [or] opinion . . . is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man’s 
essential nature.”). Notably, the second rationale is not mentioned in Sullivan. See generally New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 274 (1964). See also Kalven, Jr., supra note 3, at 209 (noting 
that, in Sullivan “the Court is carried along by a momentum of insight about the democratic 
necessities for free speech” (citation omitted)). For a general overview of the First Amendment’s 
theoretical underpinnings and supporting sources, see LEE LEVINE, ROBERT C. LIND, SETH D. 
BERLIN & C. THOMAS DIENES, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 1.02 (4th ed. 2011). 
268. Memorandum from Justice Brennan for the Conference, supra note 261, at 1. Powell’s notes 
suggest that Brennan delivered essentially these views at the Conference. According to Powell, 
Brennan saw “no distinction between media and non-media [defendants]” and “certainly no real 
difference between D&B and conventional media.” Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 
255, at 1. Powell also recorded Brennan as saying that, “every member of society [is] entitled to 
‘robust speech,’” to which Powell added the parenthetical “even falsehoods about one’s 
bankruptcy.” Id.  




273. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 92.  
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the previous term.274 
Powell described his own vote at Conference as one “to affirm in part 
and reverse in part.”275 While he emphasized that he was “not entirely at 
rest,” he asserted that he “will not agree a non-media defendant is 
entitled to the same protection as media.”276 He then set forth what he 
described as his “tentative [thinking].”277 He again asserted (albeit 
incorrectly) that “all prior cases applying the First Amendment in 
defamation cases have involved media defendants,” and that “Gertz 
involved a private plaintiff and the same First Amendment concerns 
identified in New York Times for media defendants existed.”278 
According to Powell, “at risk [in Gertz] was freedom of the press to 
express views on public issues.”279 In Powell’s view, “none of these 
concerns is present when one private person is libeled by another private 
person.”280 If the Court were to adopt Brennan’s view, Powell said, “we 
are talking about changing the common law—centuries old.”281 Thus, 
Powell asserted, “Gertz must be read in the context of a media 
defendant” and, “if it can be read otherwise, it is dicta.”282 
At this point, Powell proceeded to explain that his dissent the 
previous term “adhered to [the] common law”283 by concluding that 
“only falsity and publication need be shown to be entitled to presumed 
and punitive damages.”284 Now, he said, he was advocating a “possible 
modification of the common law,”285 one which reflected what he 
perceived as “a major difference between presumed and punitive 
damages,” that would reflect the fact that “the purpose of one [is] to 
compensate” while “the purpose of the other [is] to punish.”286 After 
pointing to the criticism of punitive damages contained in Brennan’s 
opinion from the previous term,287 Powell said he “would consider” 
                                                     
274. Id.  
275. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. For an earlier discussion of this issue, see supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text 
(emphasis in original).  
279. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255 (emphasis in original). 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 




286. Id. (emphasis in original). 
287. Id.; see supra note 142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the controversy over the 
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erecting a regime that would “allow presumed damages against non-
media defendants without proof of malice” because, in cases such as 
Greenmoss Builders, “proof of actual damages is often impossible”288 
and “many private persons libeled can’t afford to prove malice.”289 But, 
he said, his construct would “allow punitive [damages] only on proof of 
malice as defined” in Sullivan.290 
From Brennan’s perspective, Powell’s strategy was, to say the least, 
unclear. Although his negative views of punitive damages were by this 
time well known, his proposal did not appear to be designed to 
command a majority. It would appear especially unlikely to appeal to 
White, who particularly abhorred Powell’s extensive renovations of the 
common law in the name of the First Amendment in Gertz itself. 
Brennan speculated that Powell might have thought the approach would 
solidify the votes of Rehnquist and O’Connor, both of whom had 
similarly expressed disdain for punitive damages more generally, as well 
as Brennan and his allies, who disapproved of them in defamation cases 
against the media.291 It is also conceivable that Powell thought his 
proposal would be attractive to White, who had generally suggested in 
his Gertz dissent that the First Amendment’s focus should be on limiting 
damage awards, not on further tinkering with common law liability 
rules.292 
Regardless of its motivation, the Powell proposal was, as Brennan put 
it, “dead on arrival”293 at the Conference. No member of the Court 
embraced it. Rehnquist appeared satisfied to leave the common law 
where it was in all respects. According to Powell’s notes, Rehnquist said 
that he had “joined Gertz because he thought it was [the] least 
objectionable view at the time.”294 Addressing Powell’s latest proposal, 
Rehnquist said that, “if punitive damages are ok in other types of 
litigation, they are ok in libel cases.”295 Powell’s notes of Rehnquist’s 
                                                     
use of punitive damages in Brennan’s earlier opinion.  
288. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255 (emphasis in original). 
289. Id. (emphasis in original). 
290. Id. (emphasis in original). 
291. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 92–93. 
292. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 391 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t 
would appear that [the Court’s] new requirements with respect to general and punitive damages 
would be ample protection. Why it also feels compelled to escalate the threshold standard of 
liability I cannot fathom . . . .”). 
293. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 93. 
294. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255. 
295. Id. 
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comments also include two parenthetical comments. In one, Powell 
indicated that, “Bill [Rehnquist] said to me privately (at a break) that as 
of now he would not abolish punitive damages here unless we [overrule] 
Gertz.”296 In another, which may or may not have reflected what 
Rehnquist actually said at Conference, Powell noted that, “Bill agrees 
with BRW that New York Times was a mistake.”297 
Stevens, at least according to Powell’s notes, said he “agree[d] with 
some” of what Powell had said “about punitive damages.”298 In addition, 
Stevens expressed some sympathy for “clarify[ing] presumed damages 
to hold that a plaintiff can’t rely on the presumption alone” but must 
introduce “some evidence” of harm.299 Still, Stevens asserted, the 
damages issue was “before us” and he believed that, at the end of the 
day, “D&B should get as much protection” as a media defendant.300 
For her part, O’Connor continued to focus on distinctions drawn 
based on the identity of the speaker and the content of the speech. 
Although Powell noted that she too was “not at rest,”301 O’Connor 
emphasized that “we have distinguished different types of speech—
commercial, fire in crowded theater, obscenity”302 in past cases and that, 
in her view, “D&B is more akin to private speech than to media.”303 
C.  The Battle Resumes 
From Brennan’s perspective, the result of the Conference appeared to 
be that, since Powell had not indicated a willingness to overrule Gertz, 
Brennan had retained White’s vote and the majority.304 Accordingly, on 
October 30, 1984, Brennan re-circulated his putative majority opinion 
from the previous term, with only minor modifications.305 Within forty-







302. Id.; see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Svc. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 
(1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without 
redeeming social importance.”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.”); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
303. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 255. 
304. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 93. 
305. Id. 
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eight hours, Stevens, Blackmun and Marshall joined it.306 O’Connor, not 
surprisingly, promptly responded that she would “await further writing” 
before “deciding what action to take”307 and Powell wrote Brennan that, 
“[a]s you would expect, my position remains basically in dissent. I may 
make some changes, however, in the draft I circulated last Term.”308 He 
added that it “may take me a while to get this done.”309 
Indeed, Powell and his clerk spent almost two months working on his 
new opinion. On November 12, after all four of Powell’s clerks310 had 
reviewed the first draft, they sent him a carefully worded memorandum 
detailing what they described as “a tension” in his reasoning, “which 
may appear an inconsistency.”311 As they explained it, “[a]lthough you 
criticize Justice Brennan for abrogating the common law, your own 
position now also abrogates it. We realized this might be a problem, but 
I am unsure how to minimize it.”312 The memorandum then set out 
several alternatives, two of which Powell endorsed in the margin: (1) 
“criticize Justice Brennan not for abrogating the common law, but for 
abrogating it unnecessarily,”313 and (2) criticize “him for being 
unfaithful to the aim of the common law”314—i.e., “although you are 
abrogating the common law, you are at least remaining true to its most 
important aim in damages—compensation—while Justice Brennan is 
not.”315 With this, Powell enthusiastically agreed, writing “Yes!”316 in 
the margin and adding the following by hand: “and the common law in 
England has been changed with respect to punitive damages.”317 In 
                                                     
306. Id. 
307. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan (Oct. 30, 1984) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
308. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Oct. 30, 1984) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
309. Id. 
310. Powell’s law clerks that Term were Arthur Bentley III, Annmarie Levins, Daniel Ortiz, and 
Lynda Simpson. 
311. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Nov. 12, 1984) (with handwritten 
notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
312. Id. 
313. Id.  
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 2. 
316. Id. (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell). 
317. Id. Less than ten years earlier, the United Kingdom’s Faulks Committee on Defamation had 
issued a report discussing the state of defamation law and making recommendations regarding its 
reform. See Reports of Committees: Report of the Committee on Defamation, 39 MOD. L. REV. 187 
(1976). The Committee came to the conclusion that there was “no logical justification for the 
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subsequent drafts, therefore, Powell and his clerks both emphasized the 
English experience with punitive damages and scrubbed the first section 
of the opinion (i.e., his dissent from the previous Term) to remove 
unnecessary (and potentially awkward) pledges of fidelity to the 
common law.318 
Powell’s own thinking is further revealed, at least in part, in a 
memorandum he wrote to one of his law clerks on October 22, 1984, 
which contained his comments on the clerk’s first draft of Powell’s new 
opinion. As they had discussed, the draft retained most of his opinion 
from the previous term, but also included a new section that separately 
addressed Powell’s proposal for the disparate treatment of presumed and 
punitive damages. The draft followed Gertz in permitting awards of 
punitive damages in any defamation case in which actual malice had 
been proven. This, however, was not what Powell now wanted to do: 
Subject to further thought and discussion with you, I am inclined 
to say that punitive damages are not appropriate even where 
actual malice can be shown. If I reach this conclusion, I would 
hold that in a non-media case (such as this case), presumed 
damages may be recovered with no showing of malice required; 
but where the libel defendant is a member of the media, I would 
require proof of actual malice as a predicate for recovering 
presumed damages.319 
                                                     
retention of exemplary damages, and therefore recommends their abolition.” Id. at 193. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, the United Kingdom generally, and England specifically, has become 
the destination of choice for so-called “libel tourists,” persons allegedly defamed by publications 
circulated around the world who choose the courts of England as the most hospitable forum for 
litigation. See, e.g., Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum 
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Unguaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 
883, 905 (2006) (“The United Kingdom has notoriously plaintiff-friendly laws for defamation that 
attract ‘libel tourists’ who try to take advantage of the pro-plaintiff laws.”); Rachel Ehrenfeld, 
Britain’s Half-Hearted Bid to Reform Libel Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/opinion/britains-half-hearted-bid-to-reform-libel-law.html 
(“[English libel law] chills free speech through the award of disproportionate damages, a lack of 
viable defenses and the application of the law to cases with only the slightest links to Britain, even 
when neither party lives there, a practice that has led to what is known as ‘libel tourism.’”). In 
response, Parliament is currently considering a libel reform act that would, among other things, strip 
British courts of jurisdiction in such cases unless “of all the places in which the statement 
complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in 
which to bring an action in respect of the statement.” Defamation Bill, 2012–13, H.C. Bill [51] cl. 9 
(Gr. Brit.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-
2013/0051/cbill_2012-20130051_en_2.htm#pb1-l1g1. 
318. See, e.g., Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent One (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Nov. 23, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee 
Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
319. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz 3 (Oct. 22, 1984) (on file with the 
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And then in a crucial passage, Powell added: 
  Of course, the foregoing views would be a significant 
departure from New York Times and Gertz. This departure might 
have considerable attraction for the members of the Court who 
have joined WJB. It would be rejected heatedly by Justices who 
joined me last Term. If we went this route, WJB might take this 
part of my opinion away from me. I believe he would be 
deterred, however, by recognizing that he would be retreating 
from his views as to punitive damages in Smith v. Wade and the 
Court’s opinion in Silkwood. In any event, this would be an 
interesting situation.320 
His October 22 memorandum to his clerk reveals Powell’s desire to 
pull back from Gertz in another respect as well. Addressing language in 
the clerk’s draft that, drawing from Gertz, asserted that “presumed 
damages share some of the problems of punitive damages,”321 Powell 
counseled that it was “best not to emphasize—as the draft does—
language from that case. My thinking in this area has undergone a good 
deal of refinement in the first private libel case I have considered 
carefully.”322 
Powell finally circulated his own opinion on November 23, 
denominating it, as he had indicated he would at Conference, one 
“concurring in part and dissenting in part.”323 When he circulated it to 
Burger, Rehnquist and O’Connor, he added a cover letter. In it, Powell 
told them that the opinion “adhere[d] to my view of last Term that the 
entire law of libel should not be constitutionalized” because that “would 
be an unprecedented extension of New York Times and Gertz.”324 At the 
same time, Powell advised his colleagues that: 
                                                     
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
320. Id. In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), Justice Brennan authored an opinion for a 5-4 
majority, finding that punitive damages could be awarded against a prison guard in an action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a jury finds reckless or callous conduct. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
464 U.S. 238 (1984), the Court held by a 5-4 majority, which included Brennan that the award of 
punitive damages to the family of Karen Silkwood, who was exposed to plutonium at a nuclear 
plant but died in a car accident, was not preempted and therefore not prohibited under federal law. 
Powell’s point was that, in both of these cases, Brennan voted on the side that favored an award of 
punitive damages. 
321. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz, supra note 319, at 4. 
322. Id. 
323. Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent One, supra note 318.  
324. Cover Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger with copies sent to Justices 
Rehnquist and O’Connor (Nov. 23, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law 
Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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  After considerable thought, I have concluded that punitive 
damages should be abolished except where authorized by a 
statute that prescribes appropriate standards. The imposition of 
punishment is a function of the state, not of lay juries without 
standards or statutory limitations. I do not see how permitting a 
jury to impose private fines can be reconciled with the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Also, the purpose of tort recovery is to 
compensate—not to confer a windfall.325 
He concluded by noting that his “opinion is divided into parts so that 
you may, if you wish, join it in part. You would be welcome.”326 
D.  Powell’s Folly 
Powell’s new approach fell largely on deaf ears. White, Rehnquist, 
and O’Connor did not respond to it, at least in communications shared 
with the rest of the Conference. Something, however, did appear to be 
afoot, albeit unbeknownst to Brennan. The first hint came on November 
29, when Burger wrote to his colleagues that, because he was “hav[ing] 
some problems with the case,” he would “await Byron’s views which, I 
gather, he may write out.”327 Brennan had not previously been informed 
that White had taken up his pen. That same day, again unbeknownst to 
Brennan, Rehnquist wrote to Powell with copies to Burger and 
O’Connor, similarly to advise him that “I agree more with your separate 
opinion in this case than I do with Bill Brennan’s proposed opinion, but 
I have enough reservations about yours so I think that I will wait and see 
what Byron writes. I am not yet ready to prohibit punitive damages in 
defamation cases.”328 
On December 14, Brennan circulated a second draft of his own 
opinion, in which he responded, albeit briefly and only in footnotes, to 
Powell’s new proposal. With respect to Powell’s proposed treatment of 
presumed damages, Brennan confined himself largely to criticizing once 
again the distinction between media and nonmedia defendants on which 
it was premised, citing a host of cases in which state courts had not 
                                                     
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference (Nov. 29, 1984) (on file with the 
Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
328. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Powell with copies to Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice O’Connor (Nov. 29, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law 
Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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distinguished between them in adjudicating defamation cases.329 With 
respect to Powell’s call to abolish punitive damages, Brennan pointed 
out that Powell had articulated the same rationale in Gertz itself for 
limiting, but not abolishing, both punitive and presumed damages.330 In 
addition, Brennan took aim at Powell’s contention that presumed 
damages should be awarded “in the realm of commercial expression” 
absent a showing of malice, despite the fact, as Brennan saw it, in such 
cases “proving that actual damages occurred is relatively easy.”331 
In Powell’s chambers, Brennan’s minimal treatment of his opinion 
was viewed as “surprising[].”332 In response to Brennan’s use of 
Powell’s own language in Gertz to undermine his newly minted 
distinction between presumed and punitive damages, Powell himself 
drafted a rejoinder, also as a footnote: 
  My opinion for the Court in Gertz, as the Court today notes, 
did not distinguish between presumed and punitive damages in 
libel suits against media defendants. Upon the more mature 
reflection, required in this case in which the Court 
constitutionalizes the entire law of libel, I find both historic and 
logical reasons for the distinction I now make.333 
Building on that logic, Powell added: 
  The purpose of presumed damages essentially is 
compensatory. As I have noted in the text above, they are 
appropriate where it is clear from the nature of the libel that 
injury occurred and where proving a dollar amount for the injury 
often is impossible. This compensatory rationale for allowing 
presumed damages is wholly different from allowing a private 
litigant to punish a defendant by awarding punitive damages 
without due process of any kind.334 
In addition, Powell’s chambers reviewed all of the state cases 
Brennan had cited, and undertook additional research concerning the 
                                                     
329. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion Two 22–23 n.10 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc.) (Dec. 14, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
330. Id. at 15 n.9; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974). 
331. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion Two, supra note 329, at 21 n.9. 
332. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Dec. 17, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
333. Personal memorandum of Justice Powell (Dec. 17, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
334. Id. 
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comparative fates of media and nonmedia defendants at common law. In 
the course of doing so, Powell’s law clerk was obliged to make an 
embarrassing admission to the Justice. Specifically, on December 18, 
1984, the clerk wrote to Powell that, “in going through all the state cases 
I was pushed into rereading New York Times and [a] few of this Court’s 
other pre-Gertz cases. I noticed that several of them, including New York 
Times itself, apply the actual malice standard to nonmedia 
defendants.”335 
In writing at least, Powell took the clerk’s discovery in stride. In 
handwritten notes in its margins, he pronounced the memo “perceptive,” 
indicated his agreement with its recommended fix, and expressed 
“surprise” both by the “string of new cases” Brennan had cited and by 
the fact that “apparently WJB and I both missed” the Court’s own prior 
cases applying the actual malice standard to nonmedia defendants.336 
Over the following days, therefore, Powell and his clerk worked to 
revise the opinion, inserting multiple references to “public expression”337 
and “media expression”338 in those places where its predecessor had 
referred to “suits against a media defendant,”339 and to recraft its 
characterization of Greenmoss Builders as a case involving “private 
expression”340 rather than a “nonmedia defendant.”341 Isolated references 
                                                     
335. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 2 (Dec. 18, 1984) (with handwritten 
notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355 (citing St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64 (1964)); see supra notes 36–43, 169–74, 278 and accompanying text. The law clerk added 
that, by pointing this out, he was not suggesting “that you should abandon your distinction between 
media and nonmedia defendants. Rather, I recommend that you modify it. From your dissent, it 
appears that you are not interested so much in distinguishing between media and nonmedia 
defendants as between libels involving media and nonmedia expression.” Memorandum from 
Daniel Ortiz, supra, at 2 (emphasis added). After pointing out that all of the Court’s prior cases 
involving nonmedia defendants nevertheless involved speech by them disseminated through the 
media, the clerk suggested that Powell “consider recharacterizing the distinction as one between 
private and public expression. This recharacterization would better accord with this Court’s prior 
cases and would also harmonize nearly all of the state cases Justice Brennan cites.” Id. at 3. The 
clerk concluded by apologizing to Powell for “suggesting such a change to you now,” explaining 
that, in earlier drafts, he “did not question last year’s research in the earlier part of the opinion.” Id. 
at 4. 
336. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz, supra note 335, at 1. 
337. See Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent Two passim (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Dec. 21, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review).  
338. See id. 
339. See Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent One, supra note 318, at 1. 
340. See Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent Two, supra note 337, passim. 
341. See Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent One, supra note 318, passim. 
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to the “press clause” of the First Amendment were also jettisoned.342 
And, Powell responded to Brennan’s string cite of state cases by 
pointing out that, “though not invariably clear, these cases involved 
public expression pertaining to ‘public questions.’”343 This, Powell now 
discovered, “is a critical distinction” because “[t]he case before us today 
involves a privately communicated libel by one private party against 
another on a subject of little First Amendment concern.”344 
Powell circulated his revised draft to the Conference on December 21. 
With it, the major premise for the petition for certiorari and the central 
issue over which the Justices had skirmished the entire preceding term, 
not to mention the central issue the Court had asked the parties to 
address at reargument—i.e., whether the constitutional rules announced 
in Sullivan and Gertz applied in defamation actions instituted against 
nonmedia defendants—ceased to be an issue at all, at least for Powell’s 
purposes.345 
E.  Waiting for White 
On December 26, White wrote to Brennan that it would be “some 
time before I am ready in this case,”346 which led to virtual silence from 
all quarters over the next month, at least from the perspective of 
Brennan’s chambers. In fact, on December 29, Powell had written a 
                                                     
342. Compare Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent Two, supra note 337, with Justice 
Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent One, supra note 318, passim. 
343. Personal memorandum of Justice Powell to Daniel Ortiz 2 (Dec. 20, 1984) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355 (emphasis in original) (citing New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).  
344. Id. 
345. See Justice Powell, Draft Concurrence and Dissent Two, supra note 337. On December 20, 
the day before Powell circulated his revised draft, Brennan had received a copy of a letter from 
Burger addressed to Powell, which may well have been forwarded to Brennan’s chambers in error. 
Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell (Dec. 20, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). In it, Burger, 
who was apparently unaware that Powell was about to jettison it entirely, told his colleague that he 
was not comfortable with the media/nonmedia distinction contained in Powell’s initial draft. D&B, 
he wrote, “is not like the New York Times, but it is a second cousin, at least, of the Wall Street 
Journal.” Id. And, Burger added, he, like Rehnquist, was “not ready to drop punitive damages.” Id. 
Burger circulated another letter seven days later, which said largely the same thing—“I cannot 
accept either the media-nonmedia dichotomy or the abolition of punitive damages in libel cases, 
especially the latter. So, very likely I will agree with no one except myself.” Letter from Chief 
Justice Burger to Justice Powell (Dec. 27, 1984) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
346. Letter from Justice White to Justice Brennan (Dec. 26, 1984) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
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“personal” letter to Burger, in which he once again attempted to secure 
his vote. 347 Picking up on Burger’s discomfort with a “media/non-
media” distinction,348 Powell pointed out that, in the “second draft of my 
opinion,” he had “clarified what concerns you. Initially, I had drawn the 
distinction simply between media and nonmedia defendants. After a 
good deal of further research, I concluded that the relevant distinction 
turns on the nature of the speech rather than who the parties are.”349 As a 
result, Powell wrote, “[i]f the speech relates to public issues or public 
persons, my opinion now agrees that the New York Times standard is 
applicable (subject to my view of punitive damages).”350 And, with 
respect to punitive damages, Powell wrote that, although he “share[d]” 
Burger’s “view as to the irresponsibility of what sometimes is reported 
in the press”351—citing specifically a then “recent disclosure to the 
Soviet Union of the purpose of our top secret military satellite”352—he 
had “thought for several years . . . that punitive damages are not 
compatible with due process. My view is not limited to the media.”353 
Powell closed his letter by advising Burger that: 
  I am not urging that you join my dissent—though you would 
be welcome. I do suggest that, in whatever you write, it may be 
prudent to leave yourself free to consider the punitive damages 
issue in nonlibel cases. In the typical product liability, personal 
injury and civil rights cases, compensatory damages normally 
are provable. Adding windfall punitive damages on top of these 
is unprincipled; and is without any of the due process 
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.354 
                                                     
347. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Dec. 29, 1984) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
348. Id. at 1; see also Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell (Dec. 20, 1984) (on file 
with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington 
Law Review). 
349. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger, supra note 347, at 1.  
350. Id.  
351. Id.  
352. Id. This reference is especially ironic because the leak to which Powell apparently was 
referring was by a government employee to a military specialty journal. In 1984, Samuel Loring 
Morison, a Navy intelligence analyst, was accused of leaking to Jane’s Defence Weekly three 
intelligence satellite photographs of a Soviet nuclear submarine under construction. Morison was 
convicted of espionage and sentenced to two years in prison. President Clinton pardoned him in 
2001. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction for 
transmittal of photographs in violation of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (1950)).  
353. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger, supra note 347, at 2. 
354. Id. 
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Shortly thereafter, Powell was diagnosed with prostate cancer and his 
treatment and recovery would keep him away from the Court for several 
months.355 Indeed, although he continued to remain involved in cases, 
including Greenmoss Builders, in which he had participated in the 
argument, dozens of others that were argued in January and February 
1985 after he took ill were either resolved by 4-4 votes, decided without 
him, or held over for argument to the following term.356 
On January 22, 1985, O’Connor delivered a “personal and 
confidential”357 letter to Powell’s chambers, knowing that he was ill and 
instructing his law clerk that it not be shown to him until he was “truly 
ready to go back to work.”358 Still, when the law clerk saw that it 
concerned Greenmoss Builders, he asked O’Connor for permission to 
forward it on to the Justice, since Powell had already asked him “to 
send . . . some materials on this case” and that he was “thinking about 
it.”359 On hearing this, O’Connor’s clerk “thought I could send it along 
so long as I was sure to say that you should not feel any pressure to 
respond or indeed even to think about it until you are back in 
Washington and feeling fine.”360 
O’Connor began her three-page letter by expressing concern that, 
although the “case has been making its uncertain way through this Court 
for two terms now,” she was “not sure the Court will succeed in 
resolving it in any way which I regard as satisfactory.”361 Still, she wrote 
to Powell, “during your illness something has occurred which offers the 
possibility that four, and perhaps five, of us can partially agree on one 
significant feature.”362 Specifically, O’Connor said that White had 
showed her a draft of an opinion that he was contemplating and that, in 
it, White declined to join the Brennan majority.363 Accordingly, 
                                                     
355. Powell had prostate surgery on January 4, 1985, and remained away from the Court at least 
until mid-March. For much of that time, he was at a hospital in Rochester, Minnesota. See Powell 
Back in Hospital; May Go Home Today, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1985, at A8. 
356. Michael S. Serrill, An Illness Ties Up the Justices: The Second Oldest Court Shows the First 
Signs of Age, TIME, Apr. 8, 1985, at 59 (noting that Powell missed fifty-six oral arguments in all). 
357. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell 1 (Jan. 22, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
358. See id.; Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell (Jan, 24, 1985) (with 
handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law 
Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
359. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 358. 
360. Id. 
361. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell, supra note 357, at 1. 
362. Id. 
363. Id.  
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O’Connor wrote, this development was “reason enough to make it 
worthwhile to pursue every avenue of agreement among those in dissent, 
who might thereby become a majority.”364 
In her letter, O’Connor then proceeded to sketch out the contours of a 
“possible agreement” amongst Powell, “Byron, the Chief, Bill 
Rehnquist, and me that the Gertz standards apply at most to expression 
related to matters of public importance.”365 In O’Connor’s view, “[i]f we 
were to all agree that the nature of the speech, rather than the nature of 
the speaker, determines whether Gertz applies, I believe we could then 
also agree this case should be affirmed, at least in part.”366 O’Connor 
told Powell that she “appreciate[d]” that, “in order to solidify our votes 
on this point, certain language in Gertz will have to be explained.”367 
Nevertheless, she asserted, Powell’s then-current draft, “by 
distinguishing between ‘public expression’ and ‘private expression[,]’ 
already approaches the position that Gertz only applies to expression 
concerning matters of public importance.”368 Thus, in O’Connor’s view, 
“[i]t is certainly plausible to contend that the reasons for imposing 
constitutional limits on state libel laws as in New York Times v. Sullivan 
and in Gertz are not substantially implicated where the libelous 
expression does not concern a matter of public importance.”369 In this 
regard, she noted, in an observation that Brennan had predicted when it 
was decided, that Time, Inc. v. Firestone370 “also is consistent with this 
view in its reliance on a content-based categorization of speech to 
determine whether the plaintiff was a public figure.”371 In the end, 




367. Id.  
368. Id. 
369. Id. at 2. 
370. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
371. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell, supra note 357, at 2. Echoing Marshall’s 
dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stewart, J.), Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, had criticized the Rosenbloom plurality’s 
application of the actual malice standard to allegedly defamatory falsehoods that addressed matters 
of “public concern,” regardless of the status of the plaintiff. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 345 (1974). Powell asserted that such a rule was both unworkable and unwise because it would 
“forc[e] state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 
‘general or public interest’ and which do not.” Id. at 346. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, however, the 
Court appeared to reintroduce essentially the same concept by defining limited purpose public 
figures to include only those persons who had voluntarily injected themselves into a “public 
controversy.” Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454; see id. (“Dissolution of a marriage through judicial 
proceedings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz, even though the marital 
difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading 
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O’Connor proposed that: 
[W]ith some fairly minor changes to parts I–III of your 
circulating draft, it would effectively hold that Gertz applies 
only to speech involving public issues and, therefore, does not 
require a showing of the New York Times type of actual malice 
in this case. I strongly suspect you could get the additional four 
votes for that approach, even if not all the same votes were 
available for the punitive damages aspect. I would certainly be 
able to join at least parts I–III, and I believe the others would as 
well.372 
Powell apparently read the letter immediately upon its receipt, noting 
in the margin of his clerk’s cover memorandum that O’Connor’s 
“suggestion has merit” and that he would “pursue it with sympathetic 
interest.”373 
Three days later, on January 25, 1985, White sent Brennan a note 
shortly before noon. It read, in its entirety: 
Dear Bill, 
  It will not surprise you, I am sure, to learn that I am voting to 
affirm in this case. I shall circulate shortly indicating my 
position. Neither am I joining Lewis [Powell] at this point. 
Having said this, I am fleeing the city for a week or two.374 
And there things stood at high noon on January 25, 1985. By then, the 
Greenmoss Builders case had been on the Court’s calendar for nearly 
two years, had spawned two sets of briefs and arguments on the merits, 
and had consumed literally hundreds of pages of opinions that had yet to 
be issued. Still, at that moment, the case was no closer to decision than it 
was when Byron White first drafted a dissent from what he believed was 
the Court’s wrong-headed inclination to deny review in the first place. 
At this juncture, it appeared that it was effectively up to White to 
determine the outcome. 
                                                     
public”); id. at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a public trial amounted to a public 
controversy); id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Gertz obviously did not intend to sanction any 
such inquiry [into whether an event is a public controversy] by its use of the term ‘public 
controversy.’ Yet that is precisely how I understand the Court’s opinion to interpret Gertz.”). 
372. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell, supra note 357, at 2. 
373. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 358.  
374. Letter from Justice White to Justice Brennan (Jan. 25, 1985) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review).  
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III.  ACT III—THE ASSAULT ON SULLIVAN AND THE 
“PUBLIC/PRIVATE” DISTINCTION 
A.  White’s Bombshell 
As it turned out, Brennan did not have long to wait to learn White’s 
“position,” how it differed from Powell’s, at least for the moment, and 
why White had felt obliged to give Brennan some (albeit minimal) 
advance warning both that he was voting to affirm and that he was about 
to “flee” the city. White’s dissent was circulated during the lunch hour 
that very day. It was, as Brennan’s Term History would later describe it, 
a full “frontal assault” on Sullivan itself.375 It did not differ materially 
from the opinion that White ultimately filed in the case and included 
essentially the same proclamation, made by a Justice who had joined, 
without reservation, Brennan’s landmark opinion twenty years earlier: 
I have . . . become convinced that the Court struck an 
improvident balance in the New York Times case between the 
public’s interest in being fully informed about public officials 
and public affairs and the competing interest of those who have 
been defamed in vindicating their reputation.376 
In White’s newly formulated view, Sullivan “countenances two evils: 
first, the stream of information about public officials and public affairs is 
polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and second, 
the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be 
destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasonable 
effort to investigate the facts.”377 To White, “these seem grossly perverse 
results.”378 On reflection, White had come to conclude that, in Sullivan, 
“instead of escalating the plaintiff’s burden of proof to an almost 
impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the 
recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the 
press. . . . Had that course been taken and the common-law standard of 
liability been retained,” White wrote, “the defamed public official, upon 
proving falsity, could at least have had a judgment to that effect” such 
that his “reputation would then be vindicated.”379 
                                                     
375. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 96. 
376. Id. (quoting Justice White). 
377. Justice White, Draft Dissent One 5 (Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Jan. 25, 
1985) (on file with Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the 
Washington Law Review). 
378. Id. 
379. Id. at 7.  
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Perhaps most cutting, in one draft, White characterized the celebrated 
analytical underpinnings of Brennan’s opinion in Sullivan—his equation 
of a “private” defamation action by a public official with the law of 
seditious libel—as an analogy that “substitutes hyperbole for an analysis 
of the interests actually at stake.”380 In the end, White contended, “other 
commercial enterprises in this country must pay for the damages they 
cause as a cost of doing business, and it is difficult to argue that the 
United States did not have a free and vigorous press before the rule in 
New York Times was announced.”381 As a result, White simply was not 
prepared to “assume that the press, as successful and powerful as it is, 
will be intimidated into withholding news that by decent journalistic 
standards it believes to be true.”382 
That afternoon, Brennan was, as he himself described his reaction to 
White’s opinion, “crestfallen.”383 He had expected an attack on Gertz 
but, as Brennan wrote in his Term History, “the gratuitous attack on 
                                                     
380. E.g., Justice White, Draft Dissent Four 8 (Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 29, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
Brennan analyzed the tortured history of the Sedition Act of 1798 and, through that analysis, 
purported both to identify “the central meaning of the First Amendment,” i.e., the 
unconstitutionality of the law of seditious libel, and to explain why the analogous award of civil 
damages to a public official for published criticism of his official conduct at issue in Sullivan 
effectively amounted to the same thing. Id. at 273. “The judgment awarded in this case—without 
the need for any proof of actual pecuniary loss—was one thousand times greater than the maximum 
fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one hundred times greater than that provided by 
the Sedition Act.” Id. at 277. At the time, Alexander Mieklejohn proclaimed, and Professor Harry 
Kalven agreed, that this aspect of Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Sullivan was “an occasion for 
dancing in the streets.” See Kalven, supra note 3, at 221 n.125; see also LEWIS, supra note 4, at 625 
(describing Brennan’s reasoning in this regard in Sullivan as “thrilling” and exuding a sense of 
“grandness”).  
381. Justice White, Draft Dissent Four, supra note 380, at 8. 
382. Id. at 11. Curiously, in a handwritten note to his secretary, which is scrawled across the top 
of a file copy of the January 25 first draft of his dissent, White sketched out what appeared to be a 
draft of a private letter to Powell. It read, “I could join your circulating dissent if you eliminated the 
distinction between public and private distributors and confined Gertz to cases involving publication 
about matters of public concern.” Justice White, Draft Dissent One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (Jan. 25, 1985) (with handwritten notes of Justice White) (on file with the 
White Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. There is no record that White ever had 
this letter typed or sent to Powell, at least in this form, although White made essentially the same 
point in a February 19 letter to O’Connor, a copy of which he also sent to Powell. Letter from 
Justice White to Justices O’Connor and Powell (Feb. 19, 1985) (on file with the White Papers, 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). And, of 
course, in the end, White did not join Powell’s plurality opinion even though it had been so 
narrowed, largely at the behest of Rehnquist and O’Connor. Powell’s efforts to narrow his opinion 
are examined at length in text accompanying infra notes 402–23.  
383. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 96. 
04 - Levine & Wermiel Article .docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:54 PM 
66 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
Times itself could not reasonably have been anticipated in a case 
presenting no question of criticism of government officials.”384 Brennan 
not only feared that other Justices—most notably Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
and Burger, might now join White, he found “deeply troubling” what his 
Term History later characterized as “the notion of a fissure in the very 
foundation of the doctrine of constitutional limits on state defamation 
law,” which he considered one of his “most important contributions to 
the advancement of constitutional law.”385 From Brennan’s perspective, 
“[n]o Justice in twenty years had objected in an opinion to the 
fundamental premises of Times itself.”386 And, although he did not 
mention it in his Term History, Brennan must have remembered that, 
just the previous term, the full Court had reaffirmed Sullivan in emphatic 
terms in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.387 (a 
decision, however, in which White dissented388). 
Accordingly, Brennan wrote to the Conference to say that White’s 
opinion “requires a considered response,” which he said he would 
“undertake to make as soon as I can.”389 While he waited for word from 




387. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Bose Corp., a manufacturer of audio speakers and systems, sued 
Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, for a product review that was less 
than favorable. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined fully by four other 
Justices, held that, when applying the actual malice standard, a judge must determine by 
independent review that there is clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The Court found 
such evidence lacking in the case before it. In his strong defense of the actual malice standard, 
Justice Stevens wrote: 
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding concrete cases; 
it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction 
that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise such review in order to 
preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. The question 
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to 
strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. 
Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in 
the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment 
that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of “actual malice.” 
Id. at 510–11. For a full discussion of Bose, see Levine, supra note 127 (suggesting that Bose was a 
direct response by the Court to the libel lawsuits prosecuted by Generals Westmoreland and 
Sharon). 
388. Bose, 466 U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting). 
389. Memorandum from Justice Brennan for the Conference (Jan. 25, 1985) (on file with the 
Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
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other chambers, Brennan and his clerks considered his options.390 
Indeed, they spent most of the morning of January 28, 1985, doing just 
that. Although the consensus in Brennan’s chambers was that a direct 
response to White’s “jeremiad against Times”391 was imperative, they 
recognized that the vehicle that White had chosen to launch it—a case 
involving credit reporting, not speech criticizing public officials for the 
performance of their official duties—made the task a difficult one. 
Ultimately, Brennan agreed with his clerks’ proposal that they try their 
hand at an opinion that began with a defense of Sullivan, proceeding as it 
must from “Meiklejohnian premises and stress[ing] the chilling effect on 
speech crucial to public affairs and self-government,”392 and moving 
from there to the issue of affording constitutional protection to credit 
reporting, a subject concededly “far” from the “political speech that first 
gave rise to constitutional limits on state defamation law.”393 
B.  Powell’s Appeasement 
While Brennan and his clerks worked on their response to White’s 
broadside, Powell and his chambers pondered how best to respond to 
O’Connor’s overture, especially in the wake of the extreme position 
White had now staked out. Although still not fully recovered from his 
illness and recuperating at home, Powell instructed his clerk to take a 
pass at making the changes that O’Connor had suggested.394 In a 
memorandum to the Justice on February 11, however, the clerk 
confessed his fear that “the changes,” which he understood were 
designed to placate White and make Powell’s opinion “more to his 
liking,” would “practically overrule Gertz in two respects.”395 First, the 
clerk wrote: 
[B]y distinguishing Gertz on the ground that it concerned 
“public expression upon matters of public importance or 
concern,” the draft essentially adopts the Rosenbloom test, 
which this Court expressly rejected in Gertz . . . for two reasons: 
                                                     
390. Brennan’s clerks that term were Charles Curtis, James Feldman, Michael Rips, and Donald 
Verrilli.  
391. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 97. 
392. Id. For a discussion of Meiklejohn’s view and its role in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, see 
supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
393. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 97. 
394. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Feb. 11, 1985) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
395. Id. 
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(i) it inadequately protected both the state interest in 
compensating individuals for injury to their reputations and the 
First Amendment interest in protecting the press when it has 
taken every reasonable precaution to ensure against falsehood 
and (ii) it was almost impossible to apply in a principled 
fashion.396 
Second, he added, “there is a real danger that lower courts (or even this 
Court) might interpret the public importance or concern standard to be 
roughly coextensive with the Gertz public figure test,”397 which, based 
on the clerk’s conversations with his counterpart in O’Connor’s 
chambers, “appears to be what she had in mind.”398 This, Powell’s clerk 
asserted, “would effectively overrule the larger part of Gertz,” for “if the 
line between public and private figures nearly matches the line between 
matters of public and private importance or concern, defendants in suits 
brought by private figures would be accorded no First Amendment 
protection at all” and the “careful accommodation of interests you 
worked out in Gertz would come to nought.”399 In short, the clerk wrote, 
“the more narrowly the new standard is interpreted” (which would 
appear necessary to garner at least White’s vote), “the more Gertz is 
overruled.”400   
  Over the next several days, however, Powell and his clerks worked 
to revise his draft opinion to reflect O’Connor’s suggestion as best they 
could. Indeed, to a significant extent, Powell’s and O’Connor’s clerks 
collaborated on preparing it.401 As a result, Powell’s revised opinion 
backed away from his most recent reliance on a distinction between 
“public” and “private” expression, determined according to whether or 
not it was directed to a mass audience, in favor of an approach that relied 
equally on the size of the audience and, as O’Connor had suggested, the 
nature of the speech. In this draft, as the clerk put it, “‘private expression 
on matters of private concern’ is subject to reduced constitutional 
protection.”402 
                                                     
396. Id. For a discussion of the interplay among the Justices with respect to Rosenbloom and 
Gertz, see supra text accompanying notes 205–06. 
397. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 394, at 2; see also Justice 
Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 96. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. 
400. Id. at 3. 
401. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Feb. 14, 1985) (on file with Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
402. Id. at 2.  
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In addition, Powell apparently concluded (whether based on further 
discussions with O’Connor or other Justices is unclear) that his proposal 
to eliminate punitive damages would not garner additional votes. 
Accordingly, he instructed his clerk to work on “splitting the opinion 
into two,”403 with the idea that the final section—in which the distinction 
in his treatment of presumed and punitive damages was set out—would 
“be omitted”404 if Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Burger would “accept”405 
the remainder of his analysis. Under that scenario, Powell wrote in notes 
to himself, “the bottom line” would be “to affirm and simply say nothing 
about punitive damages.”406 If he could cobble together a majority that 
would deny constitutional protection to “private expression on matter[s] 
of private concern,” Powell thought, he “could forego a separate 
op[inion]” expressing his antipathy to punitive damages.407 Still, Powell 
noted, he would “like a separate op[inion] if we can make it reasonable 
to do this,” an opinion that “probably would say that [although] the 
distinction bet[ween] ‘presumed and punitive’ was not presented in this 
case,”408 the issue “is imp[ortant] and merits consideration.”409 
C.  White’s Reaction 
On February 19, White wrote to O’Connor, with a copy to Powell but 
to no other Justice, to inform them that O’Connor’s efforts to create a 
majority around Powell’s opinion had failed, at least for the moment. In 
short, Powell’s resistance to abandoning his distinction between “public” 
and “private” speech proved too much for White: 
  Although Lewis has made substantial changes, I still have 
difficulty with this draft, which at several places states that the 
publication here was a private publication about a non-public 
                                                     
403. See id. at 1. 
404. Handwritten note from Justice Powell to Daniel Ortiz 1 (undated) (on file with the Powell 





408. Id. (emphasis in original). 
409. Id. The “logistics” of “splitting the opinion into two” proved to be “so complicated” as a 
technological matter that doing so delayed circulation of Powell’s revised draft for several days. 
Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 401, at 1. According to his clerk, to 
accomplish it, he had “to work with a person in the computer room who is only there Mondays 
through Fridays from 9 to 5.” Id. In addition, before he circulated it to the Conference, on February 
16, Powell privately provided his draft to O’Connor, who took the liberty of passing it along to 
White. Letter from Justice White to Justices O’Connor and Powell, supra note 382. 
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matter. It is emphasized that the circulation here went only to 
subscribers. I take it, then, that if the publication had been a 
public one, Gertz rules would apply even if the subject matter 
was non-public. Although Lewis states that the distinction is not 
between media and non-media defendants, there obviously are 
different rules for those who publish publicly and those who 
circulate privately; and, obviously enough, a media defendant 
would always be publishing publicly and entitled to the 
protections of Gertz, whether the subject matter was public or 
private.410 
This result was unacceptable to White, who told O’Connor and Powell 
that he therefore could not “join the draft in this form.”411 In White’s 
view, “[t]o give more protection to those who publish publicly and hence 
do the most damage makes little sense to me.”412 Still, White explained 
that he remained prepared to provide a fifth vote for Powell’s opinion if 
this distinction were abandoned: 
Lewis could do what he wants to do by simply applying Gertz to 
matters of public importance, regardless of who the publisher is. 
As I have indicated in what I have already circulated, I believe I 
could join such an approach, at least for the purpose of 
producing a court opinion.413 
Powell was plainly tempted by White’s proposal. In handwritten notes 
to himself that appear to have been penned shortly after he received it, 
Powell worked his way through the issues. He began from the premise 
that his “present draft is limited to the case where both publication and 
subject are private” and reasoned that, under that approach, “a media 
defendant (e.g. Wall St[reet] Journal) always will publish publicly” such 
that, “under Gertz, it would be liable only if malice is shown.”414 After 
                                                     
410. Letter from Justice White to Justices O’Connor and Powell, supra note 382. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. At the bottom of Powell’s copy of the letter, White, noting Powell’s re-engagement with 
his colleagues even though he was not physically back at the Court yet, wrote by hand, “Lewis: It’s 
great to have you back in the swing. Take care of yourself.” Id. (with handwritten note from Justice 
White).  
414. Personal handwritten notes of Justice Powell (undated) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. Here, Powell seems to have forgotten 
both that the actual malice standard would not apply unless the plaintiff was also a public figure and 
that the issue of the liability standard was not before the Court in any event. See Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (“Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their 
achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public’s attention, are properly 
classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to 
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pronouncing this result “ok,” he recounted White’s objection to 
providing “more protection (the malice defense) to a defendant who 
publishes its libel than to the defendant as in this case who did not 
publish it publicly.”415 This objection, according to Powell’s notes, 
“makes sense” since, otherwise, the “[Wall Street Journal], having given 
wider publicity to the libel, would fare better than D&B that had only 
published it privately.”416 He then turned to White’s proposed fix—
”B.R.W. thinks I could simply apply Gertz to matters of ‘public 
importance’ whether published privately or publicly (i.e., whether media 
or non-media)”417—which would permit the Court to “affirm here 
because” there is “no matter of public importance” involved. Such an 
opinion, Powell noted in conclusion, “B.R.W. would join.”418 Off in the 
margin of this last passage, however, Powell posed the one-word 
question, “Rosenbloom?”419 
D.  Settling for a Plurality 
Later that same day, O’Connor wrote privately to Powell and 
appeared to assume that he would not abandon the public/private 
distinction in exchange for White’s vote. “By now,” she wrote, “you 
have seen Byron’s response to your recirculation. I have also talked to 
Bill Rehnquist and the Chief Justice and I feel reasonably confident that 
you will have four votes for your proposed new circulation. Byron 
would at least be a fifth vote to affirm the judgment which would 
effectively place the plurality opinion in your hands.”420 She concluded 
by suggesting that “[p]erhaps this is the best we can do but I am 
certainly with you on your recirculation.”421 
Powell finally circulated his new draft on February 22. As expected, 
                                                     
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”); see also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text (explaining that, due to the jury instruction below, which required the jury to 
find liability under Gertz, there was no need for the Court to pass on the applicable standard for 
liability). 




419. Id. See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
420. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell (Feb. 19, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
421. Id. 
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he gave up entirely on his efforts to preclude punitive damages awards 
and to limit awards of presumed damages, arguing instead that both 
forms of recovery should be available where, as in Greenmoss Builders, 
the speech at issue constituted “private expression involving purely a 
matter of private concern.”422 He did not circulate a separate opinion 
addressing the presumed/punitive damages issue. In addition, express 
reference to a media/nonmedia distinction had also disappeared 
although, at least in Brennan’s view, it lingered in the analysis 
nonetheless.423 
More significantly, Powell’s new draft retained its dual focus on 
“purely private expression on a matter of private concern.”424 It 
characterized Sullivan as a case “involving public expression on matters 
of public concern”425 and contrasted it with the facts in Greenmoss 
Builders, which Powell said involved “private expression between a 
construction company and a commercial credit reporting agency on an 
issue of purely private concern.”426 And, in a footnote responding to 
Brennan’s survey of state law cases declining to make a media/nonmedia 
distinction, Powell pointed out that “though not invariably clear, these 
cases do not involve private expression on essentially private matters. 
This, not a defendant’s media or non-media status, is the critical 
distinction.”427 And, in the opinion’s concluding section, Powell asserted 
that while, “[i]n this case there is no need to define precisely what 
constitutes private expression on matters of private concern,” in his 
view, “the libelous speech at issue here implicates the First Amendment 
at most tangentially,” primarily because it was “private expression” 
                                                     
422. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 97. 
423. Id. Brennan, unaware of the extensive interaction between the other Justices or its substance, 
erroneously concluded that the abandonment of the media/nonmedia distinction was the change 
responsible for garnering O’Connor’s vote, which was announced shortly thereafter. Id. In that 
regard, Brennan’s Term History suggests that O’Connor was otherwise hostile to the 
media/nonmedia distinction and that she joined Powell only because it had been “disguised 
sufficiently to satisfy” her. Id. In fact, O’Connor had consistently supported a media/nonmedia 
distinction in Greenmoss Builders, see, e.g., Letter from Justice O’Connor to Chief Justice Burger 
and the Conference (Mar. 28, 1984) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law 
Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355 (highlighting 
nonmedia status of Dun & Bradstreet), and would cling to it two years later in her opinion for the 
Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986) (“[W]e [do not] 
consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant.”). 
424. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent Three 3 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Feb. 22, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
425. Id. at 2.  
426. Id.  
427. Id. at 4 n.7. 
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distributed “to only five subscribers, who were not allowed under the 
subscription agreement to disseminate it any further.”428 
E.  Enter Justice Rehnquist 
In circulating his new draft in this form, it appears clear that Powell 
consciously chose to forsake White’s vote rather than rely solely on the 
“public importance” distinction he himself had rejected in Gertz. He 
might even have harbored at least some doubts that, at the end of the 
day, the mercurial Chief Justice would join what now appeared to be a 
plurality. He likely did not, however, anticipate that his circulation 
would place in jeopardy the support he had consistently received from 
Rehnquist. Nevertheless, on March 1, Rehnquist wrote privately to 
Powell to advise him that he did not “fully agree with either your 
circulation or Byron’s as they now stand.”429 Rehnquist, it turned out, 
had the same objection as White to Powell’s “emphasis on the fact that 
in this case we have a ‘matter of private expression on a matter of 
private concern.’”430 Apparently unaware that White had voiced 
precisely the same concern to both Powell and O’Connor barely two 
weeks earlier, Rehnquist told Powell: 
I would like to see the emphasis on the “private” nature of the 
expression either removed or very much subdued, because it 
seems to me that the way it is now the doctrine has a very ironic 
twist. A “private expression” that may be circulated to only 
three or four people is subject to no constitutional protection, but 
a similar expression on a matter of “private concern” that is 
circulated to 1,000 people may be able to claim constitutional 
protection. This runs contrary to one of the principal tenets of 
libel law, as I understand it, a tenet based on the idea that the 
greater the circulation of the falsehood, the greater the damage 
to the plaintiff.431 
Accordingly, Rehnquist asked, “[w]ouldn’t it be enough in this case 
to say that the matter was one of ‘private’ concern—e.g., not a matter of 
‘public concern’ and dispense with the fact that it was not widely 
circulated.”432 In Rehnquist’s view, “[i]f one who falsely defames can 
                                                     
428. Id. at 8. 
429. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justices Powell, White, and O’Connor 1 (Mar. 1, 1985) (on 
file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
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gain some sort of constitutional immunity by widely circulating the 
defamation, I think the doctrine has very little to commend it.”433 That 
said, Rehnquist recognized that he was suggesting a distinction not much 
different than the one “between matters of ‘public concern’ and other 
matters, which Bill Brennan attempted to draw”434 in Rosenbloom, a 
distinction the Court “rejected” in Gertz “when offered as a substitute 
for the distinction between public figures and private figures.”435 At the 
end of the day, however, Rehnquist had concluded that such a distinction 
was unavoidable: 
[U]nless one is to go all the way with Bill Brennan and 
constitutionalize everything—which I certainly don’t want to 
do—or draw the line between media and non-media 
defendants—which I likewise do not want to do—some useful 
distinction that can be developed in subsequent cases has to be 
made here. I think the one you have hit upon—“matters of 
private concern” versus other matters—is worth a try, but I don’t 
think it should be freighted with the additional requirement that 
the circulation or expression be “private.”436 
Rehnquist ended his letter by advising Powell that, “[i]f you find it is not 
palatable to modify your opinion in this regard, I will think anew.”437 
Although it was not clear to Rehnquist whether White would affirm the 
judgment below, he advised Powell that, “if he would, I might well join 
him. But since Sandra has already joined you, I would like to join you if 
possible.”438 
Powell was plainly taken aback by Rehnquist’s letter. In the margins 
of it, he made notes to himself to ask his law clerk “why this is not so” 
and “what’s our answer” to Rehnquist’s arguments against the 
public/private expression distinction.439 At the end of the letter, Powell 
sketched out, in his own hand, the consequences of the approach that had 
now been separately advocated to him by both White and Rehnquist: 
Under Bill [Rehnquist]’s view, even if [a] libel is published by 
[the New York Times] it would have no [constitutional] 
protection unless the plaintiff is a public figure or public official. 
The test would be the “subject” of [the] libel. If [the New York 
                                                     
433. Id. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. at 2. 
436. Id.  
437. Id. 
438. Id. 
439. Id. at 1 (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell). 
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Times] had falsely published that [Respondent] was bankrupt, it 
would have no constitutional protection. State libel laws would 
apply.440 
Later that day, Powell heard from his law clerk, who characterized 
Rehnquist’s letter as a request that “you drop the ‘public expression’ 
prong of your test and, in effect, adopt JUSTICE WHITE’S position,” 
even though, in his letter, the clerk noted Rehnquist “admits that this is 
tantamount to accepting the Rosenbloom test.”441 The clerk reminded 
Powell of their “previous discussions” about “the consequences of 
taking this position,”442 in which they had concluded that, in doing so, 
the Court “would not only have to adopt a test rejected in Gertz, but also 
risk in practical terms overruling much of what Gertz accomplished.”443 
The clerk (and undoubtedly Powell as well) was plainly frustrated. As he 
wrote to Powell: 
  At this point, I really don’t know what to suggest. You have 
made reasonable accommodations to the views of others without 
much success. Further concessions, while possibly gaining a 
Court or plurality, entail some risks and in practical terms would 
require major changes in the opinion.444 
He added that he had talked to O’Connor’s clerk who, he said, had 
“asked me to tell you that she was ‘surprised and shocked’ by JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST’S letter and will stay with you whether or not you follow 
its suggestions.”445 
As winter turned to spring in 1985, therefore, the Court appeared no 
closer to a resolution than it had been in October 1983, when it first 
considered taking the case. Far from having clarity or consensus 
developing with the passage of time, the Court was more splintered than 
ever, with the fate of Gertz very much still up in the air and that of 
Sullivan not far behind. 
                                                     
440. Id. at 2 (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell). 
441. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Mar. 1, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. This characterization is not entirely 
accurate. In Rosenbloom, the question was whether the “knowing-or-reckless-falsity [constitutional] 
standard applies in a state civil libel action brought not by a ‘public official’ or a ‘public figure’ but 
by a private individual.” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971) (plurality). Here, 
in contrast, the question was whether the First Amendment would apply at all.  
442. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 441, at 1. 
443. Id. See supra notes 397–400 and accompanying text.  
444. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 441, at 3. 
445. Id. 
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IV.  ACT IV—DEFENDING SULLIVAN AND REGRETTING GERTZ 
On March 4, 1985, still recuperating and “handicapped here in the 
apartment without books and face-to-face discussion with Justices as 
well as” his clerks, Powell dictated a “MEMO TO MYSELF,” in which 
he once again attempted to sort out his options.446 In it, he made a 
telling, albeit private, concession: 
As I view it now, my opinion in Gertz is an example of 
overwriting a Court opinion. I said much that was unnecessary 
to a decision of that case. A large part of Gertz is dicta.447 
Thus, Powell found himself “left in something of a dilemma particularly 
in view of what I wrote (perhaps unnecessarily) in Gertz.”448 
A.  The Contours of Compromise 
As Powell continued to assess his options, his clerk talked to 
Rehnquist’s and confirmed that Rehnquist was asking Powell “to drop 
entirely the private expression prong of your ‘private expression on a 
matter of private concern’ test,” which Powell’s law clerk reminded him 
makes Rehnquist’s “position practically identical” to White’s.449 On 
March 7, therefore, Powell sketched out by hand the contours of a 
“possible compromise.”450 He could, he wrote, “de-emphasize” his 
previous reliance on the concept of “private expression,” retain his 
“emphasis on ‘private concern’ but leave open when expression may be 
viewed as public.”451 Thus, in Greenmoss Builders, “where there was no 
public interest in the [New York Times] sense, I’d reach [the] same result 
if D&B had circulated to 1000 customers.”452 Such a narrow holding, 
Powell thought, would leave open the question of constitutional 
protection in a case in which “the D&B report to 1000 had said the only 
bank in town was bankrupt,” which would presumably be a matter of 
                                                     
446. Personal Memorandum of Justice Powell 1 (Mar. 4, 1985) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
447. Id. at 1–2. 
448. Id. at 5. 
449. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Mar. 5, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
450. Personal notes of Justice Powell (Mar. 7, 1985) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington 
and Lee Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
451. Id. 
452. Id. 
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“local public concern.”453 Powell asked himself whether this would be 
“the type of public concern with the NYT/Gertz sense of ‘robust debate’ 
on public issues?”454 In his notes, Powell avoided answering his own 
question, positing only that a “Johns Manville or Continental Bank 
situation would be of national economic concern” and in those 
circumstances the “expression would be public.”455 In the end, Powell 
suggested, he could simply “leave open when the expression is 
public.”456 
Ultimately, this is what Powell chose to do. He circulated a fourth 
draft of his opinion to O’Connor and Rehnquist privately. In it, he 
removed virtually all express references to the concept of “public 
expression” and focused instead solely on the distinction between 
“matters of public concern,” on the one hand, and “expression on a 
matter of purely private concern,” on the other.457 It professed “no need 
to define precisely what constitutes expression on matters of private 
concern” because “it is clear that the libelous speech at issue here 
implicates the First Amendment at most only tangentially.”458 It 
provided no further guidance beyond the assertion that “[p]etitioner’s 
credit reporting is a matter of private concern, for it is speech solely in 
                                                     
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
455. Id. At the time, Johns-Manville, one of the nation’s largest asbestos manufacturers, was 
litigating numerous product liability cases brought by customers and by employees in its 
manufacturing plants. See Barnaby Feder, Asbestos Injury Suits Mount, With Severe Business 
Impact, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1981, at A1 (noting that “[m]ore than 400 new suits [were] filed each 
month against . . . Johns-Mansville”). According to the Times, “since millions of Americans ha[d] 
already been significantly exposed [to asbestos], some accountants and businessmen [wondered] 
whether Johns-Manville and other industrial defendants, and the insurance companies backing them, 
ha[d] the means to compensate all of the potential victims.” Id. at D4. Continental Illinois National 
Bank and Trust Company was, at the time, the subject of multiple press reports arising from its own 
financial difficulties and resulting concerns that the bank might fail. See Peter T. Kilborn, The High-
Stakes Scramble to Rescue Continental Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1984, at A1; Sharon Stangenes, 
Continental Bank No More: Closing The Book On Chicago’s Oldest Financial Institution, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 31, 1994, at 1. See generally Snyder v. Phelps, __U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) 
(“Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’”) (internal 
citations omitted); In re Apex Long Term Acute Care—Katy, L.P., 465 B.R. 452, 458 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2011) (bankruptcy is a matter of “distinct[] public concern”); In re Shulman Transp. Enters., 
Inc., 744 F.2d 293, 294 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). 
456. Personal notes of Justice Powell, supra note 450. 
457. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent Four 3 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 13, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
458. Id. at 7. 
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the individual economic interest of the speaker and its specific business 
audience”459 and a footnote suggesting that “commercial reporting 
disseminated in the general public interest would involve different 
considerations.”460 All that was left of the “public expression” concept 
was a sentence in another footnote, in which Powell noted that the 
“particular information contained in the disputed credit report, for 
example, was made available to only five business subscribers, who, 
under the terms of the subscription agreement, could not disseminate it 
any further.”461 The significance of this observation was not further 
explained. 
On March 12, before it had been circulated to the Conference, 
Rehnquist reaffirmed his support for Powell’s new approach in a letter 
thanking him “for your response to my suggestions” and pronouncing 
himself “happy to join your fourth draft.”462 It appears that this letter was 
inadvertently copied to all the other Justices, since Brennan’s chambers 
received it that day as well and Rehnquist sent a more formal “join”463 
letter to Powell, with a copy to the Conference, the following week. 
Indeed, on March 13, Powell wrote a “personal” letter to Burger, with 
copies only to O’Connor and Rehnquist, in which he related “some good 
news in this case at long last.”464 He informed Burger that “Sandra, Bill 
Rehnquist, and I have been cooperating, and the three of us have agreed 
on the draft (my 4th draft) that I am circulating today.”465 Powell 
described for Burger his “understanding that this draft is in accord with 
your views also” and took the opportunity to remind him that his “vote 
will at least give us a plurality to affirm the decision, and prevent the 
constitutionalizing of all libel law that Bill Brennan’s opinion would 
accomplish.”466 Oddly, there is no indication either that Powell reached 
                                                     
459. Id. 
460. Id. at 9 n.11. 
461. Id. at 7–8 n.8. 
462. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Powell and the Conference (Mar. 12, 1985) (on file 
with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
463. A “join” letter is the way a Justice expresses intent to sign on to another’s draft opinion that 
has been circulated among them. The letter literally says, “Please join me” in the opinion. The 
custom has long persisted despite the odd syntax, which seems to suggest that the opinion author is 
joining the letter-writer, rather than the letter-writer joining the opinion author. 
464. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor 
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out to White now that he had effectively made the changes White had 
previously requested or that, having reviewed Powell’s draft, White 
seriously reconsidered whether he could or would join it. 
B.  Brennan Strikes Back 
For Brennan and his clerks, who had been collectively unaware of the 
jockeying over Powell’s now-abandoned “public expression” concept, 
Rehnquist’s decision to join Powell was significant for a very different 
reason. By joining Powell, Rehnquist had effectively deprived White of 
any additional votes for his repudiation of Sullivan, with the possible 
exception of Burger’s. And, even as Powell continued to court Burger’s 
vote, Brennan thought he had at least some reason to believe that the 
unpredictable Burger would join him, which would create a majority 
through which to rebut both Powell and White. 
On March 20, Brennan finally circulated his own revised opinion, 
including his rejoinder to White and now to Powell’s latest position. Still 
styled as an opinion for the Court, Brennan set out the question 
presented as he at that juncture continued to understand it—i.e., 
“whether Gertz should be restricted to cases that do not involve 
‘nonmedia’ defendants or speech about economic and commercial 
matters.”467 To this, Powell wrote in the margin of his own copy, “not 
the Q.”468 Brennan further purported to “reject any distinction between 
‘media’ and ‘nonmedia’ defendants.”469 In the body of the opinion, 
Brennan shifted the analysis on this score slightly, ascribing the 
proposed media/nonmedia distinction to “Respondent” (rather than to 
Powell) and noting that Powell now “seeks the same result solely on the 
basis of the content of the speech.”470 Brennan wrote that “both 
approaches” were not only “unworkable and irreconcilable with our 
precedents,” but “[m]ore fundamentally” they “contravene basic First 
Amendment values.”471 Indeed, Brennan wrote, “[o]nly legal alchemy 
could transform these independently insufficient rationales into a 
legitimate justification for denying the type of speech at issue in this 
case any protection from the chill of unrestrained presumed and punitive 
                                                     
467. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion Four 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 20, 1985) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
468. Id. (with handwritten notes of Justice Powell).  
469. Id. at 3. 
470. Id. at 20–21. 
471. Id. at 21. 
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damage awards.”472 
Brennan mounted a full-throated defense of Sullivan, which 
emphasized the difficulty of litigating the issue of truth in a courtroom as 
well as a self-governing society’s fear of designating any branch of 
government—including the judiciary—as an arbiter of political truth: 
  Even if the erroneous assertion were not the inevitable 
companion of the truthful one in robust discourse, the difficulty 
of litigating the question of “truth” would, we suggested in New 
York Times v. Sullivan, still stand as a daunting deterrent. Our 
cases in the two decades since that decision bear out this 
perception about the judicial risks of a judicial test of truth. 
Often the spoken or written word will capture a judgment, 
inference or interpretation the “truth” of which is not readily 
susceptible to adjudication. [Bose]. “Truth” will often be a 
matter of degree or context. [Greenbelt]. Particularly when we 
debate the unwisdom of a policy or political point of view, our 
perspective on “truth” will be colored by the shared assumptions 
of the day; often what seems truth is but fashion. . . . The 
amorphous essence of political “truth” creates the risk of 
erroneous imposition of liability, and thereby chills debate, even 
when a jury seeks to discharge its duty in good faith. When the 
speaker is unpopular and the jury hostile, a rule of law 
permitting the imposition of liability for mere inaccuracy gives 
the jury carte blanche to oppress.473 
Indeed, Brennan took pains to elaborate the basis for his concern about 
making the government the final arbiter of truth: 
  The aversion to a judicial test of political truth also reflects a 
related judgment about the propriety of vesting an organ of 
government with such powers to say what the truth is. . . . When 
we entrust to courts, to the government, the unfettered power to 
resolve ambiguous questions about the truth of political 
expression we cede a measure of our individual liberty and right 
of self-government and hazard a regime of imposed 
orthodoxy. . . . Sharp criticism and free trade in political ideas 
does not guarantee the discovery of political truth, but our 
Constitution embodies the judgment that it is far better to risk 
error than suffer tyranny.474 
Although his draft did not mention or otherwise discuss either case 
                                                     
472. Id. 
473. Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted). 
474. Id. at 8–9. 
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specifically, it seems obvious that Brennan had in mind the trials in 
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.475 and Sharon v. Time, Inc.476 These cases, 
which had then only recently concluded in New York, had spawned 
much discussion and criticism of the role of Sullivan in those 
extraordinarily expensive examples of litigation viewed by many as 
designed to yield a definitive “verdict” on the truth of issues such as the 
propriety of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Israeli incursion into 
Lebanon.477 It is indeed difficult to read Brennan’s opinion and not 
conclude that he was, at the same time, attempting both to rebut White’s 
attack on Sullivan and to explain how it had since been misperceived by 
litigants and misconstrued by courts: 
  Nor would a shift in emphasis from proof of defendant’s state 
of mind to proof of the truth of the challenged speech reduce the 
chilling effect of litigation costs. Allegations of libel will often 
raise difficult historical or policy questions that can only be 
answered through complex, and consequently expensive, 
litigation. The would-be critic will be deterred not only by the 
cost of his or her own attorney fees but also by the prospect of 
liability for the other side’s fees if the jury verdict is 
unfavorable. And this approach adds incremental deterrence 
because it encourages public officials to sue to vindicate their 
reputations and thereby increases the number of libel suits a 
would-be critic will be faced with defending. Thus the suggested 
alternative would result in more suits and more victories for 
plaintiffs and would not significantly reduce the deterrent 
potential of damages that could be awarded in these suits.478 
In crafting his new opinion, Brennan considered whether to abandon 
the support for Gertz that had characterized his earlier drafts (and 
effectively driven away White) and to advocate instead the position he 
had previously championed in Rosenbloom. After all, now that White 
was in dissent, Brennan no longer needed to defend Gertz to secure 
White’s vote (perverse as that logic might have been, it was actually 
quite right—White had earlier indicated his willingness to join 
Brennan’s majority only if the Court were not prepared to overrule 
Gertz479). In addition, Burger, whose vote Brennan now needed to 
                                                     
475. 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also supra note 225. 
476. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also supra note 225. 
477. These cases are discussed in detail in note 225. 
478. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion Four, supra note 467, at 11–12 (internal citations omitted). 
479. White’s earlier position is discussed at notes 203–204, 269–272 and accompanying text. 
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cobble together a majority, had joined his plurality in Rosenbloom.480 
Ultimately, however, Brennan determined that he was not likely to 
secure Burger’s vote, no matter what position he took on Gertz. As a 
result, he concluded that his “best course” would be to accept Gertz and 
attempt to explain its rationale and rules in a way that would further the 
law’s development in more constructive directions.481 In Brennan’s 
view, because “future debate would be about the scope of Gertz,” no 
matter what his opinion in Greenmoss Builders said, “the most leverage 
could be brought to bear by staying with Gertz at this time, even if he 
thought the Rosenbloom approach correct.”482 In addition, as his Term 
History explains, Brennan feared that “Powell and White between them 
had so destabilized defamation law by abandoning Gertz and moving 
right” that he should not “exacerbate the uncertainty by abandoning 
Gertz and moving left.”483 And, of course, Brennan was fairly certain 
that, if he too attacked Gertz, he would lose the votes of Marshall (who 
had not joined him in Rosenbloom and was an early supporter of Powell 
in Gertz) and Stevens.484 
For his part, it appears that Powell did not know quite what to make 
of this last addition to Brennan’s opinion. When he read Brennan’s 
explication of Gertz’s reasoning (from which Brennan subtly 
disassociated himself, but not the Court, by employing phrasing such as 
“[t]his approach was thought”485), Powell wrote words like “true” in the 
margins of his copy.486 But, when he got to the heart of Brennan’s 
recounting of the reasoning in Gertz—i.e., that its holding applied to all 
speech by all speakers—Powell took to scribbling words like “no” and 
“not so” in the margins.487 In a separate handwritten note to himself 
addressing Brennan’s “new draft,”488 Powell again took issue with 
                                                     
480. See Levine & Wermiel, supra note 11 (reporting that Burger joined Brennan’s opinion in 
Rosenbloom largely because he did not approve of the activities of the plaintiff, a so-called “smut 
peddler”). 
481. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 99.  
482. Id. 
483. Id. 
484. Id.; see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Courts, including this one, are not annointed with any extraordinary prescience. . . . [Nonetheless, 
under the plurality’s opinion,] courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest 
in a particular event or subject; what information is relevant to self-government.”). 
485. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion Four, supra note 467, at 13. 
486. Id. (with handwritten notes of Justice Powell). 
487. Id. at 14, 16. 
488. Handwritten note of Justice Powell responding to Justice Brennan’s Draft Opinion Four of 
Mar. 20, 1985 (undated) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
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Brennan’s characterization of Gertz’s holding—i.e., that it “precluded 
presumed or punitive damages in ‘any libel action’”—reassuring himself 
(after wondering “Did I say this?”) that Gertz had left the standard of 
liability to the States and that its holding with respect to presumed and 
punitive damages “applied to suit by private individuals versus a media 
defendant and where [the] subject was of public interest.”489 
C.  Enter Justice Stevens 
Brennan’s own concerns about forming a majority were driven home 
within one day of the circulation of his March 20 draft when he received 
what he later described as a “dispiriting” private letter from Stevens.490 
To Brennan’s dismay, Stevens had written to express “serious 
misgivings” about Brennan’s opening section—his pointed defense of 
Sullivan against White’s attack. 491 Stevens wrote that he found 
Brennan’s argument “less persuasive” than Sullivan itself and urged him 
to limit himself to “nothing more than a few appropriate quotations” 
from Sullivan coupled with “a brief reference to its solid acceptance in 
the jurisprudence of the Court.”492 More significantly, Stevens rejected 
                                                     
489. Id. Powell was right insofar as he disagreed with Brennan’s characterization of the holding 
in Gertz. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Powell’s apparent frustration with 
Brennan’s draft continued on March 21, when his clerk provided Powell with a written analysis of 
it. The clerk characterized Brennan’s work as his “strongest draft yet” and told Powell that “[a]part 
from making a very strong and spirited defense of New York Times v. Sullivan, it makes two points 
which you should keep in mind”—specifically, that the “case concerns only damages rules and not 
liability standards” and that Brennan’s opinion “tries to hold you to much of your language in 
Gertz.” Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1–2 (Mar. 21, 1985) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. Beyond identifying the issues and 
offering some alternative responses (for example, on the issue of whether to leave open whether 
Powell’s analysis would apply to the liability standard as well, “I would be happy taking either 
position, but I am not sure how much sense it would make to say that the First Amendment either 
does or might abrogate one kind of standard but not the other,” id. at 1), the clerk focused on the 
strategic implications of their response to Brennan’s draft: 
Because the only two votes still up in the air are THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S and JUSTICE 
WHITE’S, I would suggest that you make no changes at this point unless you feel that there is 
a danger that they might be persuaded by some of JUSTICE BRENNAN’S criticisms. It would 
be better, I feel, to wait to see what changes they may suggest before trying to answer 
JUSTICE BRENNAN. Also, it would be easier to respond to JUSTICE BRENNAN when we 
transform the opinion into a plurality or (we can hope) majority opinion. For now, I suggest 
you just sit tight. 
Id. at 2.  
490. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 100. 
491. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan 1 (Mar. 21, 1985) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review).   
492. Id. 
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Brennan’s contention that Sullivan was the “‘well-spring’ for the Court’s 
First Amendment libel jurisprudence,” conceding it “was indeed a great 
opinion and [that] it did mark the Court’s first step into the field,” but 
gently asserting that it was “a natural development of principles that 
have always underlain our First Amendment jurisprudence” and that it 
was “presaged by a solid common law development and scholarly 
opinion.”493 And the central problem of defending Sullivan in the context 
of Greenmoss Builders did not escape Stevens’s notice: 
[T]he extensive and passionate discussion of the importance of 
public debate . . . strikes me as somewhat counterproductive in 
the context of the particular facts of this case. As I read these 
parts of the opinion I kept asking myself whether the arguments 
shed much light on the question whether commercial credit 
reports are entitled to special protection.494 
In the end, Stevens counseled, “[u]nless someone joins Byron,”495 
Brennan could and, in Stevens’s view should, “safely assume that eight 
members of the Court (perhaps I should say seven) accept the basic 
holding in New York Times.”496 It was then not entirely certain to which 
of his colleagues Stevens was referring in the quoted parenthetical—the 
mystery, however, would be cleared up soon enough. 
As disappointed as he was by Stevens’s response, Brennan knew that 
he had no choice but to accommodate him. After all, as he later 
                                                     
493. Id. Indeed, in Sullivan, Brennan drew not only from the Court’s previous First Amendment 
precedent applying a categorical approach to define those narrow categories of expression left 
unprotected, including perhaps most significantly his own opinion in Roth v. United States 
employing the concept of definitional balancing to bring much allegedly “obscene” speech within 
the protections of the First Amendment, see N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) 
(citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)), but also from ongoing development of the 
common law, most notably his derivation of the actual malice standard from an analogous concept 
adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908), see 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272–76. For his part, Stevens did much the same in his own opinion for the 
Court just the previous year in Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 504 
(1984) (explaining necessity of independent appellate review of defamation judgments, in 
significant part, based on both common law principles and role of courts in determining whether the 
expression at issue in a given case falls within a defined category of speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (Stevens, J.) (“It was the 
overriding importance of that commitment [to debate] that supported our holding [in Sullivan] that 
neither factual error nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the two, sufficed to remove the 
First Amendment shield from criticism of official conduct.”); supra notes 126 and 302 and 
accompanying text. 
494. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan, supra note 491, at 1–2.  
495. Id. at 2. 
496. Id. 
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explained it, “[g]iven White’s broadside,”497 a defense of Sullivan that 
Stevens declined to join would suggest that support for the case “was 
crumbling on the Court.”498 In his response to Stevens that same day, 
Brennan “confess[ed]” that his draft “reflects concern that Byron’s 
propositions might attract support” and conceded it was 
“[p]erhaps . . . an overreaction.”499 He told Stevens that his “suggestion 
that eight (or at least seven) of the Court accept the basic holding of New 
York Times is very comforting” and ended his private letter by assuring 
Stevens that he would “be trying to adjust the circulation along the lines 
that you suggest.”500 
D.  White Responds and Powell Reacts 
Although Marshall and Blackmun were advised of Brennan’s plans 
through their law clerks, Brennan held back another draft for a time, 
concerned “that hasty withdrawal of the defense of Times would further 
encourage White.”501 Thus, on March 29, White fired back at the 
original draft in what Brennan described as “harsh tones,”502 specifically 
aiming his shots at the initial draft’s defense of Sullivan. Among other 
things, White took issue with what he characterized as Brennan’s 
suggestion “that courts, as organs of the government, cannot be trusted 
to discern what the truth is” in a defamation action.503 To this, White 
asserted that “[i]t is perverse indeed to say that these bodies are 
incompetent to inquire into the truth of a statement of fact in a 
defamation case” when “[w]e entrust to juries and the courts the 
responsibility of decisions affecting the life and liberty of persons.”504 
In addition, White noted the changes that Powell had made to his own 
opinion, applauding the fact that Powell “does not rest his application of 
a different rule here on a distinction drawn between media and non-
media defendants” and noting his agreement with Brennan that the “First 
Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits 
                                                     
497. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 101. 
498. Id. 
499. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Stevens (Mar. 21, 1985) (on file with the Brennan 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review).   
500. Id. 
501. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 101. 
502. Id. 
503. Justice White, Draft Dissent Four 5 n.2 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 29, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
504. Id. 
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than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech.”505 On this 
score, however, White concluded his analysis with a bow toward Powell: 
If Gertz is to be distinguished from this case, it should be on the 
ground that it applies only where the allegedly false publication 
deals with a matter of general or public importance. If the false 
publication does not deal with such a matter, the common-law 
rules would apply whether the defendant is a member of the 
media or other public disseminator or a non-media individual 
publishing privately.506 
As Powell’s clerk noted to his Justice upon reading White’s opinion, 
“Justice White has eliminated his attacks on your opinion from this draft. 
He adds nothing that requires a response from us.”507 
Accordingly, after giving O’Connor and Rehnquist a sneak preview 
on March 28 of the changes he proposed to make in response to 
Brennan, and securing at least O’Connor’s agreement to them, Powell 
circulated a new draft of his own on April 1. “There is a good deal more 
that could be said in reply,” he wrote to O’Connor and Rehnquist, “but I 
am inclined to think that our view of this case is adequately stated . . . . 
Bill Brennan’s opinion, although 50% longer, still would 
constitutionalize the entire law of libel.”508 Predictably, Powell took on 
Brennan’s description of the sweep of Gertz, accusing him of 
“mischaracteriz[ing] that case and mistak[ing] its holding.”509 As Powell 
now saw it, “[l]ike every other case in which this Court has found 
constitutional limits on state laws of defamation, Gertz involved 
expression directly relevant to the effective operation of our system of 
democratic self-government.”510 
E.  The Chief Justice 
Although Powell remained hopeful that his fifth draft would attract 
Burger’s vote and thereby give Powell at least a plurality, O’Connor was 
not so sure. On March 29, before Powell had even circulated his draft, 
                                                     
505. Id. at 9. 
506. Id. at 10.  
507. Id. at 1 (with handwritten notes from Daniel Ortiz). 
508. Letter from Justice Powell to Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor (Mar. 28, 1985) (on file with 
the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.   
509. Justice Powell, Draft Dissent Six 5 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Apr. 1, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
510. Id. 
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O’Connor wrote to him and to Rehnquist that she was “somewhat 
concerned that the Chief ha[d] not yet joined” Powell’s opinion and 
confided that she “spoke to him about a week ago expressing my earnest 
hope that he would be joining.”511 
After receiving Powell’s latest draft, however, Burger sent a pair of 
curious notes to Powell and to White, on April 9 and 10 respectively, the 
latter of which was copied to the Conference. To Powell, Burger wrote 
that he had “long struggled with this case” and reminded Powell that 
“[y]ou know what I think of the excess of New York Times and my 
reservations on your Gertz.”512 In the end, he told Powell, “I think my 
views are best served by joining both you and Byron. This is a ‘tight 
rope’ to walk and I hope I can do it sans explanation.”513 The next day, 
Burger sent a similar note to White, in which he advised him that “I have 
joined Lewis, but I will also join your concurring opinion.”514 
In Brennan’s chambers, Burger’s proclamation was treated with 
derision. It did not seem to phase the Chief Justice, Brennan’s Term 
History asserted, that White’s opinion proceeded from the premise that 
Gertz (and Sullivan) had been wrongly decided, while Powell’s opinion 
endorsed both of them, and particularly Gertz.515 A Brennan clerk (and 
perhaps others) alerted Burger’s chambers to the “problem,” and the 
clerk thought that Burger’s administrative assistant “immediately 
assumed a stiffly defensive posture.”516 
In Powell’s chambers, the Burger position produced a more 
sympathetic response. Powell’s clerk wrote to him that, in the wake of 
Burger’s letter, he had “reread JUSTICE WHITE’S opinion in this case 
and believe[d] that there [was] no technical inconsistency between it and 
yours.”517 He described White’s opinion as reflecting two “alternat[ive] 
                                                     
511. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justices Powell and Rehnquist (Mar. 29, 1985) (on file with 
the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
512. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell (Apr. 9, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
513. Id. 
514. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice White and the Conference (Apr. 10, 1985) (on 
file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the 
Washington Law Review). 
515. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 101.  
516. Id. at 102. 
517. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (Apr. 9, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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holdings (i) that New York Times and Gertz are no longer good law and 
(ii) that, even if they are, they do not apply here for the reason you state 
in your opinion.”518 Moreover, the clerk wrote, if Powell were to point 
out to Burger “the implicit contradiction of joining both”519 his and 
White’s opinion, “you stand the risk of losing him to JUSTICE WHITE 
completely.”520 In any event, Burger did clarify his position the 
following day, and thereby revealed himself unambiguously as the 
Justice cryptically referenced in Stevens’ parenthetical,521 advising his 
colleagues that he would “add something along the following line”: 
I join those parts of Justice Powell’s opinion essential to the 
disposition of the case; I agree generally with Justice White’s 
opinion with respect to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.522 
  Burger’s clarification, however, “concerned” Powell, who wrote 
confidentially to the Chief Justice the next day and told him that 
“[u]nless this language is refined, I cannot include you in what we have 
hoped would be a plurality opinion.”523 More specifically, he informed 
Burger that “since it is not clear which parts of my opinion you believe 
are ‘essential to the disposition of the case’ and which parts are not, 
other courts looking for guidance will have doubts as to where a 
majority of the Court stands.”524 Remarkably, Powell attempted to 
convince Burger that his opinion simply did not speak to the issue of 
whether Sullivan and Gertz are and should remain good law: 
  It was necessary for me to cite Gertz and New York Times to 
distinguish them. As Byron [White]’s opinion implicitly 
recognizes, Gertz and New York Times at present are “the law.” I 
simply did not consider—and the disposition of this case does 
not require us to consider—whether these two cases should be 
                                                     
518. Id. (emphasis in original). 
519. Id. 
520. Id. at 1–2. 
521. See Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan, supra note 491, at 2 (“Unless someone 
joins Byron, it would seem to me that you could safely assume that eight members of the Court 
(perhaps I should say seven) accept the basic holding in New York Times and are merely concerned 
with the scope of that holding.”). 
522. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger for the Conference (Apr. 11, 1985) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355 (internal citations omitted). 
523. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger 1 (Apr. 12, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
524. Id. 
04 - Levine & Wermiel Article .docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:54 PM 
2013] THE LANDMARK THAT WASN’T 89 
 
reversed.525 
Accordingly, Powell encouraged Burger to recraft his statement to read: 
“I join Justice Powell’s opinion disposing of this case; I agree generally, 
however, with Justice White’s opinion with respect to Gertz and New 
York Times.”526 This, Powell wrote, “would give us a solid plurality for 
the reasons why the entire law of libel should not be constitutionalized, 
and—with Byron’s opinion—there would be clear guidance to all lower 
courts.”527 Finally, Powell wrote, “I have talked to Bill Rehnquist about 
this, and he also hopes that you can make this sort of clarification of 
your views. You would still fully preserve your views as to Gertz and 
New York Times.”528 
As Powell recognized, with Burger’s vote, there were now five 
justices committed to affirming the Vermont Supreme Court. On April 
22, therefore, Powell again wrote to Burger to remind him that he 
needed to “confirm your assignment of this case to me” so that he could 
“convert my dissent into a plurality opinion for the four of us.”529 
Accordingly, on April 22, Burger formally reassigned the majority 
opinion to Powell, “with all the ‘pluses’ and ‘minuses’ that go with 
it!”530 
Thus, what had started as an interesting but not especially difficult 
defamation case was now the focus of major drama within the Supreme 
Court. And at least inside the Court support was clearly eroding for 
Sullivan, the landmark that had universally been considered the solid and 
immutable foundation of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Although Brennan tried to convince himself otherwise, it must have 
shaken his faith in his own legacy as the Justice who had both 
discovered and articulated the “central meaning” of the First 
Amendment. As the drama entered its final Act, at least from Brennan’s 
perspective, there was no “occasion for dancing in the streets.”531 
                                                     
525. Id. 
526. Id. at 2. 
527. Id. 
528. Id. 
529. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Apr. 22, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
530. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell and the Conference (Apr. 22, 1985) (on 
file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
531. See Kalven, supra note 3, at 221 n.125 (quoting Meiklejohn as having said of the New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan case, “It is . . . an occasion for dancing in the streets”); see also supra note 
380. 
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V.  ACT V—LITTLE ADO ABOUT SOMETHING? 
A.  Brennan Regroups 
Burger’s reassignment of the opinion to Powell, coupled with his 
perceived need to accommodate Stevens, led Brennan to change course 
yet again. Now that he was in dissent, Brennan decided that the best 
strategy was to “make the case seem as idiosyncratic and trivial as 
possible” and to stress that the Court was not speaking with a single 
voice even then.532 And, he decided, he would position the dissent less as 
an angry attack on the Court’s abandonment of core First Amendment 
principles, and more as a clarification and reminder that the Court had 
done precisely the opposite—i.e., though he and Powell might disagree 
on how to deal with this “trivial” case, there was no question that the 
Court remained solidly committed to the fundamental constitutional 
doctrine laid out in Sullivan.533 Accordingly, Brennan’s new draft began 
as follows: 
  This case involves a difficult question of the proper 
application of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. to credit reporting—a 
type of speech at some remove from that which first gave rise to 
explicit First Amendment restrictions on state defamation law—
and has produced a diversity of considered opinions, none of 
which speaks for the Court. JUSTICE POWELL’S plurality 
opinion affirming the judgment below would not apply the Gertz 
limitations on presumed and punitive damages to this case; 
rather, the three Justices joining that opinion would hold that the 
First Amendment requirement of actual malice . . . should have 
no application in this defamation action because the speech 
involved a subject of purely private concern and was circulated 
to an extremely limited audience. Establishing this exception, 
the opinion reaffirms Gertz for cases involving matters of public 
concern and reaffirms New York Times Co. v. Sullivan for cases 
in which the challenged speech allegedly libels a public official 
or a public figure.534 
Brennan then added a few lines to reaffirm the core principles of 
Sullivan: 
                                                     
532. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 102.  
533. Id. 
534. Justice Brennan, Draft Dissent One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(May 23, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review) (internal citations omitted). 
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The four who join this opinion would reverse the judgment of 
the Vermont Supreme Court. We believe that, although 
protection of the type of expression at issue is admittedly not the 
“central meaning of the First Amendment,” Gertz makes clear 
that the First Amendment nonetheless requires restraints on 
presumed and punitive damage awards for this expression. The 
lack of consensus in approach to these idiosyncratic facts should 
not, however, obscure the solid allegiance the principles of New 
York Times v. Sullivan continue to command in the 
jurisprudence of this Court. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumer’s 
Union of the United States, Inc.535 
Brennan had successfully employed an analogous strategy in defining 
Powell’s handiwork in the past—most notably in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke536—and he would make use of it again 
in future defamation cases—most notably Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal.537 Still, Brennan remained unsure that Stevens would go along, 
even though the notion of the Court’s ongoing support for Sullivan was 
his. Finally, Brennan decided to press his luck with Stevens by recasting 
his detailed defense of Sullivan as a long footnote. As his Term History 
put it, Brennan thought it was “worth a try.”538 
B.  Powell Reworks 
In the meantime, Powell set about recrafting his own opinion, now 
ostensibly for a plurality, in an effort to secure Burger’s unequivocal 
support. In that cause, he instructed his law clerk to revise the opinion to 
remove any overt endorsement of the ongoing validity of his own 
reasoning in Gertz.539 In hand editing on his clerk’s draft, Powell 
                                                     
535. Id. at 2 (internal citations omitted). 
536. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, with the Court split 4-1-4 over whether race could be used in 
affirmative action in medical school admissions, Brennan used the occasion to explain where 
Powell’s solo opinion agreed with Brennan’s, implicitly creating a majority. The technique 
highlighted points of agreement and blunted the impact of points of disagreement among the 
Justices. The practical effect was to keep the door open for the use of race in affirmative action in 
admissions for higher education. 
537. 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see also Levine & Wermiel, supra note 11, at 44 (noting that, in 
Milkovich, Brennan set out “to write a dissent that could help shape the nature and reach of the 
Chief Justice’s opinion”) (quoting Justice Brennan, 1989 Term Histories 83). 
538. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 102.  
539. Daniel Ortiz, Typewritten Draft Opinion for Justice Powell Announcing the Judgment of the 
Court 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (May 4, 1985) (with handwritten notes 
from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available 
at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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explained his decision to omit such language—“I hope [Burger] joins 
100% after he sees this but he is not easy to persuade.”540 On May 9, 
1985, Powell delivered advance copies of his new “plurality” opinion to 
O’Connor and Rehnquist, explaining that he had “not changed the 
substance of what you have approved.”541 He added that he had written 
“the Chief a personal letter and talked to him sometime ago in an effort 
to persuade him that he could join our opinion without qualification, and 
still agree with Byron that New York Times and Gertz should be 
overruled. I do not know what he will do.”542 Later that same day, 
O’Connor pronounced the Powell plurality opinion to be “splendid” and 
predicted that “it will be helpful in a number of First Amendment cases 
in the future.”543 The new opinion was circulated to the Conference on 
May 10. 
When he received Powell’s draft of what was now the Court’s 
plurality opinion, White circulated it to his clerk, along with a 
handwritten note inquiring “what do I do to my concurrence?”544 On 
May 14, the clerk responded with a memorandum to his Justice that 
recommended “only minor modifications in response to Justice Powell’s 
latest draft.”545 Moreover, the clerk noted that, on what he termed 
White’s “alternative rationale”—i.e., “that Gertz applies only to matters 
of public concern”—there now appeared to be “little or no distance 
between your opinion and Justice Powell’s.”546 Thus, the clerk asked 
whether White now wished to concur in Powell’s opinion, rather than 
simply in the judgment. After all, the clerk reminded White, Powell had 
“deleted the discussion which you might have the most objection to,” 
namely the suggestion that “a Wall Street Journal article” on the same 
subject “might be treated differently” than a credit report, because it was 
                                                     
540. Id.  
541. Letter from Justice Powell to Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor (May 9, 1985) (on file with 
the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
542. Id. 
543. Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justices Powell and Rehnquist (May 9, 1985) (on file with 
the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
544. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(May 10, 1985) (with handwritten note from Justice White) (on file with the White Papers, Library 
of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
545. Memorandum from Dean Gloster for Justice White 1 (May 14, 1985) (on file with the White 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
546. Id. 
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circulated to a larger audience.547 
White, however, never made any further overtures to Powell about 
joining his opinion and perhaps thereby having it speak for a majority of 
the Court. Although White himself has left no record of why he decided 
not to do so, at the time, his clerk recognized that White might have 
additional reasons for wanting to concur only in the judgment, beyond 
the obvious proposition that “a separate opinion, without a join, has 
more impact.”548 More importantly, the clerk wrote, “if your principal 
beef is with Gertz itself, you may not wish to join an opinion that applies 
what purports to be a Gertz categorical balancing of interests, but with a 
different weight on the free speech interest where a matter not of public 
concern is involved.”549 Moreover, the clerk noted, Powell’s latest draft, 
though “persuasive and well-reasoned on its face,” is “a little hard to 
take in light of the history of Gertz, which rejected Rosenbloom’s public 
interest/not public interest distinction.”550 In the clerk’s view, “[a] more 
forthright opinion would explain that it cut back on Gertz rather than 
applied it.”551 Finally, the clerk recognized that “the two central points 
made in [White’s] opinion—that the balance in New York Times may 
have been improvidently struck and that there is no media/nonmedia 
distinction among the levels of protection accorded libel defendants—
are not addressed by Justice Powell.”552 
C.  Brennan’s Final Retreat 
On May 20, Brennan circulated his revised draft, now a dissent, to his 
putative allies, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. He hoped to gain their 
approval before circulating it to others, especially to White. As Brennan 
reflected on it in his Term History, this tactic “proved sage”553 because, 
although Marshall and Blackmun expressed their approval, Stevens sent 
Brennan another private letter, this time focusing on his “concern[s]” 
about the newly added footnote.554 It ended with the somewhat ominous 
assertion that, “[e]ven though I am not sure I disagree with anything you 
have said, I am presently inclined to join all of your dissent except 
                                                     
547. Id. at 1–2. 
548. Id. at 2. 
549. Id. 
550. Id. 
551. Id. at 3. 
552. Id.  
553. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 103. 
554. Id.  
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footnote 2.”555 
This, in Brennan’s view, was the death knell for his direct rejoinder to 
White. Brennan was not only “disappointed” that Stevens’ objections 
had deprived him of that opportunity, he was also concerned that 
Stevens’ reluctance to join reflected Stevens’ own “desire to preserve 
substantial leeway for tinkering with the actual malice standard” in the 
future.556 Nevertheless, on May 22, he privately advised Marshall and 
Blackmun of Stevens’ position “that we circulate initially with footnote 
2 deleted. His thought is that we don’t yet know what Byron may 
circulate when he converts his present dissent into a concurrence.”557 
Brennan added that, “[i]f Byron repeats his attacks on the Times/Sullivan 
principles, we could then reconsider a response. If there is not to be one, 
I think John would wish to consider some revision of footnote 2. I have 
sent the draft to the printer with footnote 2 deleted.”558 Despite 
Brennan’s attempt to leave the door open in his letter to Marshall and 
Blackmun, and the arrival of a supportive note from Blackmun that same 
day,559 no version of footnote 2 would ever be reinserted. Instead, the 
dissent’s first footnote gently observed that White’s dissent “ventures 
some modest proposals for restructuring the First Amendment 
protections currently afforded defendants in defamation actions,” but 
asserted that White “agrees with New York Times v. Sullivan” that “the 
breathing space needed to ensure the robust debate of public issues 
essential to our democratic society is impermissibly threatened by 
unrestrained damage awards for defamatory remarks.”560 
Brennan’s efforts to soften his attacks on Powell’s plurality opinion, 
and to emphasize instead the broad areas on which they agreed, was 
apparently lost on Powell himself. When he read Brennan’s draft of May 
                                                     
555. Id. 
556. Id. In some respects, Brennan’s reservations proved prescient. Compare Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (defining “actual malice” as requiring a “high 
degree of awareness” that the defamatory statement at issue was “probabl[y] fals[e]”), with Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (Stevens, J.) (asserting that 
defendant’s motives and ill will toward plaintiff may properly be considered in assessing “actual 
malice”); and id. at 692 (Stevens, J.) (suggesting that “purposeful avoidance of the truth” can 
constitute “actual malice”).  
557. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justices Marshall and Blackmun (May 22, 1985) (on file with 
the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
558. Id. 
559. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens (May 22, 1985) 
(on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the 
Washington Law Review). 
560. Justice Brennan, Draft Dissent One, supra note 534, at 2 n.1. 
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23, he told his law clerk, he did so “[w]ith an increasing rise in my blood 
pressure.”561 On the Brennan draft itself, he sketched out by hand his 
proposed “answer” to Brennan’s opinion: “Effect of this opinion is to 
extend NYT to entire law of libel, a result contrary to the common law, to 
the history of our country, and with a total disregard of the interest of the 
individual in his reputation.”562 To Brennan’s footnote assertion that 
“[o]ne searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition 
that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only when 
speech involved matters of public concern,”563 Powell protested in the 
margin that this question was “not at issue in Gertz.”564 And, in a 
memorandum to his law clerk, Powell fumed that Brennan’s dissent 
“repeatedly attributes to our opinion views we did not express.”565 In yet 
another memorandum, he sought his clerk’s views on the advisability of 
adding the following sentiment to his opinion: 
If the dissent were the law, a woman of impeccable character 
who was branded a whore would have no effective recourse 
unless she could prove ‘malice’ by clear and convincing 
evidence—not in the ordinary meaning of that term but under 
the more demanding standard of New York Times. The dissent 
would, in effect, constitutionalize the entire common law of 
libel.566 
In suggesting this, it apparently had slipped Powell’s mind that, when it 
came to both the standard of liability and the ability of a private figure 
plaintiff to recover actual damages for injury to reputation, Brennan’s 
dissent deferred entirely to Powell’s own formulations in Gertz which, 
among other things, did not obligate the “woman of impeccable 
character” to prove “malice” at all.567 
                                                     
561. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz 1 (May 27, 1985) (on file with the 
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
562. Justice Brennan Draft Dissent One, supra note 534, at 1 (with handwritten notes from 
Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
563. Id. at 11 n.11. 
564. Id.  
565. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz, supra note 561, at 1. 
566. Memorandum from Justice Powell for Daniel Ortiz (May 28, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
567. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (“Private individuals are . . . more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.”); id. at 347 
(“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory 
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Powell’s clerk, in contrast to his Justice, apparently recognized what 
Brennan was attempting to accomplish. He wrote to Powell that, “[o]n 
the whole,” he was “surprised by the approach JUSTICE BRENNAN 
has taken. For the most part, his draft emphasizes the common ground 
between the justices’ different positions and it attacks your opinion fairly 
mildly.”568 And, he reminded his Justice, some of Brennan’s criticisms 
of Powell’s efforts to recast his opinion in Gertz were not entirely off the 
mark. He was particularly troubled by Brennan’s reference to Powell’s 
assertion in Gertz that: 
[A] publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court 
deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest may be 
held liable in damages even if it took every reasonable 
precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions. And liability 
may far exceed compensation for any actual injury to the 
plaintiff, for the jury may be permitted to presume damages 
without proof of loss and even to award punitive damages.569 
“Unfortunately,” the clerk told Powell, “these two sentences do suggest 
that the Gertz standards apply even if the libel involves no matter of 
public concern.”570 Although the clerk offered a means of distinguishing 
Gertz, one that he described as “not very persuasive,”571 Powell 
responded by hand that he would “not answer WJB expressly” beyond 
possibly “repeat[ing] that what was said in Gertz must be read in light of 
the issue presented.”572 
For his part, Brennan held out some hope that, having accommodated 
Stevens, White might soften his own attack on Sullivan. Alas, this was 
not to be. On June 11, White circulated a new draft of his own opinion 
“concurring in the judgment,” which retained his attacks on Sullivan. In 
fact, in a move that was “somewhat irksome” to Brennan’s chambers, 
                                                     
falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
568. Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1 (May 25, 1985) (with handwritten 
notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
569. Id. at 2. 
570. Id. 
571. Id. 
572. Id. In addition, Powell specifically agreed with his clerk’s recommendation that they not 
emphasize that Gertz had in fact addressed the liability standard: 
[F]or now it may be a good idea to mention liability standards as little as possible. Strict 
liability is JUSTICE WHITE’S big bugaboo, and, to the extent you suggest that Gertz’s 
liability rules are not affected at all by Dun & Bradstreet, you may lose any chance of adding 
his name to your opinion.  
Id. 
04 - Levine & Wermiel Article .docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:54 PM 
2013] THE LANDMARK THAT WASN’T 97 
 
White “even retained his explicit rejoinders” to Brennan’s now deleted 
arguments in support of Sullivan, introducing them with the phrase “it 
could be argued,” rather than “Justice Brennan argues.”573 
The process by which White included this language in his draft is 
revealing. Initially, his law clerk took a crack at revising his then extant 
dissenting opinion in the wake of Brennan’s and Powell’s circulations. 
In addition to changing it from a dissent to an opinion “concurring in the 
judgment,” White’s clerk deleted in significant part the sharp language 
from the previous draft that had attacked Brennan’s now-abandoned 
defense of Sullivan.574 Indeed, in a memorandum to White dated May 
29, 1985, the clerk noted that “Justice Brennan has pulled the language 
in defense of New York Times v. Sullivan that had caused you to 
respond,” which, the clerk indicated, warranted the deletion of much of 
the previous draft’s rejoinder.575 White, however, overruled the clerk, 
using the editing term “STET”576 to signify his decision to retain most of 
the strong language from the previous draft and substituting, in his own 
hand, phrases such as “it might be suggested” and “it could be 
suggested” for the prior draft’s references to what “Justice Brennan 
suggests.”577 
D.  The Chief Reappears 
On May 23, the same day that Brennan circulated the latest 
incarnation of his dissent, Burger too circulated a new opinion, again 
“concurring in the judgment.”578 Rather than adopt Powell’s more 
                                                     
573. Justice Brennan, 1984 Term Histories, supra note 222, at 104. In addition, the significance 
of Powell’s comparative silence with respect to the Gertz liability standard was not lost on White. 
He added a sentence explaining that, “[a]lthough JUSTICE POWELL speaks only of the 
inapplicability of the Gertz rule with respect to presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the 
Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases 
such as this.” Justice White, Draft Concurrence Five 10 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc.) (June 11, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
574. Justice White, Draft Concurrence Five, supra note 573, at 10.  
575. Memorandum from Dean Gloster for Justice White (May 29, 1985) (on file with the White 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
576. “Stet” is a longstanding proofreader’s term derived from Latin, meaning “let it stand.” It is 
used most often to undo an editing change. 
577. Justice White, Draft Dissent Four 5, 8 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) 
(Mar. 29, 1985) (with handwritten notes from Justice White) (on file with the White Papers, Library 
of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
578. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Concurrence One 1 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc.) (May 23, 1985) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
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modest suggestions,579 however, Burger attempted to explain himself at 
greater length. He reiterated his dissatisfaction with Gertz but explained 
that it “is now the law of the land, and until it is overruled, it must, under 
the principle of stare decisis, be applied by this Court.”580 Accordingly, 
Burger pronounced his agreement with Powell “to the extent that it holds 
that Gertz is inapplicable in this case.”581 Nevertheless, Burger 
emphasized, he agreed with White that “Gertz should be overruled” as 
well as with his general “observations concerning New York Times v. 
Sullivan.”582 He then took the opportunity to endeavor to rewrite the 
actual malice standard itself, declaring that “since New York Times 
equates ‘reckless disregard of the truth’ with malice, this should permit a 
jury instruction that malice may be found if the defendant is shown to 
have published defamatory material which, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, would have been revealed as untrue.”583 He added that: 
If this is not what New York Times v. Sullivan means, I agree 
with JUSTICE WHITE that it should be reexamined. The great 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment carry with them 
certain responsibilities. 
  Consideration of these issues inevitably recalls the aphorism 
of journalism attributed to the late Roy Howard that, “too much 
checking on the facts has ruined many a good news story.”584 
Powell and his clerk remained perplexed by Burger’s approach and 
strategy. “I honestly can’t see why he doesn’t join us,” the clerk wrote 
by hand on Powell’s copy of Burger’s opinion, to which the Justice 
added, “I agree.”585 Still, Powell’s attentions remained focused on 
Brennan and, on May 27, he wrote to Brennan, somewhat curtly, that he 
                                                     
579. See supra note 542 and accompanying text. 
580. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Concurrence One, supra note 578, at 1. 
581. Id. at 2 
582. Id.  
583. Id. The Court had specifically repudiated this view in Connaughton. See Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989) (“Today, there is no question that public 
figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the professional 
standards rule, which never commanded a majority of this Court.”).  
584. Id. On June 17, 1985, Burger revised the beginning of this passage from “If this is not what 
New York Times v. Sullivan means” to “But since the Court has not applied the literal language of 
New York Times in this way.” Chief Justice Burger, Draft Concurrence Two 2 (Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.) (June 17, 1985) (on file with the Powell Papers, Washington and 
Lee Law Library), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. The 
impetus for Burger’s acknowledgement that his preferred reading of Sullivan is not the law remains 
unclear.  
585. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Concurrence One, supra note 578, at 1 (with handwritten notes 
from Daniel Ortiz and Justice Powell). 
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would “probably make some response to your 23-page dissenting 
opinion, and it may take me a while to do this.”586 
E.  And in the End 
On June 19, 1985, after clearing it with O’Connor and Rehnquist, 
Powell circulated his own revised opinion. In it, he added three footnotes 
rebutting specific points in the Brennan dissent. Most notably, in 
footnote four, he took on the troublesome contradiction Brennan had 
noted between the plurality opinion and Gertz, implementing the 
strategy he had developed with his clerk and explaining that “[g]iven the 
context of Gertz,” the holding in that case rightly applied only “in cases 
involving public speech.”587 And, in footnote seven, he added his 
hypothetical treatment of the “woman of impeccable character.”588 
The following day, White wrote to Powell and the Conference to 
advise them that, having reviewed the latest drafts, he would only be 
adding the following “two sentences” to his own opinion: 
A legislative solution to the damages problem would also be 
appropriate. Moreover, since libel plaintiffs are very likely more 
interested in clearing their names than in damages, I doubt that 
limiting recoveries would deter or be unfair to them.589 
With these changes, White asserted, “I see no reason why the case 
                                                     
586. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (May 27, 1985) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
587. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion Four 7 n.4 (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc.) (June 19, 1985) (on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) 
(on file with the Washington Law Review) (emphasis in original). 
588. Id. at 11 n.7. Powell did not, however, add an additional footnote drafted by his clerk 
because he had “some doubt as to [its] advisability,” considered it “marginal,” and was “not sure 
whether this would trouble WHR and SOC.” Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell 1, 
5 (June 13, 1985) (with handwritten notes from Justice Powell) (on file with the Powell Papers, 
Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. Specifically, the clerk had proposed 
taking on, albeit subtly, White’s conclusions with respect to the liability standard, see supra note 
573 and accompanying text: 
  Because negligence was shown at trial, we do not consider the extent to which Gertz’s fault 
requirement applies to libels involving no matter of public concern. Like damages rules, 
liability standards are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., New York Times Co v. Sullivan. They do, however, involve somewhat different concerns 
and we indicate no opinion today on how these competing interests balance under Gertz. 
Memorandum from Daniel Ortiz for Justice Powell, supra note 588, at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
589. Letter from Justice White to Justice Powell and the Conference (June 20, 1985) (on file with 
White Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
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cannot be scheduled to come down next week.”590 
The decision was finally announced on June 26, 1985. In so doing, 
Powell told the gallery in the courtroom that, unlike the Court’s prior 
defamation cases: 
[T]he suit today—by a private party—involves only a matter of 
private interest to the parties. In a word, this is a typical common 
law libel suit. A majority of the Court declines to 
constitutionalize the entire law of libel. 
  Accordingly the judgment of the Vermont Supreme Court is 
affirmed. There is, however, no Court opinion.591 
From Justice Brennan’s perspective, this last sentence read aloud by 
Justice Powell was undoubtedly the most significant. In the end, there 
was “no Court opinion” that restricted Sullivan and Gertz to suits 
brought against media defendants, there was “no Court opinion” placing 
speech about matters not deemed to be of “public concern” entirely 
outside the reach of the First Amendment and, most importantly, there 
was “no Court opinion” questioning, much less overruling, the 
constitutional balance struck in Sullivan itself. After two years of 
ideological combat on all of these fronts, Brennan could rightfully 
declare this at least a small victory. 
Indeed, in the three decades since the Court decided Greenmoss 
Builders, the constitutional balance struck by Brennan in Sullivan has 
survived largely intact. Despite White’s hostility to both its analytical 
underpinnings and the definitional balance it struck, Sullivan has since 
been reaffirmed on multiple occasions, and often in stirring terms.592 
Moreover, despite the disagreements and machinations that 
characterized its deliberations in Greenmoss Builders, the Court now 
appears largely content with the shape of the constitutional law of 
defamation it crafted in Sullivan and Gertz. Not only has it not heeded 
                                                     
590. Id. 
591. Justice Powell, typewritten statement of bench announcement 2 (June 24, 1985) (with 
handwritten note, author unknown, stating, “As handed down 6/26”) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355.  
592. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“Freedoms of 
expression require ‘breathing space.’ This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that 
allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the 
statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.”) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (reaffirming “our ‘profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’”) (quoting Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 270); see also Levine & Wermiel, supra note 11, at 45 (describing Brennan’s enduring 
influence).   
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White’s and Burger’s call to revisit those decisions, it has not deemed it 
necessary to consider a defamation case on its merits in more than two 
decades. As the fiftieth anniversary of the Court’s decision in Sullivan 
approaches, therefore, the import of Greenmoss Builders appears to be 
that, in the end, it preserved—albeit without fanfare—a fundamental 
tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence at a point in history when it very 
much remained vulnerable. 
EPILOGUE 
On December 19, 1985, almost six months after the decision in 
Greenmoss Builders was announced, Burger wrote to the Conference to 
explain that he was revising the last sentence of his own opinion to 
“accommodate a request of the estate of Roy Howard.”593 Burger’s 
opinion now concluded with the otherwise unattributed “aphorism of 
journalism that ‘too much checking on the facts has ruined many a good 
news story.’”594 Apparently, Mr. Howard had never said any such thing. 
To the contrary, Howard was the author of the much quoted “Editor’s 
Creed,”595 taken from a letter he had written to a disgruntled reader of 
one of his newspapers in which he explained that journalism’s mission is 
to “insure to readers the fullest possible access to the truth and the 
greatest possible divergency of viewpoint.”596 It is not known whether 
the irony of the Chief Justice’s publication of such a defamatory 
falsehood, which, as he put it, “in the exercise of reasonable care, would 
have been revealed as untrue,”597 was ever called to his attention. 
 
                                                     
593. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference (Dec. 19, 1985) (on file with the 
Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the Washington Law 
Review). 
594. Id. 
595. The description “Editor’s Creed” is used in the biographical sketch of Roy W. Howard that 
accompanies the archives of his personal papers at the University of Indiana at Bloomington School 
of Journalism. For the biographical sketch, see About Roy W. Howard, IND. U. SCHOOL 
JOURNALISM, http://journalism.indiana.edu/resources/royhoward/about-roy-w-howard/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2013). 
596. The Roy W. Howard Archive includes a copy of the letter, later referred to as the “Editor’s 
Creed,” published on what is labeled simply as the Editorial Page of the New York World-Telegram 
& Sun on October 27, 1950, under the headline, “Freedom of Opinion: A Letter from a Reader and 
the Editor’s Reply.” 
597. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Concurrence One, supra note 578, at 2. 
